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In the mid-2000s, the World Bank and other international institutions endorsed financial 
inclusion (FI) and microcredit as important development tools for reducing poverty and income 
inequality in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Whereas microcredit programs have 
been widely criticised as a development strategy, FI lacks similar scrutiny. This thesis aims at 
closing this gap using mixed methods. Overall, our results suggest that FI is unlikely to reduce 
poverty and income inequality in LMICs. Instead, it may lead to over-indebtedness, especially 
of informal workers. 
We first undertake a rigorous inquiry into the conceptual basis of FI. Chapter 2 systematically 
examines 67 studies and offers a new definition of FI, clarifying its objectives, elements and 
the nature of financial intermediaries. We find that the dominant definitions of FI are based on 
mainstream hypotheses that neglect the macroeconomic particularities of LMICs.  
Chapter 3 aims to overcome this shortcoming by examining the macroeconomic conditions that 
shape FI in LMICs utilising hypothesis from the Post-Keynesian approach. This chapter 
develops a model of the relationship between individuals and financial institutions and 
incorporates power mechanisms, such as social shame, that underlie FI processes in LMICs. 
Chapters 4-6 present mixed-method empirical evidence on the relationship between FI, poverty 
and income inequality. Chapter 4 reports on a case study in Brazil comprising 30 interviews 
with low-income individuals. Chapter 5 utilises microdata from 451,372 individuals to create 
a multi-dimensional index of FI using multiple correspondence analysis. Finally, Chapter 6 
employs this new index to econometrically estimate the effects of FI, poverty and income 
inequality, and to investigate causal relationships. Our findings indicate that poverty reduces 
the level of FI, but that FI presents no robust effects on poverty. 
In sum, this thesis provides a rigorous conceptualisation of FI and makes theoretical and 
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1.1 Introduction and motivation 
Financial inclusion (FI) emerged as a crucial component of economic development policy in 
the economic development literature in the mid-2000s, pushed by initiatives from international 
institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United 
Nations (UN), as well as by governments and private financial institutions. The idea of 
reducing poverty by fostering the expansion of formal financial services to the poor had 
originated with the creation and expansion of microcredit programs some years before. After  
in-depth studies had confirmed the minimal or even adverse impact of microcredit on poverty 
reduction (Duvendack et al., 2011; Bateman and Chang, 2012; Roodman and Morduch, 2014; 
Banerjee, Karlan, et al., 2015), FI emerged as a replacement policy (Bateman, 2014; Mader, 
2018). Figure 1.1 illustrates this changing policy focus by recording the shift in the frequency 
of topic word searches for ‘financial inclusion’ and ‘microcredit’ before and after  2011.  
 
















While the mainstream and heterodox literatures on microcredit have reached consensus on its 
limits in achieving poverty reduction on the basis of an extensive set of research studies, FI has 
not been exposed to a similar level of detailed scrutiny. To the contrary, mainstream studies 
have validated the claim that FI is able to reduce poverty and income inequality despite the 
absence of a thorough conceptual and theoretical consideration of this process, and of robust 
evidence about its effectiveness. This thesis therefore challenges these premature conclusions  
by developing a clear conceptual approach to defining FI, by exploring its theoretical basis,  
and by presenting empirical evidence about the relationship between FI, poverty and income 
inequality. 
It will be helpful to briefly state some of our key conclusions. First, the concept of FI is not 
consistently used in the mainstrem literature, which causes different interpretations and policy 
recommendations. Definitions range from “use of formal accounts” (Allen et al., 2016, p.1) to 
lengthy ones that include a variety of financial instruments and purposes of FI (Alonso et al., 
2013; Roa, 2013; Chakravarty and Pal, 2013; Güngen, 2018).1 Such studies often define FI 
based on data availability, not through an exercise on the fundamentals of the policy. Thus, 
policymaking can become diffused and may not reach its proposed development objectives. In 
this thesis, we start Chapter 2 by conducting an extended literature review on the concept of FI 
and discussing the theories that underlie such definitions. We conclude that further discussion 
must be provided in order to address missing aspects of FI, in particular when addressing low-
income individuals. 
Second, no theoretical basis has been established for how the different financial instruments of 
FI can work together to reduce poverty and income inequality. Yet, studies of FI make use of 
underlying theoretical paradigms that do affect the basis of their investigation and conclusions. 
Studies grounded on neoclassical and New Keynesian theories claim that FI reduces poverty 
and income inequality by boosting human capital and transferring the savings from the rich to 
the income-constrained poor entrepreneur. Focusing on the imperfections of financial markets’ 
supply-side, these studies address how barriers, such as a highly bureaucratic government, can 
be overcome to include poor individuals into the formal financial system. The demand-side is 
sometimes addressed but focuses on individuals’ lack of financial education, not on the roots 
of demand for financial services (Camara and Tuesta, 2014; World Bank, 2014; Ulwodi and 
Muriu, 2017; Klapper and Singer, 2017).  
 
1 Full definitions in Appendix A (Table A.1). 
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However, according to the World Bank Findex, reported barriers to FI are mostly related to a 
lack of income.2 In Table 1.1, lack of money, followed by the price, are considered the main 
obstacle to owning a bank account. This outcome is understandable as income-constrained 
individuals may perceive financial services’ fees to be too costly. In turn, they may prefer 
allocating their income to more essential services and goods, such as food, housing and health 
care. 
 
Table 1.1. Reasons for not having an account at a financial institution (%) 
Reason 2011 2014 2017 
Lack of money 68.15 65.96 64.63 
Price  26.10 28.50 29.99 
No need N/A 29.34 28.17 
Documentation  20.13 19.40 21.63 
Distance 19.80 22.07 20.86 
Lack of trust 17.25 16.27 18.65 
Family member has one 13.93 14.85 18.16 
Impossibility N/A 22.56 N/A 
Religion 5.70 7.44 6.87 
Source: World Bank Findex database 
 
In order to address such limitations in the mainstream FI literature, this thesis integrates 
hypothesis from the Post-Keynesian literature and develops a game-theoretical model with the 
presence of power in Chapter 3. We argue that, in fact, there are some supply constraints to the 
poor in accessing financial services, but those arise from macroeconomic structures, such as 
the high interest rates in low- and middle income countries due to their positions in the currency 
hierarchy and the monopoly power of banks. At the same time, we acknowledge the demand 
side of FI, which consists on not only having enough income to use such services, but also 
depends on a constant income source. Thus, in this thesis, we argue that formal employment is 
indispensable to promote FI, as the unemployed and informal workers have a reduced need for 
formal financial services. Moreover, because of the irregular income stream, informal workers 
may avoid financial services to prevent over-indebtedness. 
 
2 The World Bank Findex dataset surveyed around 500,000 individuals in more than 140 countries for three 
years. According to the study, 52.70%, 43.82% and 40.02% of the world population were unbanked in 2011, 
2014 and 2017 respectively. More on https://globalfindex.worldbank.org/. 
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The survey also sheds light on the causal relationship between poverty, income inequality and 
FI. The mainstream literature suggests that FI reduces poverty and income inequality. 
However, the empirical evidence establishing financial services as important instruments for 
achieving poverty alleviation and meeting development goals is not solid. Instead, “the effects 
vary, are often mixed, and appear not to be transformative in scope or scale, as they largely 
occur in the early stages of the causal chain of effects” (Duvendack and Mader, 2019, p.7). 
In turn, we propose a reverse causal relationship:a reduction in poverty and income inequality 
may boost FI and, depending on certain loan conditions, FI may increase poverty but also 
income inequality, as the income of the poor may shift to the rentiers through financial 
expropriation (Lapavitsas, 2009). This thesis contributes to the evaluation of FI policy by using 
both quantitative and qualitative methods to grasp different aspects of FI. In our qualitative 
interviews in Chapter 4, we find evidence of the negative effects of FI on income, as well as a 
lack of demand for financial services for those who are informal workers or unemployed. In 
our econometrics estimations in Chapter 6, we address such simultaneity bias which is 
currently overlooked in the literature and find that poverty does reduce the level of FI. 
However, we are unable to find robust results on the effects of FI on poverty and income 
inequality. Therefore, we are unable to confirm such claims from mainstream development 
studies that FI reduces poverty and income inequality. 
Overall, this thesis proposes a new perspective on the relationship between FI, poverty and 
income inequality from a Post-Keynesian theoretical approach. Considering the structural 
differences between high-income countries (HICs) and low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs), the relationship between individuals and financial institutions, the multi-dimensional 
aspect of FI, and the causal relationship between FI, poverty and income inequality, we aim to 
clarify this complex policy in order to evaluate its effectiveness. 
 
1.2 Ontology and methodology 
The thesis is grounded in critical realist philosophy, an approach that is especially useful in 
evaluating complex phenomena. This philosophy’s ontological perspective, in contrast to the 
positivist and interpretativist approaches, considers reality to be unique (although perhaps 
unknown), and potentially subject to multiple interpretations. In fact, reality is understood as 
having different layers, from the most atomic reality to the most general one (Downward and 
Mearman, 2007; Zachariadis et al., 2013). Since FI is a complex policy that involves several 
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layers, critical realism provides a consistent method for uncovering the conflicting layers and 
interpretations of the effects of financial services on poverty alleviation and income inequality 
reduction. 
To lay the groundwork for our FI study, we start by untangling its definition in order to 
understand its underlying theories and purposes. Next, we analyse the macro- and 
microeconomic aspects of FI to relate the general to specific characteristics of the policy. As 
both levels of analysis are essential to understand the full reality, we first reflect on the 
macroeconomic structures that may constraint the effectiveness of FI in LMICs using 
hypothesis from a Post-Keynesian perspective. Second, utilising game theory modelling, we 
consider social structures and power relations between individuals and financial institutions. 
To uncover the different layers of FI, we employ retroduction reasoning. Retroduction moves 
from the level of the identified phenomenon to higher levels of analysis (Lawson, 1999). To 
develop a thesis consistent with retroduction, we utilise mixed-methods triangulation to reveal 
the multiple facets of such stratified ontology. Quantitative analysis can give us an overview 
of reality by yielding demi-regularities and unfolding mechanisms and tendencies. In turn, 
qualitative studies are essential to uncover underlying processes and structures that might not 
be captured by numbers (Fleetwood, 1999; Fleetwood, 2001; Downward and Mearman, 2007; 
Kaltenbrunner, 2018). 
Critical realism also influences our evaluation on the causal relationship between poverty, 
income inequality and FI. Unlike in the positivist approach, where A causes B, we consider the 
process and conditions under which A causes B, including why the data appear in a particular 
way (Olsen, 2007; Zachariadis et al., 2013; Elliot et al., 2016). We also investigate the potential 
simultaneous relationship between variables. In this context, mixed methods are also necessary 
as demi-regularities from quantitative analysis may not represent causal mechanisms in an open 
system. Thus, complementary qualitative research may inform the researcher on such causal 
relationships (Lawson, 2003; Chick and Dow, 2005; Downward and Mearman, 2007). 
Lastly, we consider that the structure of an economy is slowly transformed by economic and 
social events and its form and organisation depend on its history (Lee, 2002). So, it is expected 
that LMICs and HICs will have very distinct social and economic structures that will 
undermine a linear comparison. Therefore, this thesis makes a distinction between these 




1.3 Research questions 
From a Post-Keynesian theoretical approach and a critical realist philosophy, this thesis 
answers three research questions. The first research question targets the conceptual and 
theoretical fundamentals of FI, which currently do not address the influence of intra-country 
power relations when implementing FI policies in LMICs. Whereas we recognize the existence 
of power relations also between HICs and LMICs, the thesis will focus on the micro-level 
relationships between financial institutions and low-income individuals in order to answer the 
first research question, which is addressed in Chapter 3.  
 
RQ1: How do intra-country power relations affect financial inclusion in low and middle-
income countries? 
 
The second research question deepens the analysis by trying to establish which processes lead 
to the causal relationship between FI, poverty and income inequality. From a mainstream 
perspective, a lack of FI causes poverty and income inequality and, by implementing such 
policy, those social issues would be overcome. However, we suggest that the inverse 
relationship could be more dominant. In fact, those who are poor could be excluded from the 
formal financial system because there is a lack of need for such services, once they do not have 
the necessary income to demand for financial instruments. Thus, we examine if causality runs 
(i) from FI to poverty and income inequality, (ii) from poverty and income inequality to FI, or 
(iii) both. These relationships are investigated through both qualitative and quantitative 
research in Chapters 4 and 6. 
 
RQ2: What is the causal relationship between poverty, income inequality and financial 
inclusion? 
 
The final research question focuses on the effects of FI on poverty and income inequality, as 
we aim to provide sound evidence to contribute to policy design. Whereas the current 
mainstream literature indicates that FI reduces poverty and income inequality, we investigate 
such effects through the perception and experiences of our participants in Chapter 4 and an 




RQ3: What are the effects of financial inclusion on poverty and income inequality? 
 
By answering these three research questions through different methods, we aim understanding 
in depth the relationship between poverty, income inequality and FI, as well as uncovering 
mechanisms that explain their causal relation. The results are expected to stimulate a debate 
for implementation and resource allocation for poverty and income inequality reduction 
policies in LMICs. 
 
1.4 Contributions and structure of the thesis 
The thesis aims to deliver two contributions regarding the conceptualisation of FI and three 
empirical contributions building on such conceptual work. The two conceptual contributions 
regard the definition and the connection between the macro- and the microeconomic aspects of 
FI. First, due to its multi-dimensional characteristic, FI is often defined differently across the 
literature. Such variety may generate diverse interpretations on the meaning of FI and what it 
can achieve. To address this issue, Chapter 2 evaluates 67 studies through a systematic review 
method and discusses the underlying theories and data that led authors to particular definitions. 
Second, while FI is directed to individuals, macroeconomic conditions and market structure 
affect the policy’s potential success in LMICs. Grounded on the Post-Keynesian theory, 
Chapter 3 discusses such conditions and links them to the microeconomic aspects of FI. We 
focus on three main structural differences between LMICs and HICs. First, LMICs have lower 
quality currencies, which places them at the bottom of the currency hierarchy. Second, along 
with this subordinated position, high levels of bank concentration contribute to an increase in 
loans’ interest rate. Third, the high levels of informality in the labour market lead to persistent 
income shocks in individuals’ lives. Thus, in such an environment, FI may aggravate 
indebtedness among the poorest. Besides macroeconomic conditions, the relationship between 
individuals and financial institutions also shape the success of FI in LMICs. Through game 
modelling, we illustrate intra-country power mechanisms that lead individuals to be 
disadvantaged when entering in a relationship with for-profit financial institutions. In sum, we 
suggest that such macro- and microeconomic aspects must be acknowledged when designing 
FI policies in LMICs. 
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The three further contributions of this thesis are empirical. To address the causality and effects 
of FI on poverty and income inequality in LMICs, we provide a mixed-methods study divided 
into three chapters. First, Chapter 4 presents a mixed-method case study in Brazil. By analysing 
quantitative data and conducting semi-structured interviews, we confirm that employment 
status and interest rates are essential determinants of demand for formal financial services by 
the poor. Second, in Chapter 5, we construct the first multi-dimensional index of FI using the 
World Bank Findex microdata from more than 400,000 individuals worldwide for 2011, 2014 
and 2017. The index is then aggregated to establish a global ranking of FI. Finally, employing 
these country-level FI scores, we use econometric methods to estimate the simultaneous 
relationship between FI, poverty and income inequality in Chapter 6. This analysis confirms 
our hypothesis of striking differences between HICs and LMICs, besides the importance of 
formal employment and bank concentration. Furthermore, we conclude in Chapter 7 that 
poverty and income inequality are significant determinants of FI, but the policy does not 
display robust effects on poverty nor income inequality. 
Our findings challenge the claims made in the mainstream literature, cited above and in the 
pages that follow, that FI reduces poverty and income inequality. Furthermore, we suggest that 
poverty and income inequality are important causal factors of the demand for formal financial 
services, so that these issues should be addressed before pushing FI policies in LMICs. Finally, 















What is financial inclusion? 
 
Financial inclusion (FI) is a relatively new concept that, despite containing several aspects of 
microfinance, is supposed to relate to broader mechanisms of inclusion into the financial 
system. As we research mainstream literature more in-depth , we notice that the plurality of 
definitions of FI is often under-developed or unclear. This imprecision allows for different 
interpretations, in particular concerning who should be included in the financial system, who 
should intermediate this inclusion, and which services should be part of this process.  
To illustrate the inconsistency in the existing literature and the strong connection between FI 
and microcredit, we conduct a systematic literature review of 67 studies on FI definitions. Built 
on the systematic review approach, we select studies based on inclusion and exclusion criteria, 
as well as an explicit search strategy, thus providing a reliable outcome. After analysing the 
studies, we show the relation between the financial inclusion and financial development 
literature and critically discuss the underlying theoretical implications of selecting certain 
features to define FI, which has not been provided in the critical FI literature so far. This 
literature review enables us to understand better FI policies and how they have been designed.  
Using the mainstream literature, we highlight the key concepts of FI by generating an explicit 
definition of the policy. However, we notice that the mainstream literature still does not account 
for certain aspects of FI, in particular power relations, which is further developed in Chapter 3. 
 
2.1 Alternative definitions of financial inclusion 
Commonly defined as the access and usage of financial services, the definitions of FI are not 
uniform in the literature. Those range from very succinct definitions, such as in Allen et al. 
(2016: 1), where FI is described as “use of formal accounts” to extended ones such as in 
Chakravarty and Pal (2013), where FI is the act of removing barriers for the poor to access fair 
and low-cost financial services.3 The often imprecise and diverse definitions of FI may lead to 
different interpretations, which in turn creates complications for policy analysis and 
implementation. 
 
3 Full definitions in Appendix A (Table A.1). 
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Research on the exclusion of individuals from the formal financial system dates to the 1990s. 
“Financial exclusion” was brought into discussion by researchers who detected that individuals 
in peripheral neighbourhoods in high-income countries (HICs) were deprived of formal credit 
based on geographic or racial prejudices, despite disposing of collateral and regular income 
streams. Such studies focused on long-term credit with market rates provided by community 
development banks or community-based credit unions, so the individuals could invest in 
housing and businesses4 in order to generate wealth to themselves and their neighbourhood 
(Leyshon and Thrift, 1995; Dymski, 1995; Pollard, 1996; Dymski and Veitch, 1996). 
In contrast, the current mainstream literature on FI considers a broader range of financial 
services that are necessary in order to include poor individuals from low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) into the formal financial system. While these studies do not specify through 
which mechanisms FI as a whole would lift individuals from poverty, most of them focus on 
(micro)credit. This literature’s theoretical background is grounded on the financial 
development (FD) literature, in which increasing finance leads to economic growth, thus 
reducing poverty and income inequality in LMICs (Beck et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2007; 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008). More specifically, such studies utilise mathematical models, in 
which through investment in human capital or business, the poor are lifted out of poverty (Galor 
and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997). For example, 
Aghion e Bolton (1997, p.151) argue that “as more capital is accumulated in the economy more 
funds may be available to the poor for investment purposes. This in turn enable them to grow 
richer”. Furthermore, credit (but also savings and insurance) prevents individuals from falling 
into poverty during income shocks, thus smoothing consumption overtime (Chakravarty and 
Pal, 2013; Allen et al., 2016; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2017).  
This mainstream approach to FI overlooks, however, certain particularities of LMICs that could 
challenge such mathematical models, as has been pointed out by critical studies. First, the 
support for the expansion of informal microenterprises in LMICs does not acknowledge the 
saturation of markets for primary and craft goods, nor services such as hairdresser and clothes 
repair. This saturation pushes prices down, driving individuals to work longer hours while 
receiving lower earnings (Bateman and Chang, 2012; Bateman, 2014; Guérin et al., 2015). 
Second, the claim that the poor are “repressed” entrepreneurs does not take into account that 
these individuals may lack specialized skills or have insufficient capital to increase low levels 
 
4 Business in the financial exclusion literature is defined as a formal enterprise, not agricultural or craft goods 
that are sold in the informal market. 
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of productivity (Taylor, 2012). Therefore, promoting increasing finance to low-income 
individuals in LMICs must acknowledge the labour market structure difference between these 
and HICs.  
On the empirical level, there is limited evidence that FI can reduce poverty. A systematic 
analysis of the impact of FI in LMICs from  Duvendack e Mader (2019, p.12) found that 
“findings across the reviews were heterogenous and often inconsistent, both within and across 
reviews, and many reviews did not find evidence of expected or presumed impacts”, which 
suggests that positive results are “unreliable and/or context-dependent”. In turn, further 
research has found that FI can have negative effects on income due to over-indebtedness 
(Dattasharma et al., 2016; Kaffenberger and Totolo, 2018), similarly to evidence on 
microfinance (Schicks, 2014; Mutsonziwa and Fanta, 2019). 
The theoretical and empirical resemblances between microfinance and FI has led to the claim 
that the latter is a mere rebranding of the former (Bateman, 2014; Mader, 2018). FI, however, 
is set to be broader than microfinance, which creates hardship in developing a clear concept. 
Based on the systematic review method, this chapter investigates 162 studies in order to 
compare the existing definitions of FI and untangle their underlying theoretical foundation. It 
also scrutinises these definitions in order to answer three questions: (i) Who is the subject of 
inclusion?; (ii) Who will include them?; and (iii) What are the necessary financial instruments 
to achieve this inclusion? 
 
2.2 Method 
The systematic review method is commonly used to assess the impact evaluation in  
international development studies. The review should include a clear research question, a 
reproducible search strategy, inclusion criteria, screening methods, critical appraisal of the 
quality of included studies and information about that analysis that allows for reproducibility 
(Krnic Martinic et al., 2019). 
In this section, the systematic review method provides a framework to extract and analyse 
information using a reliable and reproducible process. We reduce the research output bias by 
providing specifications on (i) wording, (ii) type of study, (iii) period, (iv) selected languages 
and (v) search platforms. We follow these five criteria using the guidelines from Snilstveit et 




2.2.1 The selection criteria 
First, the criteria of inclusion and exclusion of selected studies were established based on the 
wording they use. We include studies that display the precise expression “financial inclusion”, 
but not its variations, such as “financial exclusion”, “financial access” or “banking”. This first 
step is essential as we aim to investigate the specific group of studies that conceptualise FI 
using FD as a theoretical foundation. 
Second, we add criteria based on the type of study. We only review studies that are publicly 
available and are peer-review journal publications, books, institutional working papers, or 
institutional reports. Institutional reports and working papers are essential for this investigation, 
as international institutions, in particular the World Bank, are strong advocates of FI policies. 
Third, we only select studies that were published between 2000 and 2018. As we focus on the 
mainstream literature on FI and its criticisms, this time frame reduces the likelihood of 
reviewing a definition that does not fit into our framework. 
Fourth, we search in four different languages (English, Portuguese, Spanish and French) in 
order to reduce the language bias. Non-English definitions were translated in order to assure 
comparability. 
Fifth, we select three search platforms in order to reduce the selection bias: Google Scholar, 
EconLit and Web of Science. Studies have also been added through the snowballing method, 
as it identifies key studies that may not be considered relevant by the search platforms. Through 
this method, we review the reference list of the primary studies and include the most common 
references. 
 
2.2.2 The selection process 
To evaluate the selected definitions, we follow the four steps of a systematic review, which 
includes the identification of the literature, screening of selected studies, eligibility of selected 
studies based on criteria mentioned above and inclusion of studies in the final review 
(Waddington et al., 2012). Results are displayed in Figure 2.1. 
In the first step, we identify 162 studies. These studies were selected as follows: (i) the first 50 
results in English in Google Scholar; (ii) the first 10 results in Portuguese, Spanish and French 
in Google Scholar; (iii) the first 20 outcomes in English EconLit; (iv) the first 20 studies in 
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English in the Web of Science5; and (v) the 42 most relevant studies mentioned in the primary 
selection that had not been displayed by search engines.6 
The screening of identified studies reduced their number from 162 to 118. This procedure was 
conducted in two stages. First, we removed 22 studies classified as duplicates and outdated 
versions.7 Second, we followed the above-established criteria according to publication type, 
publication year and public availability. Sixteen studies were excluded for not being peer-
reviewed publications, books, institutional working papers or institutional reports. These were 
in their majority conference papers or magazine articles. One further study was excluded as it 
was published in 1998, and it was out of the scope of targeted studies on FI. Lastly, five studies 
were withdrawn as their full versions were not publicly available. 
The eligibility step analysed how the selected studies defined FI. Here, 51 studies were 
disqualified for two reasons. First, 15 of them had indirect definitions, such as in Camara and 
Tuesta (2014) where the FI is not explicitly defined.8 Second, 36 studies did not define FI 
whatsoever, despite analysing some aspect of what is understood to be FI, such as loans or 
mobile money, as in Allen et al. (2014) and World Bank (2012). 
Finally, these three steps reduced the research to 67 studies in which FI was clearly defined. 
These studies included simple definitions, such as “the proportion of individuals and firms that 
use financial services” (World Bank, 2014, p.1) and “households’ access to and use of financial 
services” (Anzoategui et al., 2014, p.338), to lengthy definitions as  
“financial inclusion is defined as a process which brings different sections of people 
under a single roof of financial system, especially people in very low-income brackets, the poor 
and the marginalized sections including migrants and makes them access the basic financial 
services. These services include not only banking products but also other products such as 




5 Neither EconLit nor Web of Science had results in languages other than English, reason why we only perform 
research in this language. 
6 When using the search engines, the studies were displayed by relevance. 
7 When papers had both working paper and journal publication versions, only the latter was selected. 
8 The study claims that “the concept of financial inclusion goes beyond single indicators, such as percentage of 
bank accounts and loans and number of automated teller machines (ATMs) and branches” (Camara and Tuesta 
2014: 2) but does not provide an alternative definition. 
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Note: Diagram based on Waddington et al. (2012). 
 
2.2.3 The data adjustment 
In the last step, we adjusted the included definitions. This transformation comprised five stages. 
First, nine non-English studies were translated (four in Spanish, three in French, and two in 
Portuguese). Second, only words that were at least four characters were selected, in order to 
prevent the inclusion of words such as “can” and “etc”. Third, we removed stopwords (such as 
“about”, “before” or “could”), as well as other words that did not contribute to understanding 
the definition of FI.9 Fourth, stemmed words were clustered, that is, words that had the same 
 
9 These are: “financial”, “inclusion”, “defined”, “definition”, “defines”, “define”, “describes”, “refers”, “means”, 
































120 studies identified through 
searching engines 42 records identified by snowballing 
18 duplicates and 4 outdated versions were removed 
140 records screened 
16 records excluded based on publication 
type and 1 on publication year 
5 full text not available 
118 full texts assessed for 
eligibility 
51 full texts excluded: 15 indirect 
definitions and 36 undefined 
67 studies included: 49 journal articles, 16 working papers and 2 reports 
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root, such as “banking”, “bank”, “banked” and “banks” were grouped. Lastly, only the top 100 
words were selected. 
 
2.3 Results and discussion 
After transforming the data, we analyse the word frequency of the 67 studies that define FI. 
Results are displayed in Figure 2.2. “Service” and its variations10 have been mentioned 76 
times, reaching the highest frequency in our dataset. Next, “access” and related words, such as 
accessibility and accessible, have been mentioned 63 times. In third place, we find “formal” 
with 29 references. 
 
Figure 2.2: Frequency of word usage in the definition of financial inclusion in 67 studies11 
 
While the word frequency is informative, further analysis must be conducted to understand the 
underlying meaning of each choice of words. Based on the most commonly used words, we 
see that a possible general definition of FI could be “the access and usage of affordable formal 
banking services by people”. This definition, however, does not fully explain our main 
questions, that is, (i) who is the subject of inclusion?; (ii) who will include them?; and (iii) what 
 
10 “Service”, “services”, “services’”. 
11 The frequency of top 100 words can be seen in Appendix A (Table A.2). Some studies use more than one 
definition, so there are more occurrences of certain terms than the number of selected studies. 


















are the necessary services to achieve this inclusion? To answer these, we scrutinise the 
terminology to define FI by critically assessing the choice of phrasing. We also relate these to 
mainstream theoretical foundations, such as the human capital and life-cycle hypothesis.   
 
2.3.1 The subject of financial inclusion 
Several studies are not clear about who is the subject of FI: is it the individual, the household, 
the poor, or small and medium enterprises (SMEs)? The most frequent reference to the 
financially included is “people”, which appears in the 12th position with 12 mentions. 
Subsequently, we find other terminologies: groups (14th), population (20th), individuals (22nd), 
poor (23rd), consumer (25th), firms (27th), households (28th), society (29th), members (34th), 
adults (43rd), clients (44th), disadvantaged (52nd), and customers (68th).  
While the top terms are quite broad and prevent a precise understanding of the financially 
included agent, others enable us to discuss the different approaches to the subject of FI, as we 
have “individuals” with nine references, followed by “firms” and “households” with eight 
mentions each.  
However, despite narrowing down the main agents, the literature is still not consistent with 
respect to who should be included. Some studies define FI as the inclusion of only firms 
(Chauvet and Jacolin, 2017), only individuals (Fan and Zhang, 2017), only households (Dev, 
2006; Anzoategui et al., 2014), individuals and firms (Amidžić et al., 2014; World Bank, 2014; 
Moncayo and Reis, 2016; Rastogi and E., 2018), or households and firms (Morgan and 
Pontines, 2018; Gopalan and Rajan, 2018). The decision on agency seems, however, mostly 
related to the empirical research of the study. Based on data availability, the studies define FI 
as the inclusion of individuals, firms or households. Yet, if we want to understand FI, we must 
initially assess the implications of selecting a particular FI agent. 
Firms are often overlooked on empirical analyses of FI (Karpowicz, 2016; Fan and Zhang, 
2017; Morgan and Pontines, 2018). This approach is reasonable as the need of credit by firms 
for investment has been long discussed in the literature, unlike finance to households 
(Schumpeter, 1934; King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997; Khan and Senhadji, 2000). Firms 
and households, however, present essential differences that must be highlighted in order to 
understand the role finance plays in including each agent. 
First, firms can be considered creditworthy as they have collateral (physical space, stock, 
machinery), which distinguish them from households, especially poor ones. In fact, one key 
28 
 
innovation of microfinance institutions (MFIs) was to accept social collateral or non-standard 
assets (such as cattle) as collateral, which allowed poor households to receive credit (Besley 
and Coate, 1995; Postelnicu et al., 2014). Therefore, uncollateralized loans to households are 
riskier and imply worse contract conditions, which may have negative effects on households’ 
well-being. 
Second, the use of credit is distinct in firms and households. Firms use credit for investment, 
which may generate profits and, even with high interest rates, may enable repayment. 
Households, in turn, often need credit for consumption purposes.12 Therefore, households may 
be unable to repay the loan and be forced to make sacrifices, such as cutting on food (Schicks, 
2014; Afonso et al., 2017; Kaffenberger and Totolo, 2018). As such, we should not mix firms 
and households. 
According to the mainstream literature on FI, nonetheless, households also act like firms when 
they “invest” in themselves. Based on the human capital hypothesis (Becker, 1962), it is 
considered that individuals who invest in education, for instance, will have higher returns in 
the future, as this investment has high marginal productivity (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008; 
World Bank, 2014). This hypothesis disregards, however, several aspects of this type of credit. 
One is that children need several years of education before entering the labour market. 
Therefore, their parents will be indebted until children are old enough to earn the returns of 
such “investment”. Second, high returns from education require a well-established formal 
labour market in which education levels may have a positive effect on wages. This is not the 
case of many LMICs. Informal employment reaches 85.8% in Africa, 68.2% in Asia and the 
Pacific, 68.6% in the Arab States and 40% in the Americas (ILO, 2018a). Therefore, the pilling 
debt for education purposes may lead households into over-indebtedness.13 
The mainstream literature also considers self-employed workers as firms (“entrepreneurs”) 
(World Bank, 2014; Fungáčová and Weill, 2015; Allen et al., 2016). This approach stems from 
the FD literature, where the entrepreneur is a necessary tool for economic growth (King and 
Levine, 1993), and even rural self-employed workers are considered entrepreneurs (McKinnon, 
1973). This association is particularly important in LMICs, where the labour market is 
characterised by the strong presence of rural and self-employed labour (ILO, 2018b), but can 
be harmful to development. By assuming that individuals are potential entrepreneurs that only 
 
12 We assume that households who purchase houses will live in them, so the final purpose is consumption. 
13 Further criticisms on the human capital theory can be found in Bowles & Gintis (1975) and Fleming (2017). 
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lack necessary funding, these studies overlook the fact that many do not have specialised skills 
and face highly competitive markets, which would prevent most businesses to thrive and may 
push prices down (Kalpana, 2005; Bateman and Chang, 2012; Taylor, 2012). Thus, as credit 
for consumption, investment loans to self-employed workers may also lead to over-
indebtedness, as shown in the microcredit literature (Bateman, 2012; Schicks, 2014). 
Stepping aside from the differences between firms and households, we now focus on 
households and individuals. Whereas “people”, “groups” and “population” are the most 
common agents of FI according to our review, these are not precise enough for economic 
analysis. Hence, we focus on “individuals” and “households”. Nevertheless, choosing between 
these two needs to be done purposefully as they present distinct characteristics. 
The majority of studies that selected households as the unit of analysis did so due to data 
availability, such as when the national database only displays information on the household 
level (e.g. Dev, 2006; Anzoategui, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez Pería, 2014; Ehrmann and 
Ampudia, 2017). Meanwhile, other studies explicitly define individuals as the subject of FI 
(Amidžić et al., 2014; Fan and Zhang, 2017), even when acknowledging the particularities of 
the household level (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015; dos Santos and Harvold Kvangraven, 2017; 
Tambunlertchai, 2018). 
Choosing individuals over households seems reasonable, as the proclaimed goal of FI is to 
include everyone into the financial system. Despite household dynamics that could affect the 
inclusion of specific individuals, FI policy does not target merely a representative of the 
household. Despite certain critics of how neoclassical economics considers the centrality of 
individuals, analyses on the individual level remain fundamental. As our social world values 
individuals, using them as the subject of normative and scientific concern is necessary to 
economics as a science (Davis, 2003; Davis, 2010). Considering gender disparities within the 
household as an example, we understand the importance of the individual-level analysis. If a 
woman within the household does not have access to banking either because her partner already 
owns an account or he does not allow her to access the formal financial system, she would still 
be considered financially excluded.  
Similarly, services that are used by the household, such as loans for children’s education, are 
still provided to a single individual. Evidence shows that there are more systemic barriers to 
women than men, despite women’s marital status (Agier and Szafarz, 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al., 2013; Safavian and Haq, 2013). Therefore, women within the household could still be 
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considered financially excluded, even if her husband would be able to acquire formal financial 
services. Therefore, for FI, the individual should be the subject of analysis. 
We notice the striking differences between firms, households and individuals. In light of the 
discussion, this thesis considers that firms, by their distinct nature, should not be considered an 
subject of FI along with individuals or households. Moreover, we consider that the individual, 
not the household, should be the subject of FI, as the main objective of the policy is on the 
individual-level inclusion. 
 
2.3.2 The intermediaries of financial inclusion 
The second question relates to what type of institution will include individuals in the financial 
system. The discussion on the intermediaries is meaningful as for-profit and non-profit 
financial institutions may lead to different effects. Few of the 67 investigated studies define 
clearly the nature of financial institutions. Okello Candiya Bongomin, Munene, Ntayi, et al. 
(2018, p.831), for instance, refers to “responsible and sustainable financial institutions”, but do 
not clarify what is meant by “responsible” and “sustainable”. The most specific account is 
given by Morvant-Roux et al. (2010) who includes formal banks, financial cooperatives and 
MFIs in the definition of FI. 
Throughout the studies, it is possible to identify that most studies implicitly consider only the 
private banking system (and sometimes the so-called fintech14 firms) to be the optimal 
intermediary of FI. In turn, the state should only have a regulatory role and support FI by 
providing government transfers through digital payments (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2013; 
Zulkhibri, 2016; Wang and Guan, 2017). Explicitly, the World Bank (2014, p.3) affirms that 
“the focus of public policy should be on addressing market failures” as “direct government 
interventions – such as […] lending through state-owned banks – tend to be politicized and less 
successful, particularly in weak institutional environments”.  
However, there is a central issue in promoting market-driven FI, which is not addressed in the 
mainstream literature. For-profit lenders are not driven by development goals, thus will be 
unlikely to change business from profitable credit for consumption purposes to individuals to 
 
14 Fintech refers to financial products that use technology to distinguish themselves from traditional financial 
services. For instance, mobile money is seen as a fintech innovation as it uses mobiles to store and transfer 
money without using the traditional banking system. An interesting critical account on the development of 
fintech-led FI can be found in Gabor and Brooks (2017). 
31 
 
transformative investment projects (dos Santos and Harvold Kvangraven, 2017). In fact, 
microfinance has been very profitable for private financial institutions, even if it leads the poor 
into over-indebtedness and wealth destitution (Bateman and Chang, 2012; Guérin et al., 2013; 
Ghosh, 2013; Güngen, 2018). Thus, for-profit FI may not lead to poverty and income inequality 
reduction. 
Likewise, fintech firms are for-profit corporations. Initially focusing on payments, these firms 
have also developed microloans systems through mobile phones, for instance. Case studies 
showed their potential harm, including aggravating poverty. In Kenya, for example, money 
withdrawal fees (around £0.21) can be burdensome to the poor as it costs the same as half of a 
kilo of corn (Johnson, 2016a). Fintech loans have also increase indebtedness both in Kenya 
and Tanzania, with 20% and 9% of borrowers, respectively, reporting to reduce food 
consumption in order to repay loans (Kaffenberger and Totolo, 2018). Therefore, both types of 
financial institutions may have adverse effects on development goals. 
This discussion leads us to our final consideration on this topic. Several of the studies define 
FI as the ability to access affordable financial services (e.g. Gupte, Venkataramani and Gupta, 
2012; Mohieldin et al., 2012; Atkinson and Messy, 2013; Kim, 2016). At the same time, 
financial institutions must maintain a “sustainable” business, which implies the absence of 
subsidies (Kim, 2016; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2017; Okello Candiya Bongomin, Munene, 
Mpeera Ntayi, et al., 2018). As discussed in Guérin and Kumar (2017: 742), “subsidies have 
been presented as too limited and uncertain, and as sources of interference, dependency and 
market ‘distortion’ […], which in great part explains the market shift that has occurred over 
the last decade”. This means that the financial institution must charge fees and rates compatible 
with clients’ riskiness, besides their profitability goals. Individuals with lack of collateral and 
irregular income stream, such as informal workers, represent a high risk as they may default 
on loans or make more frequent insurance claims. Aiming at profit maximisation, private 
financial institutions will set high prices for these clients and, without subsidies, have no 
incentives to provide free or low-cost services. Thus, in LMICs, where credit market might not 
be competitive due to bank concentration and limited financial infra-structure, an affordable FI 
provided by a sustainable for-profit financial institution seems unlikely. 
Bearing these aspects in mind, we consider that mainstream FI policies promote the increase 
of the importance of for-profit financial institutions. As such, this characteristic must be evident 
in the definition of FI, as it shapes the goals and prices of financial services. 
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2.3.3 The elements of financial inclusion 
As the subject and the intermediaries of FI, elements in the literature on FI are also not very 
clearly defined. In the examined definitions, few studies explain which elements are essential 
or how extensive the use of each element must be for an agent to be considered financially 
included. The majority of studies use broad terms, such as “banking services” or “financial 
access”. If the research is empirical, the definition may contain one or more explicit elements, 
such as bank accounts. 
The term most often referred to is “banking” with 21 occurrences.15 However, what do precisely 
the studies mean by banking? Soederberg (2013) differentiates banking from microcredit and 
mortgage, while Sethi and Acharya (2018) distinct banking services from other financial 
services, such as insurance, pensions and remittances. These other services, nevertheless, are 
usually intermediated by banks as well, which creates confusion on why they would be 
considered non-banking services. On the other hand, other studies are more explicit when 
referring to banking services, such as in Garg and Agarwal (2014) who specifically mention 
bank deposits, and Güngen (2018) who defines FI as bank account ownership. Thus, we 
conclude that the term “banking” refers to bank accounts. 
Owning a bank account allows individuals to use other financial services, but these are not 
always acknowledged in the literature. “Deposits” has seven references (36th), followed by 
“payments” (39th) and “remittances” (85th). These examples show that existing definitions 
might have selected all-encompassing terms in order to be able to include as many elements 
possible in the discussion. This broadness, however, is problematic as it can lead to different 
interpretations of FI. 
Furthermore, while bank account ownership counts as the first step into FI, evidence shows 
that owners may not use them frequently. In LMICs, 18% of individuals did not withdraw funds 
in the previous month, and 58% withdraw once or twice – mainly when receiving their wages 
(Allen et al., 2016). In South Africa, for instance, six million basic bank accounts were opened 
in four years, but only 3.5 million remained active (World Bank, 2014). Hence, acknowledging 
the usage aspect of FI is necessary for an accurate definition as the mere access may not reflect 
a full inclusion. 
 
15 Due to the use of stemmed words, ‘banking’ encompasses also ‘bank’, ‘banks’ and ‘banked’ as demonstrated 
in Appendix A (Table A.2). 
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After “banking”, the first specific element discussed in the literature is “credit”, with 16 
occurrences (e.g. Chakravarty and Pal, 2013; Wang and Guan, 2017; Kim, Yu and Hassan, 
2018). The fact that (micro)credit appears as the leading service of the existing definitions of 
FI illustrates the importance of this instrument. Credit to low-income individuals in LMICs 
was considered an effective tool for a mass exit from poverty by the microcredit and financial 
development literature (e.g. Khandker, 1998; Beck et al., 2007). As previously presented, based 
on mathematical models, mainstream studies consider that credit can be used for investment in 
human capital and informal businesses, which boosts the poor’s income and reduce poverty. It 
also allocates funds from the rich savers to poor borrowers, reducing income inequality (Galor 
and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997). 
Today, nonetheless, both mainstream and critical studies acknowledge the harmful effects of 
microcredit, in particular over-indebtedness (Guérin et al., 2015; Afonso et al., 2017; 
Kaffenberger and Totolo, 2018; Mutsonziwa and Fanta, 2019), or at least consider there is 
mixed evidence of its effects on development goals (van Rooyen et al., 2012; World Bank, 
2014). However, credit still presents itself as a core element of FI. 
This evidence supports allegations that FI is a “rebranding” of microcredit (Bateman, 2014; 
Mader, 2018) after studies showed the insignificant or negative effects of FI on poverty 
reduction (Duvendack et al., 2011; Banerjee, Karlan, et al., 2015; Banerjee, Duflo, et al., 2015). 
Therefore, instead of replacing microfinance for a more suitable and evidence-based poverty 
reduction policy, such as social protection floors, we also consider that international institutions 
have replaced it by FI.  
The third most mentioned financial service is “insurance” with 11 references (Garg and 
Agarwal, 2014; Kim, 2016; Okello Candiya Bongomin, Munene, Ntayi, et al., 2018). Grounded 
on the life-cycle hypothesis (Modigliani, 1966), insurance is said to prevent individuals from 
falling into poverty in times of income shocks (Brau et al., 2011; Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 
2012b). While (micro)insurance cannot boost individuals’ income, it could still serve as a 
palliative solution for cases of financial distress, such as crop loss, medical emergency or 
unemployment (Asian Development Bank et al., 2008; Churchill and Matul, 2012; World 
Bank, 2014; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2017). Such claims represent a shift of development efforts 
from poverty alleviation to poverty stabilisation (Taylor, 2012). Therefore, insurance is a 
mechanism for preventing individuals from becoming poor(er) but would be unable to lift 
individuals out of poverty. 
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While preventing individuals from allocating a large part of their income on an emergency, 
insurance requires payments that can burden the poor. For those who earn less than US$2 a 
day, payment on premiums can dislocate income from basic needs, such as foods and housing, 
to financial products. Therefore, it is possible that low-income individuals will prefer affording 
everyday needs over uncertain future financial distress. Again, for-profit financial institutions 
are preferred and “it is critical that any insurance products supported by governments should 
be strictly market-based, including having a design and a rating methodology that are 
actuarially sound” (World Bank, 2012b). Thus, in order to be sustainable, insurance firms need 
to charge more for the riskier and more costly clients, such as individuals with chronic diseases 
or the self-employed. This practice would increase premiums to the poor, preventing them from 
accessing affordable services. 
The promotion of private insurance disregards two further points: social relation and public 
services. First, it assumes that, in the event of financial distress, individuals have no other 
borrowing alternative. Particularly in LMICs, social ties in small and rural communities are 
strong (Guérin, 2014; Johnson, 2016b), and borrowing from friends, community or family 
usually implies little or no interest rates (in contrast to for-profit financial institutions). As we 
see in Table 2.1, during an emergency, individuals prefer to either use their savings or borrow 
from family and friends, confirming the relevance of social networks. 
 
Table 2.1. Primary source of emergency funds16 
Variable 2014 2017 
Savings 35.43 33.90 
Family or friends 38.18 29.61 
Money from working 15.69 24.88 
Borrowing from a bank 3.44 5.63 
Informal private lender 1.31 N/A 
Selling assets N/A 3.10 
Other 3.73 1.94 
Source: World Bank Findex dataset 
 
16 Answers do not sum up to 100% as some of the interviewees did not answer the question. 
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Second, the role of the state is often ignored by the mainstream literature of FI. In the case of 
insurances, public policies such as universal health care and unemployment benefits could also 
allow for risk sharing, besides preventing individuals from falling into poverty. Lavinas (2018) 
considers this process as part of financialisation in capitalist economies, in which the 
privatisation of public goods and services aims to shift the debt burden from the state to 
individuals. Thus, whereas social safety nets and social networks may prevent individuals from 
becoming poorer, for-profit and sustainable insurance providers may not have the same effect.  
Lastly, we find “savings” as the final key element of FI (56th position). Formal savings are also 
related to the life-cycle hypothesis as it provides individuals with a cushion for periods of 
income shocks. This element is less contradictory as these are less risky services to financial 
institutions and, at the same time, possibly beneficial to individuals, if earned interest rates 
outweigh incurring costs. In fact, a review of 11 studies showed that savings opportunities 
might have small, but positive and consistent effects on broader poverty measures (household 
consumption, income and food security) (Duvendack and Mader, 2019). However, as with 
insurance, it is unlikely that poor individuals will have enough income to save and benefit from 
such service in ways of reducing poverty in large scale. 
In this sub-section, we saw that four elements are highlighted in the literature but are not always 
explicitly acknowledged on the definition of FI: banking (usually referring to account 
ownership), credit, insurance and savings. Most instruments are closely related to the 
microfinance policy and have shown small to null effects on poverty reduction.  
 
2.4 The definition of financial inclusion 
The need for a definition of FI that explicitly includes its subjects, intermediaries and elements 
is imperative in order to understand the policy and its objectives fully. First, we clarified the 
agent of FI. FI must focus on individuals as, while it is necessary to account for the household 
aspect, single individuals within the household may still be financially excluded. Moreover, 
we disregard firms as the subject of FI as they present different nature with respect to 
creditworthiness and financial services usage. Lastly, we consider that self-employed workers 
must be analysed as individuals, not firms, as they often lack collateral, represent low-
productivity activities and take place in the informal labour market. 
Second, we must highlight that FI is led by for-profit financial intermediaries. Such approach 
is inherently contradictory to the goal of poverty and income inequality reduction, as 
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sustainable financial institutions will be unable to both maximise profits and serve free or low-
price financial services to the poor. 
Third, the necessary elements of FI must be explicit in order to avoid ambiguity. In the review, 
we noticed that “banking” was the most referred financial service. Instead of using such a broad 
term, we prefer including deposits and payments. Subsequently, credit was the second key 
element, indicating strong ties between FI and microcredit. Finally, insurance and savings were 
also mentioned. Each of these instruments has implications on how we assess FI. Therefore, 
selecting them purposefully allows us to assess the policy better. 
Based on the 67 studies selected through a systematic review, we propose an explicit definition 
of FI. Therefore, in the mainstream literature, FI can be understood as the 
 
“access and usage of credit, deposits, savings, payments  
and insurance by individuals provided through for-profit financial institutions”. 
 
Being clear about which services must be included, whom we are researching on and which 
institutions will promote FI allows us to assess this policy into depth. This conceptual precision 
is fundamental in order to understand the claims and objectives of FI, in particular the reduction 
of poverty and income inequality in LMICs. 
 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter presented an original analysis of the theoretical foundations, the link between FI 
and FD, as well as the discussion on the the subjects, intermediaries and elements of FI. Such 
evaluation contributes to the critical literature on FI that challenges the potential of the policy 
in reducing poverty and income inequality. 
We first presented the existing definitions of FI and concluded they are not always clear and 
display implicit theoretical foundations. Highlighting the theoretical background is important 
as it allows us to understand the rationale for FI conceptualisation and implementation. In our 
following chapter, we suggest different theoretical hypothesis to understand the relationship 
between FI, poverty and income inequality. Second, with respect to the subject of inclusion, 
the literature considers a range of units of analysis that ranges from people to firms. Making it 
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explicit that individuals are the target of FI is necessary to investigate the policy further, as we 
do in the following two chapters. Third, concerning the intermediaries of FI, we also found 
that, while usually implicit, most studies refer to for-profit financial institutions. Such approach 
is deeply rooted in the theoretical framework of market equilibrium of which government 
intervention distorts economic and social outcomes. At the same time, the mainstream literature 
overlooks the role of for-profit state-owned banks, as well as the negative role that such “profit-
based development” policies can have on the poor.  Next, we noticed that the key elements of 
FI are differently described in the literature. Among these elements, credit is related to the 
human capital hypothesis, whereas insurance and savings stem from the life-cycle hypothesis. 
However, those hypothesis were developed for HICs, with a strong formal labour market, and 
do not resonate with the majority of LMICs, as we discuss in the following chapter. Lastly, we 
conclude that a clear concept is necessary to fully understand the implications of FI and 
presented an explicit and concisedefinition of what the mainstream literature considers to be 
FI. 
However, such definition still disregards existing and important aspects of FI in LMICs, such 
as the high interest rates and a large informal labour market. Moreover, it also disregards the 
power imbalances that occur between lender and borrower, which are aggravated when FI is 
led by for-profit financial institutions in LMICs. Thus, in order to answer the first research 
question, i.e., “How do intra-country power relations affect financial inclusion in low and 












A theoretical approach to financial inclusion 
 
Despite being a key policy in the economic development literature, there is no theory of FI that 
explains the machanisms through which the different financial instruments reduce poverty and 
income inequality. From a heterodox approach, FI is considered to increase income inequality 
on the aggregate level, particularly making use of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis and 
the financialisation concept. In turn, mainstream approaches consider that FI acts through 
individual-level mechanisms, grounded on the human capital and life-cycle hypotheses, to 
establish a mass exit from poverty and better distributional outcomes. In this chapter, we aim 
to link Post-Keynesian macroeconomic hypotheses to critical microeconomic modelling to 
provide a theoretical framework to discuss the potential effects of FI on both levels.  
Heterodox theories in the FI literature focus on the effects of household finance on growth and 
distribution. The Minskyan approach affirms that the increasing indebtedness of households 
leads to instability in the financial system, thus generating economic crises (Dymski, 2005; 
Cynamon and Fazzari, 2008; Santanna, 2019; Polillo, 2020). During the subprime crisis in the 
US, for instance, predatory loans to minorities and low-income households were an essential 
cause for the housing bubble and its subsequent burst (Wray, 2008; Dymski, 2010; Dymski et 
al., 2013). Thus, expanding finance may be detrimental to households in the long run. 
With respect to the financialisation of the household sector, the literature presents two streams. 
From an economic geography perspective, the financialisation of everyday life shows how 
finance has expanded into individuals’ socio-economic lives affecting their relations with 
housing, savings, pensions and insurance instruments (Leyshon and Thrift, 2007; van der 
Zwan, 2014; Lai, 2018; Hillig, 2019; Montgomerie, 2020; Langley, 2020). From Post-
Keynesian and Marxian approaches, financialisation of households is associated to the 
increasing indebtedness of the working class and a shift from income from wages to profits, 
which increases income inequality (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013; Hein, 2015; Kohler et 
al., 2019; Godechot, 2020). Moreover, income inequality is also considered a source of 
financialisation. As households want to maintain their decreasing life standards due to falling 
real wages and reduction of public services, they incur into debt. This increasing inequality and 
indebtedness are thus seen as a feature of financialisation (Lapavitsas, 2013; Stockhammer, 
2015; Sotiropoulos and Hillig, 2020). 
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Such heterodox studies on household indebtedness often focus on HICs. In turn, analyses on 
household indebtedness in LMICs consider microfinance and FI as policies that promote 
financialisation and potential systemic risks. This expansion of finance is considered a policy 
to shift the debt burden from governments to households, despite the potential to lead to the 
over-indebtedness of the poor (Aitken, 2013; Girón, 2015; Santanna, 2019; Correa and Girón, 
2019; Lavinas, 2020; González, 2020). While we acknowledge the aspects of financialisation 
and financial instability as outcomes of FI policies, this thesis emphasises Post-Keynesian 
hypotheses of currency hierarchy and oligopolistic characteristic of banks to establish the 
structural basis of FI in LMICs. 
In contrast to heterodox approaches, mainstream theoretical justifications for FI are discussed 
in the micro-level. Based on the life-cycle and human capital hypotheses, individuals are able 
to improve income through investment in education and informal businesses. Furthermore, 
banks reduce income inequality by intermediating the transfer of savings from the rich to the 
expenditures of the poor. However, there is to date no particular model that has been used to 
explain the relationship between individuals and financial institutions with respect to the 
different elements of FI. Several studies discuss the microcredit repayment behaviour but do 
not address account ownership, savings or insurance (Stiglitz, 1990; Armendariz de Aghion 
and Morduch, 2000; Vogelgesang, 2003; Van Tassel, 2004; Tedeschi, 2006; Brihaye et al., 
2018). A more recent attempt to model FI was performed by Dabla-Norris et al. (2020). The 
study develops a general equilibrium model of heterogeneous agents to assess the effects of FI 
on growth, productivity and income distribution. However, such model focuses on firms, not 
on individuals.  
As we can notice, heterodox approaches of finance focus on the relevant aggregate aspects, 
whereas mainstream studies investigate FI purely on the micro-level. We argue that FI in 
LMICs must address both aspects as, it is indeed a micro-level policy but it is constrained by 
macro-level characteristics. Therefore, to create a consistent analysis of FI through heterodox 
lenses, we use game theoretical tools in order to first evaluate the relationship between 
individuals and financial institutions in using different financial instruments. Whereas game 
theory is a helpful to clarify the relationship between agents, it has its limitations as it does not 
provides “solid microfoundations” (Heap and Varoufakis, 2004, chap. 1). Yet, it does allows 
us to understand the relationship between individuals and financial institutions, in particular in 
addressing the power aspect embedded in it. 
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The multi-dimensional aspect of FI needs to be addressed to assess the effectiveness of the 
policy as a whole. Starting with the mainstream definition from Chapter 2, i.e.,FI as the “access 
and usage of credit, deposits, savings, payments and insurance by individuals provided through 
for-profit financial institutions”, this chapter has two objectives. First, it shows the interactions 
between individuals and for-profit financial institutions, including state-owned banks, with 
respect to deposit, savings, credit and insurance instruments. We apply game theory modelling 
to address these interactions in LMICs, but add the concepts of intra-country power and social 
relations as they play a fundamental role. Second, we discuss how these new aspects influence 
the reality of FI in LMICs in order to lay the groundwork for our empirical analysis in Chapter 
4. 
Our theoretical contribution to the literature on FI is twofold. First, we insert Post-Keynesian 
theories to assess the macroeconomic structures that distinct LMICs from HICs. Second, we 
develop game models on four elements of FI (deposit and savings, credit and insurance),, 
building on the power aspect of these relationships and focusing on LMICs. With that, we aim 
to answer the first research question on considering the role of power relations in FI policies, 
besides addressing the role of state-owned banks and the macroeconomic constraints of LMICs, 
which is currently absent from the mainstream literature. 
 
3.1 Macroeconomic differences between LMICs and HICs 
A crucial problem with the mainstream hypotheses on the effects of FI on poverty reduction 
and income inequality is the lack of acknowledgement of the macroeconomic differences 
between LMICs and HICs. In this thesis, we discuss three distinct macroeconomic conditions 
and market structure. In LMICs, there is (i) the prevalence of the informal labour market, (ii) 
the subordinated position of local currencies in the international monetary system, and (iii) the 
oligopoly characteristic of the national financial markets. These aspects influence the power of 
the financial institutions over the individuals and shape their relationship, as we will discuss 
next. 
 
3.1.1 Macroeconomic conditions and market structure 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the labour market in LMICs is characterised by the strong presence 
of rural and self-employed labour (ILO, 2018b). Unlike in HICs, where wage employment is 
the norm, workers in LMICs are often in the informal labour market, which influences demand 
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and regular payment of financial services. Figure 3.1 displays the share of informality by 
country. As we notice, LMICs have a higher share of informality.17 In Africa, 85.8% of 
employment was informal in 2016, followed by Asia and the Pacific (68.2%), Arab States 
(68.6%) and the Americas (40%) (ILO, 2018a). 
 
Figure 3.1: Share of informal employment in total employment, including agriculture (2016) 
 
Source: ILO (2018a, Fig. 5). 
A large informal sector has two implications for FI. From the supply side, increasing credit to 
informal businesses leads to an expansion of low-productivity micro-enterprises with high 
failure rates, which pushes prices down and generates over-indebtedness (Bateman and Chang, 
2012; Schicks, 2014). From the demand side, informal workers often do not have collateral or 
regular income. Therefore, they are considered high-risk clients, and banks charge higher 
premiums to offer them financial services (Lavinas, 2018). These risks are perceived in all 
elements of FI: bank account may be denied as the individual may not be able to afford the 
monthly account fees; credit may be declined or incur very high interest rates; and insurance 
premium increases as pay-outs may occur more often. In sum, under these circumstances, FI 
as a poverty reduction tool may be constrained. 
Informality also means that these workers may have no access to social protection, such as 
unemployment benefits or employer-sponsored health care, thus making them more vulnerable 
than formal workers. Due to these particularities, the income of individuals in LMICs, in 
particular the poor, is irregular and unreliable. The volatility in income affects directly the 
 
17 ILO’s measurement of informality can be found in Appendix B. 
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access and the usage of financial services in private markets, especially loans (Lavinas, 2018). 
As demonstrated by the Findex survey, the lack of income is the main reason for not owning 
an account at a formal financial institution (Table 1.1). This phenomenon could also be 
associated with the lack of regular income, as the individual may be unable to afford fees 
periodically.  
The income volatility may also lead the individual to borrow in the credit market, in particular 
for consumption purposes.18 This action is, however, encouraged by the mainstream literature 
which considers loans as a consumption smoothing mechanism, thus bringing welfare 
advantages to the poor (e.g. Ouma, Odongo, & Were, 2017; World Bank, 2014). At the same 
time, the lack of steady income makes this individual to be considered a risky borrower, as the 
financial institution has no guarantees that the loan will be repaid. Therefore, interest rates 
charged by financial institutions will be higher to cover for potential defaults or late 
repayments.  
Finally, while being insured may prevent the individual from reducing consumption levels 
during financial distress, it is unlikely that poor individuals will be able to afford insurance 
policies. Therefore, whereas insurance could reduce uncertainty, poor individuals will make 
use of such financial instrument. 
A second macroeconomic condition regards the subordinated position of LMICs in a hierarchic 
and structured international financial and monetary system (Bortz and Kaltenbrunner, 2018). 
According to the currency hierarchy hypothesis, the low value of the currencies of LMICs 
influences the higher base interest rates in comparison to countries with hard currencies, i.e., 
US dollar, Euro, Yen and Swiss franc, as “international investors demand a premium which 
takes the form of an increase in the nominal interest rate to compensate for the risk of moving 
to an unstable currency” (Carneiro and Rossi, 2013, p.6). This argument stems from the 
Keynesian assumption that assets have a liquidity premium, i.e., value for their convenience 
and security, which is included in the final rate of return on these assets (Keynes, 1997 [1936]). 
Considering national currencies as assets, in which “each currency in the world earns a specific 
non-pecuniary rate of return” (Herr, 2008, p.129), the more convenient and secure the currency, 
the lower its interest rate. The currency premium then represents its quality in the international 
market. Such quality gap generates a hierarchy among currencies, in which central banks with 
low-ranked currencies are forced to offer higher interest rates to maintain demand (Becker et 
 
18 More on the differences between loans for consumption and investment purposes in sub-section 3.3.2. 
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al., 2010; Conti et al., 2014; de Paula et al., 2017). Thus, fundamentally higher interest rates in 
LMICs also push loan interest rates upwards, contributing to over-indebtedness and 
undermining the efforts of poverty reduction through FI. 
Finally, financial market concentration can also influence the access to and usage of financial 
services by the poor. Bank concentration averaged 75.48% in 91 LMICs in 2017 (World Bank, 
2020).19 The concentration level varied from 18.39% in Nepal to 100% in several countries, 
including the Gambia, Myanmar and Turkmenistan. Larger economies, such as South Africa 
and Brazil displayed 76.18% and 69.79% bank concentration, respectively. 
In the Kaleckian approach, the bank industry can be considered an oligopolistic market, as 
banks set lending interest rates in the same way oligopolistic firms set prices, i.e., aiming to 
maximise profits and not based on demand factors.20 The interest rate of loans is determined 
by the mark-up (spread) over the “cost of funds”, which in the banking industry is the interest 
paid on deposits plus the interest paid on borrowed funds. This mark-up is determined, in turn, 
by the degree of monopoly or the profit margin of the bank (Rousseas, 1985; Khemraj, 2010). 
In this way, countries in which for-profit financial institutions have a large share of the market 
will be likely to set a higher mark-up on loans. In 2017, LMICs’ commercial banks had a 
lending-deposit spread of 8.21% on average, in contrast to 4.27% in developed countries 
(World Bank, 2020). 
This mark-up theory can be also be transposed to other financial products, such as bank 
accounts, debit card replacement and transactions costs, as the oligopoly power of banks 
enables them to increase the prices of essential services. In this way, we can conclude that the 
less competitive financial market in LMICs makes access to finance more expensive than in 
HICs. 
If base interest rates are inherently higher in LMICs due to their low-quality currencies, and 
the high levels of bank concentration increase the mark-up on financial services, it is likely that 
for-profit financial institutions will offer credit with high interest rates. Adding to this, the poor 
in LMICs, often part of the informal labour market, will have an added premium in interest 
rates due to their riskiness. This situation means that the access to and usage of financial 
 
19 Measured as the assets of three largest commercial banks as a share of total commercial banking assets. 
20 The hypothesis has been also discussed through a standard industrial organisation framework, where the 
market power of a bank increases interest rates (Moore and Craigwell, 2002).  
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services by the poor, when done through for-profit financial institutions, will not be a valid 
instrument to reduce poverty or income inequality.  
On the contrary, charging high prices on financial services and loans may increase poverty as 
individuals may allocate their income from essential consumption needs to financial services. 
Moreover, as the income stream of for-profit financial institutions arises from the fees and 
interest rates, higher prices will transfer income from the poor worker to the rich rentier. This 
financial expropriation may, in turn, fosters income inequality (Lapavitsas, 2009; Moura, 
2016). 
Finally, it is important to highlight that some LMICs, such as Brazil, have a strong presence of 
state-owned financial institutions. Whereas these banks might have some differences to private 
banks, such as offering lower interest rate in certain products, they are still for-profit financial 
institutions. In fact, Banco do Brasil, a state-owned bank, charges high interest rates that are 
further redistributed among shareholders (where the government is the majoritary shareholder). 
Thus, these banks will be addressed as private for-profit financial institutions in this thesis, but 
some particularities will be highlighted in Chapter 4. 
In a nutshell, the thesis advocates that high labour market informality, the low position in the 
currency hierarchy and the bank concentration in LMICs shapes FI policies. Thus, these aspects 




These particularities of LMICs also shape another aspect in our analysis: power. In this thesis, 
power is defined as a form of coercion that stems from an asymmetric relationship between 
two agents. This type of coercion is not necessarily physical, but it is still some type of threat. 
In our analysis between the relationship between an individual and a financial institution, the 
latter has power over the former in each of the three main elements of FI (deposit/savings, 
credit and insurance). This power emerges from the financial institution’s capacity to accept or 
decline the request for access to and usage of financial services regardless of the individual’s 
ability to afford them, besides refusing further business with the individual. 
Within the game theory approach, Bowles and Gintis (2007) consider power to have four key 
elements: i) it is interpersonal, i.e., a characteristic of a relationship among people, not single 
individuals; ii) it involves a threat and use of sanctions; iii) it should be normatively 
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indeterminate, that is, allowing for Pareto-improving outcomes while also susceptible to abuse; 
and iv) it must be sustainable as a Nash equilibrium. Thus, “for B to have power over A, it 
sufficient that, by imposing or threatening to impose sanctions on A, B is capable of affecting 
A’s actions in ways that further B’s interests, while A lacks this capacity with respect to B” 
(Bowles and Gintis, 1992, pp.326–327). 
While elements of power between the individual and the financial institution is present in both 
HICs and LMICs, power is stronger in the latter, in particular due to the vulnerability of 
informal workers and bank concentration.21 Unlike in Bowles & Gintis (1992), we do not 
assume a “competitive capitalist economy”, i.e. where financial markets are characterized by 
free entry and large numbers of buyers and sellers. In turn, we follow Bhaduri's (1977) 
approach to recognize the particularities of the power relationship between borrower and 
lenders in LMICs. In his model, borrowers are self-employed agricultural workers, and private 
lenders have power over the borrower. Because of the monopoly power of the lender, the latter 
is able to charge very high interest rates as the poor agricultural worker needs the loan for 
consumption purposes until harvest time. We transpose these ideas to LMICs in general. 
Enforcement under power relations is also different in LMICs. In Peru, for instance, lenders 
would paint red marks or words on the houses of individuals who defaulted. In India, the debt 
of an individual may be made public, and collectors may sit in front of their homes for up to 
six hours until the debt is paid, thus causing social shame (Solli, 2015). These public 
humiliations must be taken into account when discussing power relations in LMICs, as they 
are connected to more substantial value to social ties and yield further power asymmetries than 
in HICs. 
Therefore, in an environment of labour informality, high interest rates and power relations, the 
effects of FI on poverty and income inequality will be distinct between LMICs and HICs.22 
First, we propose that unfavourable contract conditions, such as high interest rates, along with 
unstable income stream, may lead the poor into a debt trap. Second, the income of the rentier, 
i.e., the interest rate, will be transferred from the poor to the rich saver, exacerbating income 
inequality. Such effects will be further discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. 
 
 
21 For instance, in the US there are evidence of redlining practices in the financial system, as presented in 
Dymski (1995). 
22 This hypothesis is econometrically tested and confirmed in Chapter 6.  
46 
 
3.2 Game theory and principal-agent approaches to finance 
To illustrate the relationship between individuals and financial institutions in a FI environment 
where power influences the behaviour of the poor in LMICs, we utilise a game theory approach. 
Game-theoretic reasoning is a useful methodology for analysing social interactions. Its purpose 
is to understand an agent’s action in response to another agent in order to maximise their utility. 
Within the finance literature, game theory has been widely employed to analyse behaviours in 
the credit and insurance markets (Boot and Thakor, 1994; Suijs et al., 1998; Cao and Zhang, 
2010; Warren et al., 2012; Chao and Zongfang, 2013). More specifically, microcredit has also 
been modelled through game theory by focusing on incentives mechanisms and investment 
decisions (Van Tassel, 2004; Tedeschi, 2006; Brihaye et al., 2018). 
Social interactions in the financial system have also been widely analysed through the 
principal-agent approach, in particular the relationship between lender or insurer (principal) 
and borrowers or insured (agent). An agency problem arises when the actions or attributes of 
an agent are relevant to the benefits enjoyed by the principal but are unknown or unverifiable 
(Bowles, 2004, chap. 7). As the payoffs of agent and principal are generally different, the agent 
does not behave as the principal would like (Stiglitz, 1989). 
In the financial market, conflicts between principal and agent are focused on the credit and 
insurance elements (Harris and Raviv, 1978; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Mookherjee and Png, 
1989; Vera-Hernandez, 2003; Janda, 2006; Mensah and Abor, 2012). In these models, the 
principal (lender or insurer) wants the agent (borrower or insured) to behave responsibly in 
order not to engage in risky activities that may reduce the likelihood of loan repayment or 
request an insurance claim. We base our model in such contributions but adapt it to FI in 
LMICs. 
While somewhat diverse, both analyses are complementary: whereas game theory presents the 
interactions between agents, the agency problem introduces new elements to the discussion, in 
particular contracts and information issues. Thus, we utilise both approaches to understand the 
relationship between individuals and financial institutions in LMICs, including the power 
aspect of this interaction. 
 
3.3 A micro-level model of financial inclusion 
Considering the macro and microeconomic differences between LMICs and HICs, we build on 
existing game models of the financial market and develop models of the four elements of FI: 
deposit and savings, credit and insurance. For simplicity, we assume that there is only one for-
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profit financial institution, which also handles all these four instruments, and that the individual 
needs to have a deposit account in order to access other financial services, namely savings, 
credit and insurance. 
 
3.3.1 Deposit and savings 
According to the Findex dataset (Table 1.1), most individuals reported not having a bank 
account due to (i) lack of income, (ii) price and (iii) lack of need. This information guides us 
through this first model, in which the informal worker considers their possibilities of affording 
the deposit account and building up savings. 
Using an extensive form representation23, where each node corresponds to the action of a 
player, we start with a three-period, dynamic and finite model with two agents: Individual (𝐴) 
and the Financial Institution (𝐵). This game is cooperative, as both 𝐴 and 𝐵 have the same 
preferences and goals. However, 𝐵 is able to decline the application of 𝐴 to open a bank account 
regardless of 𝐴’s ability to afford it, generating the first power mechanism.  
We state the following assumptions: 
1) Players want to maximise their payoffs (utilities) 24 
2) The game is of common knowledge: each player knows the rules of the game and this 
fact is known by both players 
3) There is perfect information on the previous agent’s actions25 
4) There is perfect recall: each player remembers their previous moves 
𝐴 starts the game at node A1 by deciding on whether they will open an account (Figure 3.2).26 
If bank accounts are free27, and the game is of common knowledge, power mechanisms 
dissipate as there are no economic barrier for the individual to enter the formal financial system 
(the usage frequency of such service, nonetheless, is beyond this discussion). However, if bank 
 
23 Also referred to as structure tree or directed graph. 
24 By considering the utility function must be maximised, the numerical payoffs associated with each outcome 
are referred to as ‘utils’ (Heap and Varoufakis, 2004, chap. 1). 
25 While each player knows how the other play has acted (as it is a sequential game), there is imperfect 
information with regards the ability to pay of 𝐴, thus also creating an agency problem. 
26 We use “they” as a singular third-person pronoun to prevent gender bias. 
27 It is important to highlight here that free bank accounts are a policy decision, not a characteristic of certain 
financial institutions. For instance, in Brazil, the Central Bank has imposed a regulation in which all state-
owned and private banks must supply individuals with a basic free bank account (Resolução CMN n° 3.919 of 
25/11/2010). However, as we will see in Chapter 4, private banks might refuse opening a bank account to 
certain individuals or tricky them into getting a paid one, as reported by participants. 
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accounts are not free, the individual must consider if they will earn enough in the future in 
order to continue paying the incurring monthly costs. In order to decide that, they consider their 
present and future income. If income is insufficient to afford the service in more than one 
period, they will not open an account. This decision leads to solution 1, where the game ceases. 
However, if they consider having enough income, they will apply for opening an account, 
which takes us to node B1. 
 











At node B1, 𝐵 decides on accepting 𝐴’s application. A decline may be due to several reasons: 
𝐵 believes 𝐴 will not have enough income to repay maintenance fees or 𝐴 cannot provide 
specific documentation, such as a national ID or proof of residence.28 If 𝐵 does not open the 
account, we reach solution 2. This solution’s outcome is the same as solution 1 but incurs in 
worse payoffs (as discussed next). Nonetheless, if 𝐵 opens the account, the parts sign a contract 
in which 𝐴 commits to paying monthly fees, and 𝐵 commits to keeping the money safe and 
allowing 𝐴 to perform payments and withdrawals.29 If the account is opened in the first period, 
𝐴 acts again at node A2. They decide on building up savings, based on their income and 
 
28 This documentation issue is common in LMICs (Table 1.1). 
29 While we acknowledge that there could be some amount limitations to withdrawal, for instance, this 










deducting the account fees. If they save, we finish at case 3. If they do not, either by choice or 
by lack of income, we end at solution 4. 
𝐴 has two information sets. In their first set, they choose between applying for a bank account 
(𝑃) or not (𝑃′), as well as saving (𝑆) or not saving (𝑆′), thus generating 2𝑥2 different 
combinations. The strategy set for 𝐴 is: 
 
𝑆𝐴 = {𝑃𝑆, 𝑃′𝑆, 𝑃𝑆′, 𝑃′𝑆′} 
 
𝐵 has only one information set: open the account (𝑂) or decline the request(𝑂′). The strategy 
set for 𝐵 is thus: 
 
𝑆𝐵 = {𝑂, 𝑂′} 
 
The best response for 𝐴 requires enough income to be deposited into a bank account and saving 
at the end of the period (𝑃𝑆). For 𝐵, the best response is to open the account (𝑂), as it receives 
payment for the account maintenance fee and increases liquidity. 
We rank the preferences of each player: 𝐴 prefers outcomes {3, 4, 1, 2} and 𝐵 also prefers 
{3, 4, 1, 2}. As preferences are the same, we know we have one Paretto-efficient Nash 
equilibrium, namely solution 3. We can also quickly identify the equilibrium using the payoff 
matrix (Table 3.1). We assign values of utilities that represent the payoff that each agent 
receives based on each decision and outcome. As we see, the best payoff for 𝐴 is requesting to 
open the account and save. Likewise, the best response of 𝐵 is always to open to the account 
(and receiving savings from 𝐴). 
Whereas we find a power mechanism in the first part of the game (node B1), there is no power 
relation in the second part of the game, i.e., when we reach node A2. The reasoning behind it 
considers that solution 3 is preferable to both players, but there are no mechanisms through 
which B can enforce A to save. Of course, B creates incentives for A, such as providing interest 
on savings, but these cannot be regarded as power, as it does not change the Paretto-efficient 
Nash equilibrium. Therefore, there are expectations from both parts that solution 3 will be 
reached instead of case 4 but, if A does not have enough income for savings, there are no 
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penalties for them. Solution 1 yields a payoff of (0, 0), as 𝐴 does not apply for a bank account, 
but also does not invest time or effort into it. Likewise, while renouncing possible future profits, 
𝐵 does not invest efforts in reviewing 𝐴’s application, so its payoff is also 0. In contrast, 
solution 2 has a (−1, −1) payoff, as both agents put effort into applying/reviewing the 
application but, with its refusal, both are deprived of possible future gains. The third solution 
is the best response for both agents as it yields a result of (2, 2). For 𝐴, having an account as 
well as building up savings in the formal financial system provides them with low, but positive, 
interest rates on deposits. For 𝐵, receiving the monthly fees for the account also yields a 
positive payoff. Furthermore, the low interest rates paid to savers is offset by charging high 
interest rates to borrowers so that the payoff of solution 3 is 𝐵’s preferred outcome. Finally, 
solution 4 (1, 1) is the second-best option. Despite not receiving interest on deposits, 𝐴 has 
access to further financial services from 𝐵, which yields a positive, but smaller, payoff. To 𝐵, 
it receives account maintenance fees, but liquidity is lower, so the payoff is smaller than in the 
previous solution. Therefore, as solution 3 is the one with the highest payoffs for both agents, 
besides being their best responses, it will be our Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium. 
 
Table 3.1: Payoff matrix of the savings-deposit game30 
 Financial institution (𝐵) 
𝑂 𝑂′ 
Individual (𝐴) 
𝑃𝑆 2,2 -1, -1 
𝑃′𝑆 0,0 0,0 
𝑃𝑆′ 1,1 -1, -1 
𝑃′𝑆′ 0,0 0,0 
 
However, while solution 3 is the best response of 𝐴, they may be unable to build up savings 
due to a lack of income. This outcome is reasonable for individuals in LMICs, where informal 
workers receive low and irregular income. We argue that, if incapable of building up savings, 
thus reaching solution 4, 𝐴 must find an alternative source of funds in the case of an income 
shock. This assumption is based on the answers given on the Findex questionnaire on funds in 
 
30 While it seems that the payoff matrix has more solutions than the extensive form, some of the values are 
the mere repetition of a particular solution. For instance, as there is no solution that represents the possibility 
Not Apply/No Savings (P'S'), the payoff associated to it is the one from solution 1, i.e., Not Apply (P'). 
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an emergency: if individuals had savings, they would not apply for credit, as it means higher 
costs than using their own funds.31 Therefore, if they do not have savings, they must borrow 
from the same financial institution 𝐵, as we see next. 
 
3.3.2 Credit 
Unlike the deposit-savings relationship, the social interaction in the credit market is based on 
non-cooperation, as there is a conflict of interest over how the gains will be divided. Whereas 
the repayment is beneficial to the lender at a cost to the borrower, default benefits the borrower 
at a cost to the lender. In this type of relationship, one or more parties seek to advance their 
interests by the use of threats, promises, conferring rents and repeated interactions (Bowles, 
2004, chap. 1). 
In this principal-agent problem, contracts between the principal (lender) and agent (borrower) 
are incomplete, as the borrower’s ability to pay is not enforceable for two reasons. First, the 
borrower may not have enough funds for repayment. This situation can occur as the borrower 
may use the loan for consumption purposes, yielding no investment returns and increasing the 
risk of default. Another possibility is the lack of income by the due date because of irregular 
income streams or unemployment. Second, the type of investment and its associated risks are 
usually not subject to enforceable contracts (Bowles, 2004, chap. 9). As contracts are 
incomplete and not enforceable, an asymmetry of information arises, leading to conflict 
between principal and agent. In an environment with a lack of exogenous enforcement (such 
as a court), these repayments are facilitated by the exercise of power (Bowles, 2004, chap. 7).  
The difference between loans for consumption and investment are significant for our analysis. 
Existing models on loan repayment focus on individuals or firms who undertake the loan as a 
business project, which implies that the success or failure of the venture will determine 
repayments (Bowles and Gintis, 1992; Chao and Zongfang, 2013; Paliński, 2015). In our 
model, however, the borrower might use the loan for investment or consumption purposes, so 
repayment is not necessarily associated with the returns on investment. 
At the same time, we must make a distinction between different types of consumer loans, in 
particular the purchase of durable and non-durable goods due to their specific characteristics. 
 
31 In Chapter 2 (Table 2.1),  we saw that more than 30% of individuals prefer to recur to savings, while an 
average of only 4.5% prefer to borrow from a financial institution. As we are only talking about the relationship 
between individual and financial institution, we refrain from analysing the possibility of borrowing money from 
family and friends. 
52 
 
Durable goods, such as vehicles and household appliances, are not necessarily considered 
essential goods but are often used as a proxy for poverty measurements (Sahn and Stifel, 2000; 
Booysen et al., 2008; Bérenger et al., 2013; Alkire et al., 2017). Here, the credit relation is 
similar to household investment (like housing), as the good can be repossessed by the lender 
in case of debt arrears. In this type of contract, credit is usually provided in the form of low or 
interest-free instalments, such as store credit, or long-term loan from a financial institution. In 
this case, credit can indeed smooth consumption, as individuals may lack savings to purchase 
a durable good in cash. 
On the other hand, non-durable goods, such as food and medicine, are necessary essential 
goods. Their costs are lower and their consumption is more frequent than durable goods. The 
immediate consumption of non-durable goods prevents them from being seized by the lender, 
disassociating these consumption loans from investment-type loans. Due to this risk, non-
durable goods are usually subject to high-interest loans, such as overdrafts and unpaid credit 
card statements.32 Therefore, while allowing for consumption smoothing in the short-term, the 
recurrent use of high-interest loans for non-durable goods may lead the borrower into a debt 
trap. 
Such high-interest loans bring up the adverse selection issue. High-interest loans are used as 
screening devices by financial institutions. Here, riskier individuals may accept a higher 
interest rate as they perceive their probability of repaying to be low (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
In this thesis, as base interest rates are inherently higher in LMICs due to the currency premium, 
besides the interest rate spread, high interest rates may attract riskier borrowers, leading those 
to possible over-indebtedness. 
We now show the borrower-lender interaction through game theory. Following from the 
previous model, we start from solution 4: the individual opened a bank account but was unable 
to save. Therefore, they will apply for a loan in order to afford a service or good they need/want. 
The borrower (𝐴) and the lender (𝐵) engage in a debt contract, where the borrower makes a 
promise to repay the principal plus interest rates.  
Considering the lack of collateral and the possibility of using the loan for non-durable goods, 
the lender may use its power in order to enforce repayment. A standard enforcement method 
in LMICs is to create social shame within the individual’s community, such as humiliating 
 
32 In LMICs, it is common to shop in small stores or from self-employed workers and give a promise to pay in 




signs and announcing the owed amount at one’s home or workplace.33 A further power 
mechanism is to deny further loans to the borrower, which would not be desirable for a credit-
constrained individual (Bowles and Gintis, 1992). The latter outcome is prejudicial to 
borrowers in LMICs, where the poor may need credit for smoothing consumption of durable 
goods or during emergencies. At the same time, enforcement also incurs costs to the lender, as 
it must hire agents to go to the borrower’s house, for instance, so such situation is less preferred 
by the lender as well. 
We present a dynamic and finite game with the same two players: Individual (𝐴) and Financial 
Institution (𝐵). The same four assumptions on rationality, common knowledge, perfect 
information and perfect recall hold for this game. However, we add a further assumption: 
 
5) Players need to maintain their reputation in order to keep playing the game 
 
Following Brihaye et al. (2018), we develop an extensive form representation for the 
relationship between 𝐴 and 𝐵 in a repeated five-period game (Figure 3.3). Despite being an 
over-simplification of the borrow-lender relationship, the model allows us to understand the 
actions of each player. 
There are nine possible final solutions. 𝐴 starts by applying or not for the loan, so A1 is our 
initial node. If 𝐴 does not apply, we reach the final node 1. If 𝐴 applies, 𝐵 follows at node B1 
by granting or not the loan. If 𝐵 grants it, we go to node A2, where 𝐴 acts again. If it does not, 
we reach case 2. 𝐴 can now act in three different ways: repay the loan on time, repay the loan 
late or default.  
First, if the loan is repaid on time, 𝐵 does not need to enforce repayment (terminal node 3). 
Second, if 𝐴 repays it late, 𝐵 can act in two ways: it can either enforce or not extra charges for 
late repayment. If it enforces, we go to decision node A3, where 𝐴 will move again. If it does 
not enforce it, we reach outcome 6. If 𝐵 enforces the contract, 𝐴 must make a new decision at 




33 This type of behaviour has been widely documented in the literature (see Solli, 2015). 
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The third possibility of 𝐴 is to default the loan. Again, 𝐵 can either enforce or not the contract. 
If it does, we go to decision node A4. If not, we reach case 7. In this fourth period, 𝐴 has the 
chance to repay or default the loan at node A4. If 𝐴 repays with charges, we go to case 8. If 
they still do not pay, solution 9. 
In this credit game, 𝐴 has three information sets. In the first set, they can choose between 
applying (𝑃) or not (𝑃′) for the loan. In the second set, they choose among repaying the loan 
on time (𝑅), repay it late (𝑅′) or default (𝐷). In the third set, to repay charges (𝐶) or not (𝐶′). 
Thus, the individual has two alternatives in the first set, three in the second set and two in the 
last one, i.e. 2𝑥3𝑥2 different combinations. The strategy set for 𝐴 is: 
 
𝑆𝐴 = {𝑃𝑅𝐶, 𝑃′𝑅𝐶, 𝑃𝑅𝐶




















𝐵, in contrast, only has two information sets. First, it grants (𝐺) or not (𝐺′) the loan. Second, 
it enforces (𝐸) or not (𝐸′) repayment. This combination yields a 2𝑥2 strategy set for 𝐵: 
 
𝑆𝐵 = {𝐺𝐸, 𝐺′𝐸, 𝐺𝐸′, 𝐺′𝐸′} 
 
As this is a strictly competitive game, whenever the payoff of 𝐵 increases, the payoff of 𝐴 will 
decrease, so there is no room for join game or compromise (Watson, 2013, chap. 12). In our 
sub-game after 𝐴 applied for the loan, we can rank the preferences of each player: 𝐴 prefers 
the solutions {7, 6, 9, 5, 3, 8, 4, 2}, while 𝐵 has the following ranking {3, 4, 8, 6, 2, 7, 5, 9}. 
Let us consider the preference order of 𝐵 first. 𝐵’s highest payoff is at case 3, where 𝐴 repays 
on time, and there is no cost of enforcement. Next, in solution 4, there is a late repayment and 
enforcement costs, but 𝐴 agrees in paying extra charges. Case 8 is 𝐵’s third option as, despite 
enforcement costs, 𝐴 repays the loan in full plus extra charges. Next, solution 6, there is a late 
repayment cost, but there are no enforcement costs. Sequentially, we find outcome 2, where no 
loan was granted in the second period. This option is preferable to not receiving the repayment 
loan, plus incurring charges for enforcement. Case 7 follows as, despite the default, there are 
no extra enforcement costs. Outcome 5 is less desirable as 𝐵 bears enforcement costs, and these 
are not offset by further charges. The last option for 𝐵 is case 9, where there is an initial default, 
enforcement costs and no repayment. 
Inversely, 𝐴 prefers not to repay and not to incur in extra charges. At the same time, they also 
prefer not to be enforced – as there are social costs – and to receive a new loan in the future. 
These considerations lead us to a game with power mechanisms: while the payoff in case of 
no-repayment is higher for 𝐴, the threat of a decline in new grants, besides the social shame 
will force 𝐴 to choose a sub-optimal solution. 
As in the deposit-savings game, we allocate values to each payoff according to the preferences 
of each player. In Figure 3.4, similarly to the payoff matrix, each solution represents a vector 
of 𝐴 and 𝐵. For instance, 𝑃𝐺𝑅 = (−1, 4), as it provides a −1 payoff to 𝐴 (𝐴 suffers no 
enforcement or extra charges, but has no late repayment/default premium) and 4 to 𝐵 (it 
receives the full repayment without enforcing it). 
Unlike in the payoff matrix, however, we use a different technique when modelling in 
sequential games in order to find the Nash equilibrium. Backward induction procedure is a 
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“process of analysing a game from the end to the beginning” (Watson, 2013, p.186). In 
representing sequential rationality, we identify the optimal action for each information set by 
working backwards in the sub-game tree. By starting from the solution nodes, the player selects 
the best response in order to maximise the payoff. This means that the other actions are 
dominated by the optimal one (Watson, 2013, chap. 15). However, as 𝐵 has power over 𝐴, 𝐴 
will have its decisions affected, thus selecting a lower payoff. 
As we added the fifth assumption that players want to preserve their reputations, social 
constraint also affects actions. For 𝐴, having a good reputation in the credit market is essential. 
As we have a repeated game, 𝐴 may need to apply for a further loan in the future, so that this 
factor shapes their actions. Likewise, they want to maintain their reputation toward the 
community, so they will avoid being enforced by 𝐵. Likewise, 𝐵 also has a reputation to 
preserve. It must enforce repayments in order to prevent defaults or delays from other 
borrowers. Thus, while not imposing the repayment is preferred by 𝐵, it still does so in order 
to maintain its reputation and prevent future bankruptcy. 
 































Working backwards, we start by the longest branches: the solutions 4, 5, 8 and 9. For 𝐴, the 
payoffs of not paying changes are higher. Inversely, the payoffs of 𝐵 are higher when 𝐴 does 
pay the charges. Thus, we establish that, once enforcement has taken place, 𝐴 will select not to 
pay charges. We say that not paying is a dominated strategy for 𝐴. Aware of that, 𝐵 realises 
that not enforcing would yield higher payoffs than enforcing but receives no repayment 
charges. If 𝐴 knows that 𝐵 will not enforce, they will decide on defaulting, as no penalties will 
incur. In this case, our Nash equilibrium is solution 9 (2, −4). 
Nonetheless, as stated before, 𝐵 must preserve its reputation, so it will always enforce 
repayments – even if it yields lower payoff. Similarly to the chain store paradox (Selten, 1978), 
the financial institution selects a worst payoff in the short-term in order to prevent the behaviour 
of other agents in the long-run. Likewise, 𝐴 is concerned about their reputation within their 
community and the risk of social shame.34 Both the potential need for future loans, as well as 
social implications, will place 𝐴 under the power of 𝐵. The power aspect in this relationship 
will force 𝐴 to change their choices to a solution where payoffs are lower. Thus, 𝐴 will elect to 
pay on time, with a payoff of −1, in comparison to the payoff of defaulting 4, as they must 
preserve their reputation and may demand credit in the future. 
Because of this power imbalance, 𝐵 grants the loan as it knows 𝐴 is likely to repay on time. 
This is our pure-strategy Nash equilibrium but, as it does not maximise the payoffs of 𝐴, it is 
not Pareto efficient. Thus, bearing in mind our initial assumption that players are rational and 
want to maximise their payoffs, while also acknowledging the effects of power, both agents 
will follow the actions that will take them to the payoff (−1, 4). 
This model provides us with three critical insights. First, individuals’ acts are constrained by 
the power exerted by financial institutions. Second, both players are willing to select a sub-
optimal solution in the short-term to prevent worse adverse outcomes in the future. Third, 
individuals also choose sub-optimal repayment schedules to avoid social pressures in the 
present. These aspects of borrowing in LMICs is further discussed in Chapter 4, where 
participants report power mechanisms. 
 
 
34 A complication of the model would be to add other banks that could affect the default decisions of 𝐴. We 




Finally, we model the relationship between 𝐴 and 𝐵 in the insurance market.35 Recalling the 
deposit-savings game, if 𝐴’s application to open a bank account is accepted by 𝐵, 𝐴 moves 
further and they either save (solution 3) or not (solution 4). If they did not save, they apply for 
a loan, initiating the credit game. In turn, to apply for insurance, 𝐴 must have extra income to 
afford it, so the insurance departure is from solution 3. While insurance can be useful for 
income smoothing in case of an emergency, it is not an essential service. In LMICs, where self-
employed workers in the informal market have irregular income, purchasing insurance may not 
be feasible. 
Similarly to the lender and borrower relationship, insurance has been modelled through game 
theory and principal-agent approaches in previous studies (Fields and Tirtiroglu, 1991; Warren 
et al., 2012; Asimit and Boonen, 2018). While insurance contracts prescribe prudence, they 
cannot enforce such behaviour (Bowles, 2004), which results in suboptimal outcomes, as in the 
credit game. Unlike standard insurance games, our model has two particularities. First, the 
agent is always risk-averse, as living in a LMIC with lack of quality public services36 and 
income fluctuations prevents them to undertake risky activities. For simplicity reasons, we also 
assume that there is no government assistance to prevent income shocks, such as sickness and 
unemployment benefits, for informal workers. Second, as income is low, the agent needs to 
consider the possible benefits of allocating part of their constrained budget to insurance policy. 
While adverse selection can be found in insurance models, we focus on the moral hazard issue 
as the principal (𝐵) is not able to force the agent (𝐴) to behave according to its preferences 
(Dutta, 1999, p.293). Also known as hidden actions, moral hazard implies that the agent will 
undertake riskier activities once they are insured. For instance, an agent with car insurance 
against theft may leave the doors unlocked, increasing the robbery risk. In the micro-insurance 
literature, however, some studies defend that such moral hazard can be beneficial. For example, 
insuring crops may lead farmers to invest in riskier, but higher-yield crops, which can lift them 
out of poverty (World Bank, 2012b). 
 
35 We consider any type of insurance policy, from health care to crop insurance. 
36 While some LMICs, such as Brazil, do offer public service in terms of health care, these services are usually 
underfunded and precarious. 
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Following solution 4 of the deposit-savings game, i.e., 𝐴 was able to build up savings, the 
insurance game starts (Figure 3.5).37 At node A1, 𝐴 decides whether to apply or not for the 
insurance policy. 𝐴 must be able to analyse present and future scenarios in order to consider if 
insurance is beneficial. If benefits do not offset the costs, we reach case 1. If they do apply, 𝐵 
reacts to the application. At node B1, the financial institution decides on whether to accept or 
decline the request of 𝐴. The potential decline is based on the evaluation that 𝐴 will not behave 
responsibly or that 𝐴 presents characteristics that may be too risky to 𝐵 (e.g., if 𝐴 lives in a 
neighbourhood with high levels of crime, 𝐵 may decline insuring 𝐴’s vehicle). This situation 
leads us to solution 2. However, if 𝐵 approves 𝐴’s application, 𝐴 will be able to move again in 
the third period. At node A2, 𝐴 either submits an insurance claim or not.38 This circumstance 
takes us then to two final solutions 3 and 4. 
 











Despite the similarities to the deposit-savings game, payoffs in the insurance game are 
different, as this is not a cooperation game. For 𝐴, the preference rank is of {3, 4, 2, 1}. For 𝐵, 
{4, 3, 1, 2}. The change in preferences is due to their associated payoffs, which are a result of 
gain distribution between 𝐴 and 𝐵. For 𝐴, insurance may lead them to peace of mind in case of 
 
37 The insurance game is a repeated, dynamic and three-period model and follows the same basic assumptions 
as the deposit-savings game.  










financial distress, and they prefer to submit a claim so that the benefit outweighs the costs. To 
𝐴, a claim means that they chose correctly in applying for the policy, and they will prevent an 
income shock. Thus, if 𝐴 knows that 𝐵 will accept the request, 𝐴’s best response is first to 
apply and, if there is no enforcement, to make a claim. 
In turn, 𝐵 prefers that 𝐴 pays for the insurance policy but does not make a claim, so solution 4 
is superior to solution 3. Furthermore, declining the application (end node 2) is less desirable 
than if 𝐴 had not applied (case 1) as it incurs screening costs. Again, in order to reflect these 
preferences, we give utils to each solution (Table 3.2). 
Again, 𝐵 has power over 𝐴: if 𝐴 makes a claim, future insurance policies will be more 
expensive or perhaps declined. Thus, to assure the same price for insurance premium, 𝐴 will 
avoid making a claim. Because of that, we have a Nash equilibrium that is not Pareto efficient 
again, that is, solution 4. Here, 𝐴 would have higher payoffs if they would have made a claim 
but, having to move under the power of 𝐵, they decide not to make a claim. In this case, like 
in the credit game, the power of 𝐵 leads to the solution that yields higher payoffs to 𝐵, but not 
to 𝐴. 
 
Table 3.2: Payoff matrix of the insurance game 
 Financial institution (𝐵) 
𝐴 𝐷 
Individual (𝐴) 
𝑃𝐶 3, -1 -2, -1 
𝑃𝐶′ 1, 3 -2, -1 
𝑃′𝐶 -1,0 -1,0 
𝑃′𝐶′ -1,0 -1,0 
 
The insurance game is a short illustration of the relationship of the individual and financial 
institutions in LMICs. The model shows that, while potentially beneficial to the individual, the 
power mechanism involved in the relationship reduces their optimal outcome. Therefore, being 
constrained into making a claim, the individual may be discouraged to apply in the first place. 
Furthermore, as we address in the following chapter, poor individuals do not prioritise 
insurance. In turn, if there were disposable income, they would prefer to increase consumption 
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or save for future emergencies. Therefore, the importance of such aspect of FI is small in 
comparison to bank account ownership, savings and credit instruments. 
 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter starts by presenting three key macroeconomic conditions that shape FI in LMICs: 
the high levels of labour market informality, their subordinate position in the currency 
hierarchy, and the oligopoly aspect of the local financial markets. These yield an environment 
of high service fees and interest rates, which benefits banks but not the poor. Adding these 
Post-Keynesian hypotheses to the analysis of FI is the first part of our original contribution to 
the FI literature on the theoretical foundations. To date, mainstream studies focus on 
mathematical models that have been designed for societies in HICs, which do not grasp the 
macroeconomic constraints of LMICs. On the other hand, the critical literature focuses on the 
empirical contradictions of such policy, also not discussing the structural differences between 
the two regions.  
The second part of the chapter acknowledges such structural constraints, but focuses on the 
micro-level interactions between individual and financial institutions. Such original analysis 
also brings a new understanding of the relationship between those agents, which had not been 
developed by the FI literature so far. Moreover, we include the concept of power, which is key 
to understand the financial markets, particular in LMICs. In this region, the poor and informal 
workers, which are the subject of FI policies, are more prone to income shocks and have limited 
options on how to handle such issues (e.g. no social or employment-related benefits, irregular 
income strems, and high interest rates).  
In order to investigate the relationship between for-profit financial institutions and individuals 
in LMICs, we develop three microeconomic models considering four elements of FI: deposits, 
savings, credit and insurance. Under the presence of power mechanisms, the outcomes of such 
games will tend to benefit the financial institution, thus harming the potential benefit of the 
access and usage of financial instruments to the poor. For the individual, applying for a deposit 
account is crucial as it allows them to access further financial services, such as savings, credit 
and insurance. However, they may suffer from an initial income constraint, in which bank 
account fees become burdensome. The individual will also usually lack disposable income in 
order to save, thus also preventing them to benefit from the high interest rates. Furthermore, 
while credit and insurance may be important mechanisms for consumption smoothing, they 
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lead the individual to sub-optimal solutions as the power of financial institutions change their 
preferred choices. Therefore, we hypothesise that, under the presence of power, such financial 
services may, in fact, be detrimental to individuals in LMICs, especially the poor. In the 
following chapter, we utilise our theoretical contribution to assess the different elements of FI 



























A case study of financial inclusion in Brazil 
 
This chapter presents a mixed-method study of financial inclusion (FI) in Brazil. Despite the 
success of expanding financial services, few studies have investigated the consequences of 
these policies in the lives of the poor (Gurgel, 2014; Santanna, 2019). Since the 1990s, the 
government has fostered FI policies but, from the 2000s, these policies received a boost. 
Starting in 2003, a consumer and housing credit boom took place, along with new legislation 
on free basic bank accounts and state-owned banks’ correspondent banking39 (Barone and 
Sader, 2008; Banco Central do Brasil, 2009; Lavinas, 2015; Santanna, 2019, chap. 4). Thus, 
this chapter aims at uncovering new aspects of FI from a critical realist approach, and at 
establishing an association with our theoretical and quantitative research. 
According to the critical realism approach, research should be conducted through the mode of 
reasoning called retroduction. Using retroduction, this chapter is the first step into answering 
the thesis’ second and third research questions: 
 
RQ2. What is the causal relationship between poverty, income inequality and financial 
inclusion? 
 
RQ3: What are the effects of financial inclusion on poverty and income inequality? 
 
To conduct a study consistent with retroduction, we use between-method triangulation, i.e., 
quantitative and qualitative methods, as a tool of analysis (Downward and Mearman, 2007). In 
this way, both approaches are complementary and allow for a more in-depth analysis, including 
initial assumptions on causality and outcomes. 
Following the analysis of Chapter 3, this chapter is divided into four parts. First, it considers 
the macroeconomic conditions and market structures which shape FI in the country. Second, it 
presents the qualitative research design of our study. Third, it investigates the perception of 
 
39 Correspondent banking is the action of using other establishments, such as shops, to provide financial 
services in the name of banks. In Brazil, a common example is the lottery shops that allow deposits and 
withdrawals from state-owned banks. 
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poor individuals in order to verify the theoretical assumptions of the micro-level games and to 
reveal potential aspects of FI that had not been considered yet. Finally, the qualitative study 
sheds light on the causality between FI and poverty, which will be further scrutinised in Chapter 
6. 
 
4.1 Macroeconomic conditions and market structures in Brazil 
This sub-section introduces certain characteristics of the Brazilian labour and financial 
markets, in order to illustrate the arguments presented in Chapter 3. In line with the previous 
chapter, we divide this sub-section into three parts: (i) labour market structure, (ii) financial 
market structure, (iii) further quantitative analysis of the local financial market. 
 
4.1.1 Labour market structure 
Previously, we argued that the informality in the labour market reduces demand for financial 
services, as workers do not have enough income, but also reduces supply as often informal 
workers do not have collateral or regular income. Income irregularity also implicates that those 
individuals will be considered high-risk clients, of whom high interest rates will be charged. 
At the same time, these workers might require expensive emergency loans in order to maintain 
their consumption during periods of lower or no income. 
In Brazil, informality and unemployment have risen since late 2015 due to an economic 
slowdown and government policy shift from a social-democrat to a more liberal policy 
approach. Figure 4.1 displays the downward unemployment trend until 2014 and its shift from 
2015 onwards. 
This rise in unemployment has led workers into informality, as they need a new source of 
income. Whereas the Brazilian government provides low-income individuals with a 
conditional cash transfer called Bolsa Família (BF),40 such benefit is intended to eradicate 
extreme poverty (i.e. US$1.90/day), but it is not enough to provide the minimum goods and 
services to a household, especially in an urban context. In fact, we see in Table 4.1 that those 
who receive BF or other social benefits, such as the BPC-LOAS (for those with disabilities or 
 
40 From 2020, the BF is provided to households with per capita monthly income of R$89,00 (GBP12) or 
between R$89,01 and R$178,00 (GBP24) if there are children in the household. The amount varies depending 
on the household situation. For instance, if a beneficiary is pregnant, there is an increase of R$41 (GBP 6) per 
month. More in http://mds.gov.br/assuntos/bolsa-familia/o-que-e/beneficios/beneficios. 
65 
 
elderly without pensions), have a very low income per capita. BF beneficiaries earned an 
average of R$353 (£50) in 2019, lower than the income in previous years. 
 
Figure 4.1: Unemployment rates in Brazil (2012-2019) 
 
Source: IBGE (2020).  
 
Table 4.1: Average monthly household income per capita (in R$) 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Bolsa Família  381  403  413  393  369  354  353  352 
BPC-LOAS  722  756  776  763  752  751  724  755 
No Bolsa Família 1,565 1,602 1,646 1,575 1,570 1,558 1,623 1,641 
No BPC-LOAS 1,323 1,359 1,411 1,367 1,357 1,355 1,414 1,433 
Source: IBGE (2020) 
 
Therefore, many workers take on other jobs, such as cosmetologists, drivers and petty traders, 
in order to afford basic necessities, such as food, housing and clothing. In the end, such 
displacement from formal employment to informality caused an overcrowding the informal 
sector, which pushes incomes down. In Figure 4.2, we see the upward trend of informality rate 
in Brazil. Thus, we notice that the country is a significant example of a large informal labour 
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market and is able to illustrate the barriers faced by informal workers when accessing and using 
financial services.  
 
Figure 4.2: Informality rates in Brazil (2012-2019)41 
 
Source: IBGE (2020). 
Note: Before 2016, there is no data for self-employed and employers without taxpayer registry, which partially 
explains the sharp increase from 2016 and suggests that previous data was an underestimation. 
 
4.1.2 Financial market structure 
Besides the labour market, the structure of the financial market can also influence the 
implementation of FI policies. In order to analyse this issue in Brazil, this sub-section is divided 
into two: first, we consider the macroeconomic conditions in Brazil that lead to high interest 
rates and, second, we discuss more in-depth the bank concentration and role of state-owned 
financial institutions. 
As presented before, macroeconomic conditions and market structures also shape the local 
financial market in LMICs as the international monetary system and bank concentration may 
explain the high interest rates charged to customers. Brazil, as other LMICs, exhibits a 
subordinate position in the international currency hierarchy (Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 
 
41 Measured as informal worker + self-employed without a taxpayer registry + employer without taxpay 
registry + contributing family worker. 
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2015; Trancoso Baltar, 2015; Bortz and Kaltenbrunner, 2018; Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 
2018). The low quality of the Brazilian Real creates low demand for the currency, which is 
balanced by the monetary authority through increasing base interest rates. From 1996 to 2015, 
the average real base interest rate in Brazil was of 8.14%, much above HICs and other LMICs 
under inflation target policy (Balliester Reis, 2018). By adding a premium to the interest rate 
differential to core currencies, Brazil is able to attract foreign investors. This financial 
integration policy has been key to the Brazilian government since the 1990s, which includes 
reductions in capital controls and new policy-friendly rules toward foreign investors (Prates 
and Cintra, 2007).  
Added to the high base interest rates, interest spread in the country is also above other LMICs’. 
In Brazil, the average spread has increased over time, unlike most LMICs (Table 4.2). Between 
2010 and 2017, Brazil had a positive variation in the spread of 7.28 percentage points (p.p.), 
only behind Argentina whose interest rate level is less than a third of Brazil’s. 
 
Table 4.2: Interest rate spread for selected countries 
 2010 2017 
Variation 
(p.p) 
Argentina 1.39 9.69 8.30 
Brazil 31.12 38.40 7.28 
China 3.06 2.85 -0.21 
Colombia 5.72 7.70 1.98 
Indonesia 6.24 4.56 -1.68 
Kenya 9.81 5.99 -3.82 
Lebanon 1.94 1.18 -0.76 
Malaysia 2.50 1.69 -0.81 
Mexico 4.07 4.64 0.57 
Nigeria 11.06 8.00 -3.07 
Pakistan 5.90 3.73 -2.17 
Philippines 4.45 3.75 -0.70 
Russian Federation 4.20 4.72 0.52 
South Africa 3.37 3.13 -0.24 
Thailand 3.13 3.13 -0.01 
Median 4.20 4.56 -0.24 
                                     Source: World Bank (2020) 
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One explanation for this phenomenon is the high concentration in the credit market. From a 
Kaleckian perspective, banks can be considered oligopoly industries, where the interest rate 
spread is the mark-up of the financial institution over the costs (interests paid on deposits and 
borrowed funds), and it is determined by the degree of concentration. We suggest that fees for 
other services, such as bank accounts, are also inflated by this lack of competition. In 2017, the 
five largest banks accounted for 85.9% of loans (Banco Central do Brasil, 2017) and 83.37% 
of total commercial banking assets, displaying an increase over the years (Table 4.3). 
These five largest banks, however, are not of the same nature. Itaú, Bradesco and Santander 
are private for-profit financial institutions, whereas Banco do Brasil (BB) has a mixed structure 
and Caixa Econômica Federal (Caixa) is a fully state-owned bank. The BB is a private for-
profit bank, in which the government is the largest shareholder. In turn, Caixa is also a for-
profit bank, but with the government as the sole owner. While the World Bank (2014, p. 3) 
advocates that the public policy should only handle market failures and that  
“policies to expand account penetration – such as requiring banks to offer basic or low-
fee accounts, […] allowing correspondent banking, and using electronic payments into 
bank accounts for government payments – are especially effective among those people 
who are often excluded […]. Other direct government intervention – such as directed 
credit, debt relief, and lending through state-owned banks – tend to be politicized and 
less successful”, 
Whereas Brazil has partially followed the such advices, such as creating correspondent banking 
systems, providing social benefits through electronic payments and requiring banks for offer 
basic accounts, the country has also decided to follow a policy in which state-owned banks 
(SOBs), in particular Caixa and other regional banks, foster the FI of low-income individuals 
through loans. 
As introduced in Chapter 3, whereas SOBs might provide cheaper loans, they are still for-profit 
financial institutions and, thus, are treated in the same way as private banks in this thesis. In 
the country, both types of banks must provide basic bank accounts to individuals and both can 
be used to receive state pensions. However, certain social benefits, such as Bolsa Família, can 
only be retrieved from a Caixa account. Therefore, it is common that poor individuals will 
make use of Caixa accounts as their main and/or only account. 
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Table 4.3: Bank concentration for selected countries (%) 
 1996 2001 2006  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Argentina 40.31 47.53 46.95  57.76 59.53 61.99 63.36 65.77 65.83 57.92 
Brazil 51.10 51.15 49.80  75.95 76.62 77.45 79.50 83.44 84.99 83.37 
China 59.68 51.94 49.60  64.68 78.87 77.52 55.38 54.54 52.92 52.48 
Colombia 68.66 68.15 76.93  80.40 80.34 80.97 80.38 86.48 89.39 77.03 
India 48.17 47.20 46.71  39.89 39.37 39.48 40.17 41.26 44.29 47.03 
Indonesia 44.86 48.98 60.27  55.52 54.20 51.23 52.38 52.34 52.39 53.92 
Kenya 68.76 66.16 69.64  59.76 54.60 52.80 48.65 55.79 53.53 52.91 
Lebanon 48.18 53.86 52.43  58.33 55.86 56.34 57.17 55.95 55.65 55.77 
Malaysia 57.71 64.83 61.52  68.48 62.26 62.59 64.66 69.08 69.60 69.94 
Mexico 72.51 80.99 80.67  72.03 70.75 72.53 72.88 69.72 68.05 68.96 
Nigeria 48.60 48.41 33.42  59.06 55.52 56.47 56.83 57.28 62.73 63.21 
Pakistan 89.44 87.32 90.28  100.00 58.92 59.24 58.31 57.52 58.79 59.99 
Philippines 89.82 87.23 90.24  56.37 56.48 60.34 62.49 64.28 61.70 65.03 
Russian Federation 78.97 77.52 81.60  35.50 38.74 38.06 41.69 55.25 54.80 67.81 
South Africa 89.85 87.12 98.22  99.36 99.25 99.12 99.11 99.03 98.84 98.47 
Thailand 63.72 65.33 69.96  66.20 67.52 67.43 69.54 66.78 67.73 68.58 
Turkey 74.68 65.44 67.89  63.25 61.59 59.70 59.66 60.38 60.04 60.18 
Source: World Bank (2020) 




Other regional banks, such as Banco do Nordeste (BNB), also play an important role in 
promoting FI and microfinance in the country. This regional development bank, known as the 
“Brazilian Grameen Bank” (Neri and Buchmann, 2008), offers microcredit loans with social 
collateral, called CrediAmigo.42 However, such policies are still strongly rooted on the 
microfinance approach. 
At the same time, state-owned banks also present a strong profit seeking practice as we will 
see in our qualitative results. For now, we can investigate the profit goal of the largest state-
owned bank in Brazil. In Caixa, recent changes in governance have shifted previous 
development policies to a more profit-led objective. Like private banks, Caixa has had 
increasing profits since 2017, reaching R$21.06 billion in 2019 (Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.3: Caixa’s net profit (in R$ billion) 
 
Source: Caixa’s financial statements 2013-2019. 
 
This high profitability is a result of increasing income from fees, declining funding costs, and 
a restructuring process aimed at reducing labour costs that started in 2015 (Dieese, 2018). From 
the revenue side, part of Caixa’s profits were from services and fees. Table 4.4 displays this 
 
42 In comparison to other loans (Table 4.3), CrediAmigo seems to offer lower interest rates. A simulation of an 




type of income for the top five banks. As we notice, Caixa increased its income by 88% from 
2012 to 2018, surpassing other private banks such as Santander and Bradesco. 
 
Table 4.4: Income from services and fees of the top 5 Brazilian banks (in R$ millions) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Banco do Brasil 21.07 23.30 25.07 22.36 24.00 25.94 27.42 
Bradesco 17.07 19.46 21.79 19.30 21.58 24.03 25.22 
Caixa 14.28 16.35 18.40 20.72 22.46 25.04 26.85 
Itaú 20.31 24.07 27.74 30.82 33.23 35.80 38.40 
Santander 9.68 10.67 11.06 11.87 13.72 15.61 17.27 
Source: Dieese (2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018). 
 
From the cost side, Table 4.5 shows the reversing of the previous upward trend in job creation 
at Caixa, due to incentives to the voluntary retirement programme, voluntary redundancy 
programme and the closure of 37 branches in 2017 and 2018 (Dieese, 2015; 2017; 2018). In 
2018, Caixa only had more employees than Santander, while from 2013 to 2015, it had 
surpassed Bradesco and Itaú. 
 
 
Table 4.5: Number of employees of the top 5 Brazilian banks 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Banco do Brasil 113.81 114.182 112.216 111.628 109.191 100.622 99.161 96.889 
Bradesco 104.684 103.385 100.489 95.52 92.861 108.79343 98.808 98.605 
Caixa  85.633 92.926 98.198 101.484 97.458 94.978 87.654 84.952 
Itaú 98.258 90.323 87.589 93.175 83.481 80.871 85.537 86.801 
Santander 54.564 53.992 49.621 49.309 50.024 47.254 47.404 48.012 
Source: Dieese (2012, 2018) 
 
 




Therefore, we notice that, whereas there might be some differences between state-owned and 
private banks in Brazil, these are still for-profit and, charging high fees or interest rates on 
clients, especially low-income ones, might generate further poverty rather than poverty 
alleviation. Furthermore, we notice that the direction of SOBs are policy-driven and might 
fluctuate over time, indicating that such financial institutions might not be so incompatible with 
the mainstream recommendation on the nature of FI policies. 
 
4.1.3 Further quantitative analysis of the local financial market 
The association of high level of labour informality to high interest rates may lead to a negative 
outcome of FI in LMIC’s. In this sub-section, we analyse quantitative information about bank 
accounts and savings, credit market and insurance in order to pave the way for our in-depth 
qualitative analysis.  
 
Bank account and savings 
Bank accounts are widespread in Brazil and has been boosted by the payment of social benefits 
through Caixa. According to the Findex dataset, access to bank accounts have increased in the 
country and the majority of the population (70.1%) had access to this service in 2017 (Table 
4.6). Moreover, Caixa is the largest bank in number of clients (103,3 million clients in 2019, 
although they do not disclose which of those clients are individuals or firms), which shows the 
importance of this SOB. Finally, we do not have further information on income of clients, nor 
the type of accounts that are mostly used, but these results suggest that low-income individuals 
do have widespread access to basic bank accounts in Brazil. 
 
Table 4.6: Has an account at a financial institution? Data for Brazil 
Account 2011 2014 2017 
No 462 302 292 
Yes 575 705 708 
Total 1,037 1,007 1,000 




The use frequency of such account, nonetheless, is not well-reported. As already discussed in 
Chapter 3, low incomes prevent the poor from using further financial services, including 
savings. In fact, a Central Bank study that shows that about 57% of savers in Brazil held less 
than R$100, while 3% saved more than R$30,000 in 2017 (Figure 4.4). This concentration of 
savings also suggests that, in an environment of high interest rates, the savings-rich individuals 
will benefit more from the financial system. In 2017, the deposit rate was 6.6% a year, and 
lending rates reached up to 299% (Banco Central do Brasil, 2020). This discrepancy means 
that the poor will pay a high premium for debts, while the rich will earn high returns on savings. 
This finding goes in contrast to what is proposed by the mainstream literature, in which 
financial institutions promote better income distribution by intermediating the income of savers 
to the expenditures of borrowers. Moreover, beyond being a mere intermediary, for-profit 
financial institutions appropriate most of this spread in the form of profits, boosting the income 
of shareholders. Thus, in a situation of low income and irregular income streams, increasing FI 
of the poor may lead to income inequality. 
 
Figure 4.4: Distribution and participation of clients and amounts by savings deposit bands 
(2017) 
 










































































































































































Credit and interest rates 
In the previous chapter, we argued that informal workers and the unemployed are charged a 
premium on loans due to their repayment riskiness. Expensive loans, in turn, may lead the poor 
to over-indebtedness especially in an environment of irregular income streams. In the country, 
commercial bank interest rates clearly reflect the employment situation of borrowers as we can 
notice in Table 4.7. Breaking interest rates by credit type, we notice that the cheapest credit 
lines are payday loans44 to public officers and pensioners (i.e., regular income earners) and 
vehicle purchase credit (i.e. with collateral). In contrast, non-payday loans, credit card rates 
and overdrafts display the highest interest rates in the credit market.45 As long-term loans are 
inaccessible to self-employed and unemployed workers, they must recur to short-term loans, 
in particular credit cards and overdrafts, whose interest rates are incompatible to their earnings 
(Paim, 2015; Costa et al., 2018).46 
Table 4.7: Average interest rates of selected types of credit (March 2019)47 
Variable Annual percentage 
Payday loan - public sector workers 21.45 
Payday loan - pensioners 24.7 
Payday loan - private sector workers 37.65 
Non-payday loan 123.71 
Vehicle purchase credit 21.38 
Other goods purchase credit 75.06 
Credit card - instalment by financial institution 178.41 
Credit card – “rotativo”48 299.45 
Overdraft 322.74 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil (2020) 
Note: This is the average of interest rates supplied to individuals, not firms. 
 
44 In Brazil, a type of payday loan called ‘consigned credit’ is designed for public officials and pensioners (either 
retiree or other type of pension) who may access a cheaper type of credit by deducting the amount from the 
checking account when the person receives the wage/pension. 
45 Credit card interest rates reached 497.73% in 2017, before the National Monetary Council implemented 
Resolution 4.549, establishing that unpaid statements could only be charged in “rotativo” up to the following 
statement (Banco Central do Brasil, 2017; Dieese, 2019). 
46 In Karacimen's (2015) mixed-method study on Turkey, workers under better employment conditions also 
had access to cheaper loans, while workers in precarious employment situations would often use credit cards 
as a substitute for wage. 
47 It is important to remind that credit card instalments that are provided by stores are free from interest rates. 




We can also analyse credit access from those households that receive social benefits, i.e., have 
very low incomes. As we will discuss further in the qualitative analysis, a very important 
difference emerges from receipients of social benefits in Brazil. Whereas those individuals 
have a regular income stream, which in turn could allow them to make use of lower interest 
rates loans, the cash benefits vary a lot depending on the type of programme they are inserted. 
BF recipients under extreme poverty conditions (i.e., less than R$89 per capita) will earn R$89 
plus R$41 per child. In a household with two adults and two children, for example, the 
household would earn R$171 (£24). This represents only 17% of the minimum wage 
(R$1,000), which is not a sufficient amount to purchase basic necessities and afford monthly 
loan repayments. In turn, those who receive the BPC-LOAS, for example, earn the minimum 
wage, which is considered by banks to be a satisfactory amount of regular income (verified by 
the lower interest rates charged on payday loans to pensioners as shown in Table 4.7). At the 
same time, as we notice in Table 4.8, beneficiaries of BF do have credit access, but credit 
penetration is lower among those than beneficiaries of other social benefits. 
 
Table 4.8: Individuals who are part of social programmes and have credit access (in 
thousands)49 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of beneficiaries 24,065 30,054 32,925 34,385 34,914 38,620 
Non-BF 7,717 10,681 12,538 13,728 14,647 16,160 
BF 16,348 19,373 20,386 20,657 20,266 22,460 
       
Number of beneficiaries with active debt 4,561 6,053 6,687 6,840 6,472 6,700 
Non-BF 2,014 2,968 3,615 4,110 4,205 4,416 
BF 2,547 3,086 3,072 2,729 2,267 2,284 
       
Credit penetration (%) 19.0 20.1 20.3 19.9 18.5 17.3 
Non-BF 26.1 27.8 28.8 29.9 28.7 27.3 
BF 15.6 15.9 15.1 13.2 11.2 10.2 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil (2017, p. 38) 
 
 




Therefore, it is expected that our hypothesis that informal workers and the unemployed will 
have an increasing demand for emergency loans, but will have to face higher charges due to 
their riskiness. In the end, we assume that such conditions may lead to further loss of income 
in the long-run. 
 
Insurance 
Unfortunately, not much information is available for insurance markets in Brazil. According 
to the insurance regulatory agency (SUSEP), which does not include health insurance, there 
has been a growth of such markets in the country. In 2003, it represented 2.6% of GDP whereas 
in 2019 it grew to 3.8% (SUSEP, 2020). An interesting fact is the market concentration. While 
insurances such as car, life or housing insurance are less concentrated and the largest five 
insurance firms represented only 32% of the market in 2019, private pension schemes markets 
were highly concentrated. From 2003 to 2019, the market share of the five largest private 
pension institutions (mostly banks) went from 77% to 92% of the market (ibid). 
Yet, it is difficult to understand the impact of such changes in the lives of the poorest, as no 
further data was available. As we will see next, nonetheless, very few participants made use of 
any type of insurance because of income constraints, as we had hypothesised in our insurance 
model in the previous chapter. 
Thus, after this introduction of the macroeconomic constraints and the local financial market 
in Brazil, we first present our qualitative research design before analysing the qualitative 
results. 
 
4.2 Qualitative research design 
The research design of this study was done following the guidelines from Bloomberg and 
Volpe (2012). Figure 4.5 displays the five suggested steps. First, we started by reviewing 
qualitative and quantitative studies on FI in Brazil. Second, we analysed survey information 
from publicly available sources, such as the Central Bank of Brazil, in order to grasp the general 
context of FI. Third, based on existing information, we generated an original questionnaire and 
conducted the interviews. Fourth, we coded, translated and analysed the qualitative data 
through a thematic approach. Finally, we conducted the synthesis of findings and compared 




Figure 4.5: Flowchart of research design 
 
 
4.2.1 Data collection method 
The data collection was done through semi-structured interviews. Interviews allow for an “in-
depth, context-rich personal accounts, perceptions and perspectives” (Bloomberg and Volpe, 
2012, p.252), besides the description and explanations of complex interactions and processes. 
In this way, interviewing individuals gave us a more in-depth understanding of their reasons 
and motivations to be part of the formal financial system. This tool, however, might have 
certain limitations, as not all interviewees are equally cooperative and articulate, which might 
diminish the overall quality of the in-depth research (Bloomberg and Volpe, 2012, chap. 7). In 
our study, this happened with only two interviews, so its overall quality was not affected. 
In particular, semi-structured interviews consist in closed- and open-ended questions, which 
are able to produce data based on participant’s experience, as well as data guided by existing 
knowledge in the literature (Galletta, 2013, chap. 2). There is also flexibility as it is possible to 
adapt questions, adjust wording and level of language, change their order and add further 
questions depending on participants’ responses, in order to explore or clarify particular answers 
(Berg, 2009, chap. 4; Elliot et al., 2016).50 
 
50 Questionnaire can be found in Appendix C (C.1). 
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There are, nonetheless, further limitations to qualitative research. First, this method cannot 
guarantee wide generalisability (Berg, 2009). However, it still allows for transferability, that 
is, the study makes it possible for other researchers to use similar processes for studying other 
communities (Bloomberg and Volpe, 2012, chap. 7).  
Second, we are unable to provide validity. Instead, qualitative research demands credibility 
(Bloomberg and Volpe, 2012, chap. 7). To ensure credibility, we compare participants’ answers 
to those from other studies throughout the chapter (Schicks and Rosenberg, 2011; Gurgel, 
2014; Banco Central do Brasil, 2014; Schicks, 2014; Williams et al., 2015; Banco Central do 
Brasil, 2018; Lindsjö, 2018; Santanna, 2019). Discrepant findings are also reported in order to 
provide accurate information. 
Finally, the method does not provide reliability, but dependability. To achieve it, we provide 
an “audit trail” to allow other researchers to replicate the findings (Bloomberg and Volpe, 2012, 
chap. 7). 51 
 
4.2.2 Research sample 
The research sample consisted of 30 individuals. Participants were selected by purposive 
sampling, a non-probability sampling strategy to select a specific type of individual displaying 
a particular attribute (Berg, 2009, chap. 2). According to Guest, Bunce and Johnson (2006), 
when using purposive sampling, the saturation occurs within the first twelve interviews. Thus, 
in order to proceed carefully, a total of 15 participants were selected from the rural and 15 
participants from the urban area of Minas Gerais, Brazil.52 
The access to participants was often facilitated by a gatekeeper, i.e., local leaderships who 
indicated participants based on the socio-economic criteria. The use of a gatekeeper allowed 
for a more accessible selection of participants, besides ensuring participants about the 
significance of the research. 
First, participants were selected based on their address, as a proxy of income, so that only low-
income individuals were interviewed. Second, in order to compare to existing quantitative 
information, we select only those who earn up to or around one minimum wage (R$1,000 
 
51 Description of pilot interviews, adjustment of questionnaire and role of gate-keepers can be found in 
Appendix C (C.2). 




monthly).53 Third, further socio-economic criteria were followed so that we could reach a 
diversity of participants with respect to gender, race, age range, educational status and 
occupation.54 Finally, participants were anonymised using numerical identifiers, but their 
indirect identifiers, such as gender, age, occupation and region, are disclosed so that those 
socio-economic comparisons can be provided. 
 
4.3 Results 
Acknowledging macroeconomic conditions and market structure in LMICs, we illustrate the 
results of quantitative information through the perception of participants of the qualitative 
study. We provide such evaluation through thematic analysis, i.e., we identify patterns within 
the different interviews and provide a conclusion on the particular uncovered themes. We split 
this section into five sub-sections, following the game models provided in Chapter 3 and adding  
further insights on power mechanisms and on the causal relationship between poverty and FI. 
First, we present results on bank accounts and savings, considering the role of state-owned 
banks and income constraints. Second, we show the findings with respect to credit, highlighting 
the importance of interest rates and indebtedness. Third, we present results on insurance and 
discuss the role of income as displayed in the insurance game. Fourth, we discuss the role of 
power and the enforcement mechanisms used by local banks. Finally, we introduce the 
discussion on causal relation between FI and poverty through the perception of participants. 
 
4.3.1 Bank accounts and savings 
One of the objectives of FI is to ensure bank account ownership to all individuals. This first 
step allows access to further financial services, such as insurance and savings. However, this 
approach disregards some key aspects of the labour market informality that influences the 
access to and usage of formal financial services, as discussed in Chapter 3. First, informal 
workers may not demand bank accounts, as income is low and irregular, besides performing 
most transactions in cash. Second, the lack of income does not allow poor informal workers to 
build up savings, as all income is used for basic consumption needs. 
 
53 £140 in May 2020. 




In our sample, only three participants did not have a bank account (P9, P12 and P24).55 The 
first two declared they were unemployed, thus had no need for a bank account. The latter said 
she was too indebted and was not allowed to own one anymore. This means that 90% of our 
sample was included in the formal financial system through bank accounts. As we can see in 
Figure 4.6, 78% had an account at a SOB (BB, Caixa and/or BNB), while 33% had an account 
at a private bank (Bradesco, Itaú or Santander) and 11% an account at a cooperative (Sicoob).56 
 
Figure 4.6: Account ownership by financial institution 
 
This finding highlights the importance of SOBs, in particular Caixa, to low-income individuals. 
The bank is considered a more accessible financial institution for low-income individuals and 
has been referred to as the “bank of poverty” (P2) since it “is more viable for us who don’t own 
much” (P5). For them, “there are banks for posh people and banks for the humbler ones. The 
bank of the poor and the bank of the rich. Caixa, for me, is more for the ordinary people” (P11). 
Moreover, “their accounts have a gratifying benefit to the poor. In other banks, we can’t do it. 
Caixa, how do I say it, is the bank of the poor. It is there where you receive unemployment 
benefits, PIS57, these things, everything is at Caixa Econômica. Caixa or Banco do Brasil. […] 
 
55 We use P to characterise participants and keep them anonymous. 
56 Results sum more than 100% as some individuals had more than one account, for instance, one to receive 
wages and one to receive social benefits. 
57 Programme of Social Integration, a social benefit paid by the employer. 

















And it is a bank that when you open an account, let’s suppose, you want to cancel that account, 
the fees are not so high. It is not an absurd such as Itaú, Bradesco, Santander” (P12). 
Private banks, in contrast, are usually seen as expensive and less accommodating to the needs 
of the poor. Whereas private banks are also obliged to provide free basic accounts, several 
participants decided to migrate from private banks to Caixa because of the high costs. At 
Santander, for instance, the experience “was really bad. They ate up a lot of money because it 
was a checking account and a salary account. Anyway, I opened it at Caixa, to save a bit of 
cash on the savings account” (P20).58 Likewise, at Itaú, “the financial costs were too high, so I 
couldn’t keep the account at Itaú. I had to cancel and keep only Caixa, which is a savings and 
a salary account” (P4). In turn, at Caixa “if the money would be deposited on one day, you 
could let it to the next, without any costs. At Santander, no. If you leave it from one day to the 
other, they already take some of your money” (P20). 
Private banks were also reported to take advantage of some participants (P12, P14, P21, P24, 
P25, P26). The most common practices were pushing checking accounts instead of salary or 
savings accounts. To P26, a Santander employee “said, ‘you must open a checking account’, 
‘am I obliged to?’, ‘yes’, so well, I didn’t mind and opened it. But every month I was owing 
some money. [...] So I said, ‘there is something sketchy about it’. [...] Wait a minute, I have a 
checking account and I am paying almost R$13 to have it?”. For participants, the costs of 
keeping a checking account are too high: “you take R$25 off the minimum wage. If you think 
about it, R$20 is five packs of rice, of the worst rice” (P17).  
The relationship between employment, bank account and savings was also found in our 
research, which were in line with out theoretical discussion. As we have detailed in sub-section 
4.1.1, there has been a shift from formal to informal employement in the past years in Brazil. 
The worsening labour market conditions were felt by nine participants in our study. P2, for 
instance, claimed that the end of tourism boom after the World Cup in 2014 caused her to be 
downgraded from head cleaner to a self-employed cleaner in the hotel she works. Others, such 
as P14, a former kitchen assistant in the formal labour market was fired and became a self-
employed waster picker in a cooperative. Similarly, P12 used to work as a cashier in a 
supermarket but, due to long-term unemployed, decided to become a self-employed 
hairdresser. 
 




These examples suggest that self-employment is often the last resource of workers. Of the 20 
participants in the labour market, 12 were informal workers, especially on low-skill 
occupations, such as cleaning, hairdresser, sales and construction. This supply shock generates 
extreme competition in the labour market, which was also noticed. As put by P11, a pensioner 
who performs sporadic work (“bicos”) as a hairdresser, “nowadays there are too many people 
[working as a hairdresser], so for me it is complicated”. This competition put downward 
pressure on wages and profits, which in turn may increase poverty levels (ILO, 2009; Taylor, 
2012; Bateman, 2014). Figure 4.7 shows how self-employed workers in our sample earn in 
average less than formal workers, as there is no minimum wage floor. While the average of 
formal workers was R$1,000, informal workers reported average earnings of R$836. 
 
Figure 4.7: Average income by employment status 
 
 
Note: the numbers on top of each category show the number of participants. While pensioners have the right to a 
minimum wage, the average is lowered by one of the participants who had issues with proving his disability 
condition. He was retired for health reasons and had his income reduced to R$35, as he could not afford to go to 
the largest nearby city to do further exams and take it to the Social Security Office (INSS) to prove his inability 
to work. 
 
From the demand-side, being in the informal sector reduces the demand for formal financial 
services, especially bank accounts, “as I am not working [anymore], I can’t put money there. 
So, I don’t use it. But I didn’t close it” (P15). Unlike formal workers and pensioners, who often 
















do not make frequent use of this service. Participants use banks “the less I can. […] as I am 
self-employed, I already pay [the debts] in cash” (P2). Those who receive benefits, such as the 
conditional cash transfer Bolsa Família (BF), report to use it only once a month: “when it is 
possible to withdraw everything, I do it, so I can solve things” (P14) and they “prefer to use 
cash. I don’t know if it is true, but they say every time I use my card, they discount R$2. 
Therefore, I already withdraw everything at once!” (P11). These reports indicate that even 
those who own a bank account may not make frequent use of it due to earning in cash, the 
perceived high cost or because the income is spent immediately.59 
In our deposits/savings game, the second part of the game includes the possibility of saving if 
the individual has enough income. In our study, we noticed that, indeed, the lack of money 
constrains savings by the poor. While half of the participants claimed saving some money 
(Figure 4.8), self-employed workers only manage to save low amounts for everyday needs: “if 
I have to buy a bit of sand [for constructing a house], I keep some small amount. It is not really 
saving; it is the necessary. The wage doesn’t allow [me] to buy things” (P10). For those “who 
earn the minimum wage, we end up spending everything. Sometimes, if we do keep [money], 
it is R$100, it is money that is there for emergencies. For example, if we need something, like 
gas60, something fast, you have it there” (P1). However, “there are times by the end of the 
month that there is not R$1 to spare!” (P10). Therefore, even with access to formal bank 










59 Full information on the banking information of participants can be found in Appendix C (C.5). 
60 In Brazil, it is common to buy gas cylinders for household consumption, which costs around £14 and lasts, in 





Figure 4.8: Participants’ answers on whether they save money 
 
Overall, we notice that formal employment and demand for formal financial services are 
intrinsically related. Unemployed and self-employed workers often have a reduced need for 
financial services, either because of low income or for receiving in cash. At the same time, 
those who receive social benefits have an incentive to open an account, but do not use it 
frequently, as they prefer to withdraw it at once. Moreover, such low and irregular income 
constraints them to acquire further financial services, in particular formal savings. Therefore, 
poor individuals are unable to save high amounts of money and benefit of interest-earning from 
formal savings accounts. 
 
4.3.2 Credit and indebtedness 
In our sample, the most common formal credit instrument was formal loans, followed by credit 
cards. Of the 30 participants, 22 claimed having made a formal loan, while eight said they never 
did it. The majority requested a loan for housing purposes (8), bills (4), repay other loans (2) 
but also food (2), travel (1), dental care (1) and child birth (1). Only three participants got a 

















Figure 4.9: Have you ever had a bank loan? 
 
 
In turn, only nine participants had credit cards: eight declared having them in the past, but not 
anymore, and 16 of them said they do not have/had one (Figure 4.10). The main reasons for 
not having a credit card anymore were related to lack of money and over-indebtedness. 
 
Figure 4.10: Credit card ownership 
 
















In our study, most participants consider interest rates “high” (P3, P5, P8, P14, P17, P22, P24, 
P25, P27, P28, P29), “absurd” (P4, P12) and even “abusive” (P2, P16, P19 and P23). Some 
claim that “in a way, they [banks] take advantage of people’s needs, they have abusive interest 
rates. Then a lot of people in their innocence, in a moment of despair, end up falling for it” 
(P2). For P29, “the problem of the bank […] is that the interest is very high. So, if you delay 
one day, it is over. Then you get desperate because they will throw a lot of interest on me”. 
Therefore, they consider banks “sort of thieves. The interest is too high, other things [also] 
super high. […] They may say they don’t steal, but we know they do—super high interests, 
[…] abusive. You take a R$2,000 loan when you realize, in the end, you paid R$5,000. They 
should offer and supply you with what they propose. Like, it is a R$2,000 loan? Could be, like, 
R$2,500, to take their share. But to take R$2,000 and pay R$5,000 in interest I think it is 
unnecessary” (P19).Unlike formal workers, self-employed and unemployed workers do not 
have access to cheaper lines of credit as we saw in Table 4.7. In turn, social benefit holders, 
despite having a regular income stream, do not necessarily have access to payday loans either. 
This group can be divided into two. The first one is constituted of those who receive a minimum 
wage pension, such as to the elderly or disabled individuals.61 The second includes those who 
earn lower benefits, particularly the BF, which in our sample reached an average of around 1/3 
of the minimum wage (R$379). The first group has access to similar loan conditions as formal 
workers, while the second group must recur to expensive loans, such as overdrafts. This 
constraint is reported by participants like P14, who said she would not even apply for a loan 
because “I won’t get it. If I do get it, how am I going to pay? The money from BF is just for 
food and gas. There is not even money left to buy clothes for my boys”. This finding partially 
contradicts the hypothesis that government benefits, such as pensions and the BF, are a sort of 
collateralization in financialised capitalist economies, in order to push FI to poor individuals 
(Lavinas, 2018). Thus, we suggest that, for a regular income stream to be considered some sort 
of collateral for loans, it must overcome a certain minimum threshold – which is not the case 
of BF. 
For both formal and informal workers, credit cards play an important role in credit provision. 
Such credit cards can be provided by banks, insurance firms, retail stores (from supermarkets 
to department shops), gas station and a range of other institutions. While credit cards are often 
 





used for instalment purchases, participants consider that both credit cards and personal loans62 
have a “snowball effect”, as high interest rates and variable income may affect repayment rates 
and lead to increased indebtedness. 
In our sample, only P8 and P15 claimed never making use of instalments, i.e., 93% of 
participants had already purchased goods in monthly sums. Table 4.9 displays the goods that 
have been purchased in such manner. We notice that, in fact, individuals pay in instalments to 
purchase more expensive items, such as mobile and radios (electronics), but also basic 
necessity such as food, clothing and medicine. 
 
Table 4.9: Purchased goods using instalments 
Item Frequency Percentage 
Electronics 16 53% 
Clothes/Shoes 13 43% 
Food 9 30% 
Furniture 6 20% 
School supply 2 7% 
Medicine 2 7% 
                                       Note: Results add to more than 100% as participants might have made several                                                                      
instalment purchases. 
 
Credit cards also have a wealth effect on participants, since “the card is like this: when you 
have it, you spend it. Then later is can also become a snowball, a turmoil” (P12) and they “think 
that we can spend without being able to, so we spend much more than we should” (P19). 
Therefore, “with a credit card, you take advantage of the opportunities, the sales, and will end 
up getting indebted” (P2). Such wealth effect does not correspond to their earnings, which may 
generate over-indebtedness if individuals are unable to repay instalments in time.The problem 
is aggravated for those who purchase items for relative or friends, but do not receive the 
payment in time. P5, for instance, purchased a good for her sister-in-law on her credit card, but 
by the time the statement was due, she did not receive the money: “she was stalling, and when 
 





I was about to pay, the card was becoming a snowball” (P5). Interest rates “were too high and 
when I decided to pay, I had problems because I had lent the money of the statement and, the 
person who was supposed to pay me took a long time to do so, and when I went to pay, it 
became a snowball, and there was no way” (P28). The high costs of delaying a credit card 
repayment is a problem for low-income individuals and “for me, it is not worth having a credit 
card, I never liked it. I had to pay for it, and it became a snowball. I managed to pay, but it is 
not worth it. I had to work a way to pay, because the interests were very high. But I paid it” 
(P25). Thus, some prefer to use cash instead since they “do the budget with what I have, not 
what I don’t have. Because if I do my budget with what I don’t have, after to repay, it becomes 
a snowball” (P1). In fact, some participants would not have credit cards in order to avoid a 
potential indebtedness: “I’ve never used it. I’m scared to death. I have heard a lot of stories of 
people with credit cards, checks... I have no limits; my eyes are bigger than the stomach. I 
prefer not to hang myself too much”. Her aunt, for instance, “got screwed a lot. She even 
wanted to commit suicide once. Everything she sees, she wants it. And at the time of paying, 
only God knows!” (P10). Therefore, we notice that while credit cards could provide 
consumption smoothing, it could also lead to increasing indebtedness due to their high interest 
rates, which would go in opposition of the supposed benefits of credit for the poor. 
Taking personal loans were also, in general, considered a negative experience (e.g. P4, P6, P10, 
P16, P19, P24 P28). Participants borrowed “thinking it was one thing, but it was another. So, 
it became really bad, I delayed bills, everything. It became a snowball in my life” (P4). 
Moreover, when unable to repay the loan, “the interest rates will only go up, become a 
snowball, and this snowball will become a dirty name.63 God forbid me!” (P19). For instance, 
“last time I got R$1,100. And we keep paying it. This R$1,100 becomes a snowball. And you 
keep paying it. I will pay in 12 times. I am now on my third instalment” (P16). Moreover, 
delayed personal loans also create further financial problems and may create a debt trap: “every 
time I renegotiate, they split [the total] for me in 48 times of R$150. So, I start paying. When 
it is about 15 instalments, if I delay, they say I need to make a new contract. This new contract 
starts from scratch: 30 instalments of R$215. And it goes on, it became a snowball” (P24). 
Therefore, participants believe that banking cannot help people overcome poverty. For P10, 
the person would not have the skills to manage financial services properly and “would create a 
 




snowball”, as the more opportunities of credit it would appear, the more they would get 
indebted.64 
Four participants who borrowed higher amounts for housing purposes were also displeased. 
P28 said she “bitterly regretted” taking a R$4,000 loan, as it took her six years to repay the 
debt (a total of R$13,392) and, in the end, “it was a lot of spending and it didn’t work out. And 
I think the interest rates were really high”. Likewise, P29 also “regretted, regretted, regretted, 
because they charged R$4,900 in interest from me! I got R$5,000, I was building a little house 
up there, to add to this house, but later I said, ‘dear god, how can human beings have such a 
weak mind?’, because when I realized, I took R$5,000 and paid R$9,800. I paid it for 5 years. 
Never again”. In another case, P1 “heard that I could open [an account] and ask for a loan”, so 
she “went to Caixa and talked to the manager”. She received R$5,000 but “ended up paying 
R$10,000 because interest rates are very expensive”. However, she does not regret it because 
she “had no place to go, where to run, another alternative.” Finally, P11, who lives in Izidora 
occupation,65 borrowed R$7,000 “as I arrived at a tent, there was nothing. So always there was 
a loan to be able to buy something to build the masonry”. In the end, she “was paying more 
than R$14,000!”. As a pensioner, she also was able to get a payday loan from BMG66, “so I 
could either withdraw R$1,500 or buy [with it]. So, I went and withdrew the R$1,500 as I 
bought the materials for my house. But later I could no longer repay it”. 
The concept of over-indebtedness has been the subject of much debate in the literature, in part 
because it has been measured in different ways. We follow the definition that over-
indebtedness occurs when individuals must make sacrifices in order to comply with 
repayments, such as cutting on food, as well as becoming impoverish through debt (Schicks 
and Rosenberg, 2011; Guérin et al., 2013; Schicks, 2014; Afonso et al., 2017; Guérin et al., 
2018). Within this framework, more than a third of participants could be considered currently 
or previously over-indebted as they claimed working more hours (P8, P26, P29), cutting on 
food (P1, P2, P10, P12, P18, P19), reducing/not paying utilities (P4, P18) and selling assets to 
repay the loan (P24, P25). This evidence indicates that over-indebtedness within low-income 
 
64 More on the relationship between poverty and FI in sub-section 4.3.5. 
65 The region is a squatting movement of working-class people who built their houses in abandoned areas part 
of the Brigadas Populares social movement. More on the occupation can be found in Isaias (2017) and Galera 
(2019). 
66 BMG is one of the largest non-bank financial institutions (financeira) in Brazil. For payday loans, they have a 





individuals may be more recurrent than what is acknowledged by the mainstream literature on 
FI. 
Besides the high interest rates, an important driver of over-indebtedness is an income shock, 
such as unemployment or unexpected sickness.67 Some participants, for instance, stopped 
paying credit cards statements because “the firm sent me away, so I had to sell some goods I 
had in order to repay [the debt]” (P25), but “it was not because I acted in bad faith, it was 
because there was no time. I got unemployed. So, I did a plan, and everything went wrong” 
(P4). To further illustrate this issue, we use the example of P14. She purchased a sound system 
through instalments while formally employed but, after made redundant, she was unable to 
keep repayments. According to her, the store called to negotiate the debt, but she “didn’t have 
the money to pay. I was sad because I didn’t have the money to be able to pay. When I asked 
how much I owed, they said I was owing R$5,000, but I bought it for R$1,000 when I was 
working. I told them that I could go back to the store when I was working again. But I haven’t 
got a job until today. I am unemployed. It is hard to find a job. I have already signed up, handed 
out CVs, but no one calls me back”. These examples show that, while a steady income stream 
may facilitate loans, as it acts as a collateral to banks, it may lead to a debt-led consumption, 
as has been reported in the microfinance literature (Schicks, 2014; dos Santos and Harvold 
Kvangraven, 2017; Guérin et al., 2018).  
In our study, two extreme over-indebtedness cases were reported. First, P11, a widow and 
mother of two, suffered an accident that has incapacitated her to work. She reported having 
outstanding loans “with Caixa, […] with this BMG, then, with another financial institution that 
I went, they said it was called Olé,68 but I never even heard of this bank”. All of these loans 
were on a payday basis, as she receives a pension due to the early death of her husband. Most 
of her loans were for building a house, as her family was previously living under a plastic tent. 
Of her R$1,000 monthly benefit, R$400 is withheld by Caixa, which leaves her with little 
money to provide for her family. She said it was “her dream” to pay these debts in full, “but 
for me there was no way […]. It was either paying […] or leaving my children hungry”. Such 
 
67 Formal workers may apply for unemployment benefits up to 5 months and sickness benefits during the 
illness period. This benefit is, however, not available to informal workers. 
68 Specialized on payday loans for pensioners and public officers, Olé is part of Santander bank. In their 
website, they state “you and your needs are our focus. Therefore, we do not consult SPC/Serasa” – credit 
ratings agencies. They also state that interest rates are of a maximum 5.5% a month, i.e., 66% a year. While it 
may not seem so high in comparison to credit card or overdraft rates, these are still above the average showed 




example illustrates our argument that SOBs do not necessarily provide financial services to 
improve the well-being of low-income individuals. 
Second, a craftswoman from the rural area, P24, claims she has paid over R$40,000 in interest 
rates to Itaú over 20 years. In 1996, she took a R$700 loan from BEMGE69 to purchase supplies 
for her business. She had paid half of the loan when she “suffered a disease I was not expecting 
at the time, so the raw material wasn’t even used. I didn’t even work with what I had invested; 
therefore I couldn’t [repay], and delayed the instalments. […] At the time, I was very sick, in 
a wheelchair, […] and I had no other help. So, I had to deal with it myself, sold what I had, 
sold my house, sold my goods to treat the disease, to pay for the delayed bills and trying to pay 
the loan. But it didn’t work out”. When she tried to negotiate “this amount of R$700, it was 
R$29,000! And it was interest on interest, and I couldn’t solve it. I would go there, negotiate 
again, started paying […] but if I delayed, they would tell me I had to make a new contract”. 
Therefore, she has “decided that I will no longer pay for this. I am being a slave to this bank, I 
feel like a slave of this bank”. 
These experiences are similar to those reported in a qualitative study using focus groups to 
investigate over-indebtedness in Brazil (Banco Central do Brasil, 2014). Its preliminary results 
showed that unexpected situations (such as unemployment, medical issues, pregnancy or 
divorce), lack of financial planning (including impulse shopping and too many instalments) 
and borrowing on behalf of someone else were the leading reported causes of over-
indebtedness. Based on our sample, we confirm that the first factor, in particular health issues 
and unemployment, were key drivers of over-indebtedness. Therefore, promoting FI in an 
environment of little to no social protection mechanisms as it is common in many LMICs may 
also drive the poor into over-indebtedness in the case of an income shock. 
 
4.3.3 Insurance 
The third relevant instrument in our analysis is insurance. According to the mainstream 
literature, insurance for the poor can smooth consumption during income shocks, which is 
necessary for workers that have irregular earnings. However, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
low-income individuals often do not have enough income to afford financial instruments such 
 





as insurance and would prefer to consume the basics now instead of preventing income shocks 
in the future. 
In Brazil, a common type of insurance is for health care. Whereas the country counts with a 
public, free and universal health care system, the Sistema Único de Saúde (Unified Health 
System), those can be quite precarious and require long waiting for non-urgent procedures. 
Thus, individuals with higher income levels often have a private health insurance. However, 
among our low-income participants, only a third claimed having health insurance (Figure 4.11). 
Of those, all were beneficiaries of another relative who had access to it often through their 
workplace health insurance (P5, P6, P8, P10, P15, P17, P18, P22, P27 and P29). 
 
Figure 4.11: Do you have health insurance? 
 
 
Despite acknowledging the importance of health insurance, they “haven’t done yet, precisely 
because of the income, which is low. There are times that it sells well; there are times that 
doesn’t. We are scared of doing a commitment like this, and I can’t do it right now” (P22). 
Thus, “usually those who have health insurance are the ones with a signed [formal] contract. 















working formally. And to pay health insurance without working and without being sick [it is 
not worth it]” (P30). 
Besides the low income, irregular income streams create uncertainty, which discourages 
individuals from acquiring further financial services, in particular insurance. While pensioners 
and formal workers “think like this ‘well, I can do this commitment. If I can’t pay, I will have 
to take from the money that I earn’. Even if he gets tight, eat less rice, less beans, no rice, no 
beans” (P26), informal workers need to be careful as “today you are working, tomorrow you 
don’t know. So today you earn a salary, tomorrow you don’t know” (P2). In fact, only six 
participants had another type of insurance (Figure 4.12). Those who had more expensive goods, 
such as car and mobile, would sometimes get coverage for potential theft, but the most common 
one was for funeral costs, as individuals were afraid of being buried as indigents in case the 
family would not be able to afford a proper funeral. 
 
Figure 4.12: Do you have another type of insurance? 
 
Such stories support our hypothesis presented in sub-section 3.3.3 in which low-income 
individuals may not have spare income to afford financial services such as insurance policies. 
At the same time, we realise that certain types of insurance, such as for health care, has a strong 










link to formal employment again, which reinforces the importance of labour market policies 
for promoting FI in LMICs. 
 
4.3.4 Power relations and enforcement mechanisms 
Besides the macroeconomic conditions under which LMICs are inserted, we also discussed the 
micro-level aspect of FI in Chapter 3. In our three models of deposits and savings, credit and 
insurance, we concluded that the asymmetric relationship between individuals and financial 
institutions lead to a position of power of the latter. In our interviews, we wanted to assess this 
hypothesis. While most participants did not feel that banks have direct power over them, power 
relations were reported through three enforcement mechanisms: exclusion of credit market, 
social shame and daily pressure to repay.70 
To start, some participants denied feeling that the financial institutions have any direct power 
over them. For them, if they disagree with a policy or fee, they would go to the bank to solve 
the issue. We noticed that, despite having low levels of formal education, participants had 
proper financial literacy levels and were aware of their costumer’s rights. This finding goes in 
a different direction of mainstream studies that show that low-income individuals present a 
general lack of financial education, thus reducing the demand for financial services and causing 
over-indebtedness (World Bank, 2014; Lusardi and Tufano, 2015; French and McKillop, 
2016). In fact, some participants “already had to negotiate. I negotiated a debt that was delayed, 
I was about two months without paying, so I had to negotiate. But it was chilled. I had no 
problem” (P1). Usually, the bank would call to offer negotiation and “I conversed; I told my 
opinion. I do have the means of conversing, talking, questioning. And it worked out. They 
reduced it [the debt]” (P5). If they had financial means to repay a debt earlier, for instance, they 
would claim a reduction in interest rates. P2, for example, “financed [her house] with a longer 
deadline, [but] I had the means to reduce it, so there was a negotiation, and the interest rates 
went down”. Furthermore, if there were unexplained charges, they would “question what is 
being charged, like ‘it was not like that before, why is it like this now?’. If I feel I am being 
harmed, I can also cancel the account and open at another bank” (P3). For the banks, it is better 
to negotiate outstanding debt as, according to the Brazilian costumer’s protection law, after 
five years, customers have their bad credit records removed from credit rating database (but 
 





there is no debt cancellation).71 Aware of such law, P25, despite his negotiation skills, said he 
would prefer to wait five years to have his name “cleaned” again than repaying the debt. 
Therefore, we notice that this type of consumer’s rights could be a mechanism to reduce the 
asymmetric relationship between lenders and borrowers in other LMICs, as it seems that 
awareness of their rights empowers the poor to negotiate with financial institutions. 
However, not all participants felt they had the capabilityto negotiate with financial institutions. 
Some confirmed feeling vulnerable when dealing with banks, as “when you go pay [the loan], 
not always is what you had agreed on, [they] always create an excuse, and you end up losing” 
(P21). The argument is that “the bank takes advantage of the opportunity. They go and try to 
stick more things on the person. And if the person is not careful, if it is not a person who pays 
attention to things, she will end up taking more things that she wanted” (P5). This issue may 
be due to the legal wording used in contracts. As many participants have low educational levels, 
they may feel intimidated by the bank’s staff and agree with the contracts without analysing 
them carefully. Therefore, in order to avoid being deceived, sometimes they “would call 
someone to help me, even because it is a lot of bureaucracy, many words that sometimes they 
say and we don’t understand, not in our language. We, the poor, arrive and swear a lot!72 Not 
them, some words that you don’t get, words that, for you to get, you need to be with a person 
who understands it. So, yes, I would call [someone], not by fear, but for not understanding what 
they are saying and end up creating a riot. Instead of solving it, end up disturbing [the 
situation]” (P12). In fact, we could also consider the legal language of contracts a further aspect 
of power from financial institutions. Thus, a potential mechanism to reduce such imbalance 
could be to enforce financial institutions to provide contracts in simplified language. 
Participants’ experiences show that, while direct power may be subtle, it is still present through 
enforcement. We address three recurrent reported mechanisms: the exclusion of credit market, 
social shame and daily pressures in case of outstanding debts. 
First, a bad credit rating prevents participants from taking further credit when in need, which 
is considered a severe constraint to the poor as it is a pre-requisite for accessing other services, 
such as utilities. Therefore if “a poor person doesn’t have a clean name, at least, to buy things 
in instalments, things will get complicated” (P23) and “you won’t get anything today with a 
dirty name. Nothing! Not even if you want internet at your house, if you have a dirty name, 
 
71 Law No 8.078 of 11 September 1990 from the consumer legislation. 




you can’t do it. It is very embarrassing” (P18). Moreover, a bad credit rating can restrict further 
income as “there are many [work] places that don’t accept you with a ‘dirty name’. If you have 
a ‘dirty name’, you won’t get a job. You might have an [educational] course, may have it all, 
but you can’t get [the job]” (P23). P24, likewise, says she can’t work as a craftswoman with 
bad credit as “today I am earning little because I don’t have the means to invest for me to earn 
more, because of the lack of name”. 
Second, outstanding debts also lead to social shame. Some consider “lack of character to owe 
and not pay” (P9) and that “people will look at you differently, a swindler” (P7). Those who 
have been through this situation said that “it was embarrassing” (P4) and that “there is nothing 
more embarrassing than owing and not being able to pay. […] I arrived at the bank, and they 
talk to us as if we had committed a crime” (P24). Because of that, they “felt shame. It generates 
a shame in the family”, which made her “nervous, sad. I lost sleep, lost appetite” (P10). For 
them, the name is everything they have got (P1, P7, P13, P18, P23, P24, P29). 
Third, participants reported that banks contact them several times a day and are not flexible 
with the repayment dates and values, which generates stress and increasing wiliness to repay. 
According to them, banks “call, call and call. But what happens? We are getting a call like ‘you 
have debt; can I schedule a repayment?’. I say ‘no, because I don’t have [money]’” (P1). They 
“call in the morning. At lunchtime, they call again, and in the afternoon, they call once more. 
So, it disturbs people’s daily lives” (P3). In the end, “it is so many calls to us that we lose 
patience! They put psychological pressure on us. When we owe, they call so much and say the 
same thing, ‘will you pay? Which day?’. They want you to schedule a date, so there is pressure” 
(P5). Because of the “non-stop” calls, some turn off the phone or “would ask my boy to pick 
up and say there was no one there with that name! Seriously” (P11). 
This pressure causes a negative psychological effect on participants. They would feel 
“insecure. I was worried all the time; if I would be able to pay; if everything would work out 
fine. It didn’t affect my daily life, but when I got home, laid down to rest, these thoughts would 
come” (P20). Other reported that “just from knowing my name was dirty, I was terrified! [I 
was] eager to clean it, [as it] made me anxious” (P5). Some even “had to go to a psychologist. 
I was very stressed, you know? Around this time of CrediAmigo, the bank would call, we called 
each other, cursed, we were tight on the money” (P24). 
These three enforcement mechanisms are in line to our theoretical model of credit, in which 




anxiety, most participants would prefer not to owe and pay on time, including “stop buying 
things for the household in order to repay the store. Sometimes, I had no money left because I 
had to repay them” (P1). Others would “be in favour of not eating in order to pay the [credit] 
card or the debt” (P2). Thus, we can affirm that power relations between financial institutions 
and poor individuals are, in fact, present and may have negative effects on borrowers. 
 
4.3.5 Causal relationship between poverty and financial inclusion 
By acknowledging the imposed macroeconomic constraints on FI in LMICs, as well as the 
power relations between individuals and financial institutions, we gave the first step into 
investigating the hypothesis that the policy reduces poverty and income inequality in Chapter 
3. In turn, in our qualitative research, we tried to understand the underlying mechanisms on the 
relationship between FI, poverty and income inequality based on the opinions of participants, 
following the critical realist approach. 
In our case study, poverty was not considered a result of lack of financial access. In fact, many 
participants considered that banking could increase poverty. For them, the roots of poverty 
were mainly three: income inequality, bad institutions and individual responsibility. 
First, one-third of the participants considered that income inequality was the leading cause of 
poverty. While a person “who is born in a golden crib is not to blame for poverty” (P2), “if the 
big ones had more love in their hearts, the little ones would not suffer so much” (P9). P3 
illustrates this inequality through his work experience. As a glassmaker, he visits different types 
of houses and “you go through certain places that are very poor, but if you go to a gated 
community, with houses that for you to go around the house, you get lost”. 
Inequality is, however, considered a tradition in the country, and participants felt that there was 
no solution for it. For them, “the money is poorly divided. And this is not from now, it is since 
they discovered Brazil” (P30). Inequality is a “chronic problem, [which could be solved by] 
dividing income. If the income in the country was divided with more humanity, some wouldn’t 
earn as much as they do, and others wouldn’t earn almost anything. This is the problem of 
Brazil, and everyone knows it. Everyone who reads knows that the problem in Brazil is income 
distribution” (P26). Thus, “this is the reality of our life. This goes from generation to 




is only the day you die. Then you outran it. But, yet, you will create problems for who is left, 
because they have to bury you. This is the reality; there is no way of overcoming it” (P17). 
While high income inequality has been a long-term feature of Brazilian society (Fishlow, 
1972), programmes to tackle income inequality were introduced in the past two decades. These, 
however, may display a “distributional ratchet” effect, that is, improvement tends to be 
temporary, but deterioration tends to be more permanent (Palma, 2011; Palma and Stiglitz, 
2016). Indeed, a study using tax information found that, in Brazil, income concentration in the 
top remained stable from 2006 to 2012, despite the reduction in income inequality in the bottom 
and middle of the income distribution (Medeiros et al., 2015).  
The second group (eight participants) perceived the causes of poverty to be bad institutions, 
including government corruption. As politicians “govern for themselves, not for the people” 
(P7), besides “stealing millions” (P30), funds for poverty reduction are scarce. Nonetheless, if 
“the rulers would think more on the middle class and the poor, peripherical, class” (P12) or “if 
the government wouldn’t steal so much” (P13), they believe poverty could be overcome. 
Therefore, “from everything the steal, if they would take some to solve a bit of poverty, it 
would be very nice” (P11), as “depending on the president that is there, if it is a good president, 
if he knows how to work properly, [poverty] would get better” (P29). 
Finally, four participants thought that individual responsibility, due to a lack of education or 
goals, would be the cause for their impoverished situation. “If the person has some character 
and has the will to work, he can overcome [poverty]” (P17) and “if the person chases a better 
life, she could do it” (P25), even if “you can eat today, but not tomorrow, but you get by” (P17). 
While the government may be seen as a support, it is “also us. […] For example, today I am 
currently poor. I am not poor; I am just currently poor. Tomorrow, I can have a better situation 
if I fight for it. We don’t have to die in poverty because we were born in poverty. We must 
have faith in God, work, fight and I am sure it will be solved” (P24). 
Bearing in mind these perceived poverty roots, banking was not considered a key solution to 
fight poverty. In fact, participants often highlighted the limitations of access to finance in 
reducing poverty. For them, the policy success would depend on individuals’ income, financial 
skills and loan purpose. Otherwise, FI would lead individuals into deeper poverty conditions 




On the one hand, some considered that having access to banking could improve people’s 
income, as long as they had enough money and/or wage as “it is no use to have access to 
banking, but not having money, a high wage; it depends a lot on the wage. Because they look 
and if you earn R$1,000, how can you do a R$500 instalment? How will you eat, take medicine, 
if you need to pay water, energy? There is no way, you can’t” (P1). Therefore, just having a 
bank account would not solve poverty, as “the person would have to have a job, a better dignity, 
in order to have some money” (P5), especially if there is no particular purpose for it: “how will 
he have a bank card? What for? To keep it the drawer? If he has no means to use it…” (P27). 
Thus, if “there is no salary, [the poor] will end up indebted” (P8). This situation can then lead 
to a bigger problem as “if it is to make debts, they will just be going in a hole. Like an armadillo! 
Just going in a hole and there is no way out” (P13). Such finding also confirms the importance 
of formal employment into fostering FI policies in LMICs. 
On the other hand, 17 participants thought that access to banking would lead to an increase in 
poverty, in particular, due to a lack of income and high interest rates. They believe that “the 
poor without banking is better off” (P19) as they “already don’t have anything. If we start with 
banking, [the situation] will get worse!” (P9).The lack of income and the possibility of losing 
wealth over time is the first reason participants believe the poor would get poorer by using 
financial services. P21 thinks a person “would get more [poor] because she will ask for a loan 
and won’t be able to repay”. If the poor “doesn’t have employment, doesn’t have work, how 
will she pay?”. For them, “the economy of Brazil must get better because it is useless for the 
bank to provide a loan, that he [the poor] won’t be able to repay” (P26). Thus, repayment 
problems may lead to wealth destitution as “dealing with banks being poor is bad. If I get some 
money to build a house and don’t pay it, I will lose the house” (P20). 
The second reason, high interest rates, are also seen as impoverishing, as “the bank […] takes 
you out of suffocation and puts you into an even bigger one, because of the interests, the 
payment designs. Let’s suppose: today you didn’t manage to repay your statement. When next 
month starts, when you go to pay it, you will have to pay twice, and one of the statements will 
be almost double than it was before, because of interests. [...] So, if me, poor, didn’t pay one, 
when it is the following month, you won’t pay the next. […] It will become a snowball and 
that’s it. You won’t pay anything anymore, your name is dirty, you can’t do anything anymore” 
(P16). Furthermore, “the banks steal so much, the person would deepen into bills, loans, 




afford it” (P18). In conclusion, “the bank will not come and say, ‘take this money for you to 
overcome poverty’, they won’t do that. They could even bog you down deeper. Like, ‘do a loan 
here, we will help you out. Do a R$200 loan’. In the end, it ends up being R$300, so it is not 
worth it” (P19). Those perceptions also contribute to our hypothesis that FI might increase 
poverty, in contrast to what it claimed by the mainstream literature. 
Because of these potential drawbacks of FI, participants considered that a better solution for 
poverty reduction would be through improved employment conditions and public services 
(Figure 4.14). For participants, in order to help the poor, the government should fund better 
health care and education, which could reduce these costs to the poor and improve their chances 
in the labour market, besides creating jobs and establishing higher wages. In sum, “just give a 
job to a person, and she can handle on her own. For sure, the solution would be to create jobs, 
educational centres, something like that, to recover those people who believe they are no one 
in this world. Employment, the basics: health care, education. The least they deserve” (P7). 
 
Figure 4.13: Poverty solution (participants’ answers) 
 
Note: Some participants provided more than one possible solution. 
 
Participants’ perception that FI is unlikely to reduce poverty and that policies, such as those 
related to employment and wage, is in accordance with our hypothesis that high informality 
levels in the labour markets of LMICs are a key determinant of the demand for financial 









services. Furthermore, the high interest rates driven by macroeconomic conditions, but also 
employment status, may contribute to over-indebtedness and impoverishment. 
In conclusion, on one side, where the poorest receive less than the minimum wage but pay 
interest rates around 300% on credit card debts and overdrafts, it is reasonable to suggest that 
market-led FI may lead to indebted individuals’ dispossession. On the other side, financial 
expropriation allows banks to boost profitability and growth, expanding their oligopoly power 
and furthering poverty and income inequality in the country. In this context, FI policies are 
designed to fail the poor. 
 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter presented a case study of FI in Brazil, thus contributing with an empirical research 
to the critical literature on FI. The analysis builds on the previous chapters and analyses the 
experiences and perception of 30 low-income Brazilians regarding FI, poverty and income 
inequality. The chapter combined quantitative and qualitative research in order to uncover 
aspects of the relationship between FI, poverty and income inequality in a LMIC.  
The quantitative part describes the structural and macroeconomic constraints of Brazil as 
discussed in Chapter 3. This thesis suggests that low demand for LMICs’ currencies influence 
interest rates. Furthermore, the high bank concentration in the country also pushes interest 
spread up. Thus, as in our hypothesis, LMICs are, indeed, constrained by the structure of their 
financial system. Moreover, we noticed that formal employment is an important factor to 
establish the demand for financial services, as well as a determinant of loans’ interest rates, as 
we had also stated in our theoretical analysis.  
Mirroring the game models developed in Chapter 3, the current chapter gathered evidence of 
the micro-level relationship between individuals and for-profit banks. First, we noticed that 
low-income individuals have a preference for free basic bank accounts, as they have little 
disposable income to afford fee-based current accounts. However, we heard reports that some 
participants had been tricked in the past by private banks in order to create more expensive 
accounts, which reinforces our hypothesis of the presence of power relations between 
individuals and financial institutions. Moreover, the lack of income was also stated to be the 
main reason for low or no savings, which has also been discussed previously. Whereas we 




individual from falling into poverty, we noticed that it is unlikely that those who earn around 
the minimum wage in Brazil will have enough income to save such a significant amount over 
time. 
Second, as already discussed in the microcredit literature, most loans and credit card purchases 
by individuals are used for consumption. As discussed in section 3.3.2, these types of credit do 
smooth consumption but do not present return as investment loans. Thus, a failure to repay by 
the due date often result in over-indebtedness in such an environment of high interest rates. 
Extreme cases were also reported in the chapter, which shows that such ocurrances are not so 
rare. The role of power in this credit relation is also very clear, as we notice that participants 
are afraid of failing payments and producing a “snowball”, i.e. a situation that they will never 
solve. Thus, the poor might prefer not to eat or pay utility bills in order to repay formal loans 
or credit card balances, as the consequences of not complying with the rules of the financial 
institutions is perceived as too costly financially, socially and psychologically. 
Third, we discussed the access and usage of insurance policies by low-income individuals. 
Most claimed having a health insurance related to a family member who was formally 
employed. Such finding reinforces our hypothesis that formal employment is a key determinant 
of FI. Furthermore, as in the case of savings, most participants stated they did not have enough 
nor regular income to afford insurance premiums, suggesting once more that the causality 
might run from poverty to FI. 
At last, our interviews also provided evidence on the potential positive effect of FI on poverty 
as participants report that using financial services might increase poverty due to the high 
interest rates and the unstable and largely informal labour market.  
Moreover, we confirm that income shocks under an environment of a lack of social protection 
and high interest rates may lead to over-indebtedness of the poorest, which also undermines 
the potential of FI to reduce poverty. To our knowledge, such bottom-up research strategy to 
grasp the relationship between poverty, income inequality and FI has never been conducted 
and, therefore, provides an unique view on such causal relations. In Chapter 6, we utilise such 







Measuring financial inclusion 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 have summarised academic studies arguing that financial inclusion (FI) 
reduces poverty and income inequality. The empirical literature has often conducted cross-
country comparisons to assess the effectiveness of the policy. However, most studies use 
aggregate data to construct multi-dimensional indexes of FI, which may not fully reflect 
individuals’ access to and usage of the financial system. In order to provide an accurate 
measurement of FI to assess its effects on poverty and income distribution,this chapter 
constructs a microdata index using 446,776 observations from the World Bank’s Findex 
dataset. This novel index is employed to econometrically test the effects of FI on poverty and 
income inequality in the following chapter. 
We divide the chapter into six sub-sections: first, we review existing measurements of FI; 
second, we display the differences between micro- and macro-data analyses of FI; third, we 
present the dataset; fourth, we discuss the method (multiple correspondence analysis) along 
with the construction of the micro-level index; fifth, we present the country-level index and 
compare our results to the existing literature; finally, we summarise our findings. 
 
5.1 Existing measurements of financial inclusion 
In Chapters 2 and 3, we presented the theoretical basis of mainstream definitions of FI, which 
is grounded on the financial development (FD) literature. While FI and FD are primarily linked 
through their theoretical frameworks, their measurements also often overlap. 
FD studies select aggregate variables to capture the depth of financial systems, such as the 
number of ATMs per 1000km2 and credit to GDP ratio (Honohan, 2004; Beck et al., 2004; 
Rewilak, 2017). Cross-country empirical studies on FI use similar macroeconomic variables 
(Honohan, 2008; Piñeyro, 2013; Chakravarty and Pal, 2013; Amidžić et al., 2014; Sarma, 
2016). Nonetheless, as FI targets financial services at the individual level, aggregate data may 
distort the actual level of FI of a country’s population. For instance, private credit to GDP ratios 
(e.g. as used in Sarma 2016) may be driven by a small number of highly-indebted units and 




instruments. Table 5.1 displays eight existing studies that have constructed FI multi-
dimensional indexes both using aggregate and micro-level data. 
The limitations of aggregate indexes are considered by another stream of the FI literature, who 
uses microdata to evaluate FI. Nevertheless, some of these studies do not provide multi-
dimensional indexes. They assess the determinants of FI by performing maximum likelihood 
estimations with univariate indicators at multiple points in time, such as account ownership, 
savings or formal credit (Fungáčová and Weill, 2015; Zins and Weill, 2016; Allen et al., 2016; 
Wang and Guan, 2017). While their findings, e.g. that the poor, self-employed and women 
have a lower likelihood of having a bank account, are a first step toward understanding certain 
aspects of FI, analysing single FI indicators in isolation creates difficulties in concluding on 
the general implications of a multi-dimensional policy. 
To address these issues, three studies use a multi-dimensional approach based on micro-
economic indicators. Camara & Tuesta (2014) apply principal correspondence analysis (PCA) 
for analysing the 2011 Findex database, but combine the microdata results to aggregate 
variables, yielding scores very similar to standard macroeconomic indexes. Aslan, Deléchat, 
Newiak, & Yang (2017), on the other hand, conduct joint correspondence analysis of the same 
dataset for 2011 and 2014, but as different variables are selected for each year, the results lack 
over time comparability. Finally, Koomson et al. (2020) employ the Ghana Living Standards 
Survey to generate an index using multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). However, as it 
analyses only one country, it cannot be used for a cross-country analysis. 
This thesis aims to overcome two shortcomings of existing micro-data studies of FI: their 
limitation to make comparisons over time and their use of single indicator analyses. We create 
a multi-dimensional index of FI employing multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to reduce 
the dimensions of 11 categorical variables drawn from the Global Findex database for the years 
2011, 2014 and 2017.73 Using available data for the access to and use of deposits, payments, 
creditand savings by individuals provided by financial institutions, we hold that FI must 
encompass all of these aspects, as each of them plays a distinct role in including individuals in 
the formal financial system. 
 
73 More on the motivation and particular characteristics of the Findex database can be found in Demirgüç-Kunt 




Table 5.1: Summary of approaches to existing indexes of financial inclusion74 








23 to 31 
Macrodata (e.g. number of ATMs per 1,000 km2, number of branches of other 
depository corporations) 
2 











Macrodata (e.g. number of ATMs per 1,000 sq. km, commercial bank branches 






India Macrodata (e.g. number of ATMs per 1,000 km2, credit-GDP ratio) 
5 Honohan (2008) Fitted values (OLS) 162 
Macrodata (e.g. number of bank accounts per 100 adults, number of accounts at 
microfinance institutions per 100 adults) 
6 




Ghana Microdata (e.g. ownership of savings account, transactions using ATM) 
7 Sarma (2016) 
Axiomatic distance-
based approach 
57 to 128 
Macrodata (e.g. number of registered mobile money service providers agents, 
Total volume of mobile money transactions as % of GDP) 




Macrodata (e.g. number of branches and banking agents, percentage of illiterate 
adults, number of technical and legal advice and disputes) 
 




5.2 Measuring FI with macro- vs microdata 
First, while aggregated information can be useful for a cross-country and over-time 
comparison, it can also give an incomplete picture of FI.75 The use of the number of ATMs and 
bank branches per 100,000 adults (or per 1,000 km2) is one example. As many countries have 
digitalized in recent years, there has been a reduction of this type of physical presence, even in 
countries with high levels of FI (Sarma, 2016). According to Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2018), 29% 
of adults used the internet to pay bills or purchase goods online worldwide in 2017 – ranging 
from 68% in HICs to 11% in LMICs, excluding China. The need for bank branches or ATMs 
seems to have diminished, so that using it as a measure for individuals’ FI could be misleading, 
especially in HICs. 
Second, aggregate variables may not correspond to the actual access and use of the financial 
system by individuals. For instance, the volume of credit as a share of GDP and other national-
level financial development measurements can also be deceptive as credit can be concentrated 
in large firms, rather than in loans for individuals. Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper (2013, p.290) 
compare Vietnam and the Czech Republic as examples. In Vietnam, the amount of domestic 
credit given to the private sector corresponds to 112% of GDP, while only 21% of individuals 
have a formal bank account. In contrast, Czech domestic credit to the private sector is 55% of 
GDP, although 81% of adults have a bank account.  
In order to further illustrate these differences, Table 5.2 compares two countries with high level 
of FI when using microdata (Finland and Sweden) and two countries with high levels of FI in 
indexes that use aggregate variables (Portugal and Spain) for 2011 and 2014. 
As we notice, Portugal displays a higher credit to GDP ratio than Sweden and Finland, even 
though its population has less access to credit cards and loans from financial institutions. This 
outcome can reflect that either credit has been mostly designated to firms, or that a few 
individuals hold large amounts of credit. Similarly, Spain surpassed Sweden in credit card 
ownership and Finland in formal loans in 2014, but the country lags behind Finland in credit 
card ownership and Sweden in formal loans, in addition to being slightly behind both countries 
when it comes to account ownership.  
 
 
75 A more detailed discussion about the difference between micro (demand) and macro (supply-side) data of FI 




Table 5.2. Country comparison of selected variables (2011 and 2014) 
  Finland Sweden Portugal Spain 
  2011 2014 2011 2014 2011 2014 2011 2014 
Macro 
Domestic credit provided 
by financial sector (% of 
GDP) 
189.43 164.41 152.47 156.68 204.79 173.73 248.93 211.25 
Commercial bank branches 
(per 100,000 adults) 
15.09 12.06 21.70 21.10 63.94 53.39 88.22 69.68 
Depositors with 
commercial banks (per 
1,000 adults) 
2294.86 2222.02 3856.01 4242.81 2538.17 2358.41 2176.60 1987.04 
Micro 
Account at a financial 
institution 
98.60 100.00 98.50 99.70 85.31 91.61 92.61 98.30 
Credit card ownership (%) 72.49 68.64 57.04 51.47 39.53 36.07 48.14 63.40 
Loan from a financial 
institution (%) 








Portugal and Spain also have at least double the number of bank branches than Sweden and 
Finland. Such indicator, however, may not necessarily denote a higher level of FI as the latter 
two countries may have highly automatized systems in which individuals can use bank cards 
to pay in stores or online, thus not needing the physical presence of banks. 
In sum, these examples illustrate how aggregated data may provide an inaccurate view of FI, 
both in HICs and LMICs. Thus, we consider that the use of micro-level data is more reliable 
for creating an index that genuinely reflects the level of FI of individuals in any given country. 
 
5.3 Data 
The World Bank, with financial support from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, first 
published the Global Findex database in 2011. Further survey rounds were conducted in 2014 
and 2017, yielding a pooled cross-sectional database (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2018). Using 
nationally representative data76 for 149,761, 146,688 and 154,923 individuals across the three 
years respectively, the surveys are constituted mostly of categorical variables (yes or no) that 
included questions on account and credit card ownership, formal savings and credit, as well as 
different purposes of credit usage. The dataset also provides information on individuals’ 
characteristics, including gender, age, income quintile and educational level. 
While some countries have been dropped or added in each survey round, all surveys include 
HICs and LMICs. Most countries have a sample of around 1,000 individuals per year, but larger 
countries such as China have a sample size of around 4,000 individuals. In turn, smaller 
countries, such as Haiti, have a sample size of around 500 individuals.77 
Among the 18, 44 and 48 questions used in 2011, 2014 and 2017, respectively, we select the 
11 main indicators that correspond to the access, credit and savings dimensions, in line with 
the theoretical hypotheses previously presented in this thesis.78 This selection allows us not 
only to assess the access to certain financial services, such as an account or card ownerships 
but also to consider the usage of such services through loans and savings. Unfortunately, as 
insurance was only surveyed in 2011, we decided to leave this dimension out of the index as 
there is no comparative data in subsequent years. Table 5.3 presents the selected variables for 
 
76 Weights are based on household size, sex, age, education and socioeconomic status and are provided by the 
Findex dataset (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2013). 
77 Further information on data collection can be found at www.worldbank.org/globalfindex. 




index construction and their respective dimensions. These indicators are binary variables that 
take the value of 1 if the survey respondent answered yes to this question and 0 if they answered 
no. 
 
Table 5.3. Selected variables for the financial inclusion index 
Dimension Variable 
Access Account at a financial institution79 
 Debit card ownership 
 Credit card ownership 
 Mobile money account80 
Credit Loan from a financial institution in the past 12 months 
 Loan from a store (store credit) in the past 12 months81 
 Loan to start, operate or expand a farm or business in the past 12 months82 
 Loan for school fees83 
 Loan for health purposes 
 Loan for housing purposes 
Savings Savings at a financial institution in the past 12 months 
 
5.4 Method 
5.4.1 Multiple correspondence analysis 
As in Akotey & Adjasi (2016), Booysen, van der Berg, Burger, Maltitz, & Rand (2008) and 
Pasha (2017), we employ MCA to construct an index using categorical variables. By imposing 
 
79 For 2011, there are three variables for account ownership: q1a, q1b and q1, where the latter is a composite 
indicator. This indicator, however, suffers of several drawbacks, which are explained in Appendix D.2. 
80 For 2011, a new variable was created in order to be comparable to the ones of 2014 and 2017. Further 
information in Appendix D.2. 
81 Not available for 2017. 
82 Not available for 2011. 




fewer constraints on data, MCA is more suitable for the analysis of discrete and categorical 
variables than PCA, the more common technique for constructing indexes. 
Data-driven weights can be particularly advantageous in comparison to other techniques, such 
as the counting approach, in which normative weights are assigned (Pasha, 2017). In the case 
of equal weights, this particular technique suffers from “perfect substitutability”, which means 
that an increase/decrease in one variable can be equally offset by a decrease/increase in another 
one, as they will have equivalent values (Sarma, 2016). Likewise, arbitrary weights hold a 
judgment value that may not be considered reasonable (Decancq and Lugo, 2013). Thus, after 
testing such method, we decide on selecting the data-driven weights of MCA.84 
The first step in MCA is to recode the data using an indicator matrix of dummy variables 
(Husson and Josse, 2014). An indicator matrix is a table that links individuals and categories. 
Its elements will be 1 where the category was chosen and 0 otherwise (Greenacre and Blasius, 
2006). Unlike PCA, which uses an orthogonalization technique, MCA assigns scale values to 
each of the categories of a variable and maximizes the variance of those scores, transforming 
the association between categories and displaying them in a multidimensional space (Dungey 
et al., 2018). The assigned weights and coordinates in the plots will then be used to generate 
the scores for each individual.85 
 
5.4.2 Data visualisation 
We can visualise the relationship between categories and variables using the Findex dataset. 
Figure 5.1 displays the relationship between the 11 selected indicators for the years 2011, 2014 
and 2017.86 Using the Euclidean space, MCA allows us to project the answers of 446,776 
individuals for each category of the indicators. Such cloud of individuals is not visualised 
directly, as it is found in a high-dimensional space (Husson and Josse, 2014). Instead, we use 
 
84 Using equal weights for dimensions boosts the real value of credit, as there are several indicators for credit, 
but not as many for savings, for example. To illustrate the issues of such method, Haiti had better levels of FI 
than Chile (12.89 to 12.77), which is unexpected due to the development of the financial system in Chile and 
the higher levels of income. The issue stems from the fact that Haiti has high level of indebtedness (for 
example, the country has mean of 29.33% for school credit) but low levels of access to bank accounts, debit 
and credit cards (mean 23.94%, 6.9% and 4.54%). In turn, Chile had higher levels of account ownership, debit 
and credit cards (56.21%, 44.46% and 27.64%) but low levels of indebtedness (4.69% of indebted for school 
purposes). Thus, selecting equal weights produced unsatisfactory results. 
85 A small-sample illustration of the MCA process using the Findex dataset can be found in Appendix D.3. 
86 In order to establish a comparison to the index values, the x-axis of this plot was negated, which means this 




the categories (yes/no) to understand their relationship. Each category is positioned at the 
barycentre (average) of individuals’ answers. The coordinates themselves do not have an useful 
interpretation as they are not the response profile of each individual, but the average of the 
446,776 participants. Rather, we are interested in the distance between the answers in order to 
aggregate them into groups.  
The horizontal axis (dimension 1) is related to access and savings variables. The more we move 
to the right, the more an individual has access to basic financial services. The vertical axis 
(dimension 2) displays credit relationships, where those in the upper quadrants are more 
indebted. 
 




87 The abbreviations correspond to World Banks’ regions: High Income Countries (HIC), East Asia and Pacific 
(EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), South Asia (SA), Middle East and 




The interpretation of the active variables88 in the plot is straightforward: answers are clustered 
together if individuals answered yes/no to the same questions. Moreover, frequent answers are 
placed close to the origin (mean) and rare answers far from it. 
Our results show that basic financial services (formal account, debit card, credit card and 
formal savings) are clustered together in the bottom-right quadrant. This means that individuals 
tend to use these services jointly. More advanced services, such as store credit, formal loan and 
loan for housing are rare and are displayed farther from the origin. Likewise, mobile money 
account and loan for business, health care and school fees are less prevalent and appear at the 
top of the plot. The plot illustrates that, while certain individuals have access to basic financial 
services, the majority still have low access and usage of financial services, as those who have 
answered “no” to several questions are closer to the origin. 
By adding world regions as supplementary variables89, we are also able to see the geographic 
distribution. Individuals in high-income countries (HIC) have access to more basic services 
and are less indebted. On the other hand, individuals from sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries 
have lower access to and use of basic financial services and are more indebted. We suggest that 
this could be related to the fact that the African continent exhibits very low levels of social 
protection and health care, as these benefits are mostly confined to formal workers and a high 
proportion of the workforce are employed in the informal sector (ILO, 2017). Those outside 
the formal sector may need to make use of other forms of financing medical emergencies, 
maternity leave or retirement. Likewise, although certain countries, such as Tanzania and 
Rwanda, have abolished school fees, there are still hidden costs to education, such as uniforms, 
school supplies and examination fees (Williams et al., 2015; Lindsjö, 2018). Thus, it is 
plausible that individuals in SSA are more indebted than those in other regions. In contrast, the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region exhibit lower levels of indebtedness, but 
individuals still show low levels in the access dimension. This could be partially explained by 
religious reasons. The region has a considerable Muslim population and within Islam certain 
financial practices, in particular interest rates, are prohibited if they do not comply with Sharia 
law (Pearce, 2011; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2014; Zulkhibri, 2016). 
 
88 Active variables are those used to construct the axis and the index, i.e., the 11 financial inclusion indicators. 
89 Also known as “passive” variables, supplementary variables yield additional points to the row or column 




In summary, this visual representation shows us that, as previously hypothesised, LMICs and 
HICs are quite different when investigating the access to and usage of financial services. Thus, 
using theoretical frameworks that are based on a HIC environment should be unable to provide 
us with an accurate guide to the relationship between individuals and financial institutions, as 
well as to the effects of the use of financial services on poverty and income inequality 
reduction. Moreover, our analysis shows that individuals in LMICs are more likely to be 
indebted to essential social services, in particular health care, which should also be considered 
when promoting further FI policies in LMICs. 
 
5.4.3 Index construction 
MCA is useful not only for the geometric representation it yields but also for its ability to 
generate scores based on standardization to either rows or columns coordinates (Blasius and 
Greenacre, 2014). Standard row scores are computed as the row coordinate 𝑅 for the 𝑡th 






ℎ=1                                                      (5.1) 
 
where 𝑋 is the matrix of standard coordinates, 𝑎 is the number of active variables, and 𝜙𝑡 is 
the eigenvalue of the correspondence analysis on the Burt matrix. However, as we are using 
principal normalization, we multiply the row score by the square root of the corresponding 
principal inertia (eigenvalue), so that 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∑ (
𝑍𝑖ℎ𝑋ℎ𝑡
𝑎√𝜙𝑡
)𝐽ℎ=1 √𝜙𝑡                                               (5.2) 
For the individuals’ scores, after generating the row profiles, we pre-multiply by the category-
weights of this first axis. Next, we weight the results according to the individual’s national 
representation so that we can reach a single value for each individual in the sample, for each of 
the three available years. The results are then normalized with values between 0 and 1 and 




In order to illustrate the index construction, we show the values of selected individuals in the 
dataset. Table 5.4 illustrates the key values of our index by presenting the answers of six 
individuals, their respective weights and the index values before normalization. For instance, 
our lowest score is from a 28-year-old Japanese woman belonging to the poorest 20% of the 
income distribution. While several indicators are missing, her negative responses to two of the 
questions, besides the high nationally representative weight cause her index value to be the 
lowest in our sample. In contrast, our highest index value is from a 29-year-old Austrian man 
who is part of the middle 20% of the income distribution with a secondary educational level. 
Again, while some answers are missing, the positive response to most of the questions, in 







































-1.136 - 0.325 3.502 2014 Japan No . . No . . . . . . . 
 
25% -0.123 - 0.125 0.988 2011 Guinea No No No No No No . No No No No  
Median -0.000 -0.000 1.133 2011 Russia No Yes No No No No . No No No No  
Mean 0.018 0.060 0.299 2017 Philippines Yes No No No Yes . Yes . No No No  
75% 0.116 0.270 0.429 2017 Panama Yes Yes No No Yes . No . No Yes No  
Highest 
value 
4.039 0.847 4.763 2011 Austria Yes Yes Yes . . Yes . . . Yes Yes 
 
Note: Some of the variables are missing due to lack of information, while others are missing because individuals did not answer the question. 
 
90 Nationally representative weight provided by the World Bank’s Findex dataset. 
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5.5 Country-Level Financial Inclusion 
Finally, in order to use our index in a cross-country comparison in the following chapter, we 
transform the individual-score to an aggregate-level measurement..  In order to construct the 
country-values, we use the previously generated micro-level index of FI and calculate the simple 
average over all the individuals of the respective country. Finally, we use the index to construct a 
cross-country ranking in order to be able to compare our results to the existing literature (Table 
5.5).91 As we can notice, in average, HICs have higher levels of FI than LMICs, however, this does 
not indicate any causality between income levels and the level of FI. Such analysis will be further 
developed in the following chapter. 
This ranking provides a unique perspective on FI. As argued above, if the purpose of FI is to 
include individuals, macroeconomic variables that have been used to construct previous indexes 
may not be suitable. Comparing our results to Sarma’s (2016), which is the most complete ranking 
using only aggregate variables, and Camara & Tuesta's (2014), who mix macro and micro-level 
data, key differences can be found.92,93 Table 5.6 presents the comparison among the top 10 










91 It is important to notice, nonetheless, that the scores for HICs are somewhat overestimated for 2011, as debt 
and mobile phone usage variables were not part of the survey for this group. 
92 Sarma (2016) has data for 2004-2014 and Camara & Tuesta (2014) only for 2011. Variables used in the indexes of 
such studies can be found in Table D.1 of Appendix D. 
93 A comparison to Aslan et al. (2017) would be more desirable, as they only use the Findex dataset. However, the 
paper does not provide enough information on the scores for FI, nor does it rank countries. 
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Table 5.5. The Global Ranking of Financial Inclusion (GRFI)94 
Rank GRFI 2011 Score GRFI 2014 Score GRFI 2017 Score 
1 Sweden 1.000 Norway 1.000 Norway 1.000 
2 New Zealand 0.961 New Zealand 0.948 Canada 0.939 
3 Finland 0.943 Canada 0.933 New Zealand 0.881 
4 Australia 0.935 Sweden 0.920 Sweden 0.881 
5 Canada 0.920 Finland 0.890 Luxembourg 0.865 
…       
50 China 0.381 Macedonia 0.442 Chile 0.449 
51 Brazil 0.361 Saudi Arabia 0.441 Bulgaria 0.438 
52 Saudi Arabia 0.360 Greece 0.441 Hungary 0.436 
53 Serbia 0.357 Jamaica 0.432 Venezuela, RB 0.425 
54 South Africa 0.351 Serbia 0.430 Uruguay 0.423 
…       
140 Madagascar 0.013 Burundi 0.022 Afghanistan 0.021 
141 Burundi 0.011 Madagascar 0.019 South Sudan 0.011 
142 Guinea 0.010 Niger 0.000 Chad 0.008 
143 Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.006   Madagascar 0.006 







94 Full ranking in Appendix D.4 (Table D.6). 
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Table 5.6. Ranking comparison 
Year 2011 2014 
Rank GRFI Sarma Camara & Tuesta GRFI Sarma 
1 Sweden Switzerland Korea Norway Switzerland 
2 New Zealand Portugal Spain New Zealand San Marino 
3 Finland Spain Portugal Canada Japan 
4 Australia Japan Belgium Sweden Portugal 
5 Canada United Kingdom Japan Finland Malta 
6 Denmark Malta Canada Australia Spain 
7 Netherlands Korea France United Kingdom France 
8 Luxembourg France United States Luxembourg Belgium 
9 United States Greece Australia Denmark Greece 
10 Belgium Belgium New Zealand Israel Russia 
 
A critical issue to note when drawing this comparison is that highest-ranked countries in our GRFI, 
including Sweden and New Zealand, are not part of Sarma (2016). Countries with leading financial 
centres, such as the United States, Luxemburg or Singapore, are also not present in the study.95 
Second, by selecting aggregate variables to analyse individuals’ FI, results are inflated for several 
countries, in particular Portugal and Spain. One reason for this inflation is that the shrinking of 
GDP in these countries during the economic crisis positively affected their credit to GDP ratios, 
and, in turn, boosted their index values. Another one, as discussed above, is the high number of 
bank branches in these two countries. 
When comparing the GRFI to Camara & Tuesta's (2014) ranking, we find that their usage 
dimension is quite similar to that used to come to our results, as they also select 2011 Findex 
information to construct the first part of the index (top countries are New Zealand, Sweden and 
Finland). However, the final ranking includes macroeconomic variables, which results in a similar 
 
95 According to the Global Financial Centres Index, the world’s top financial hubs were London, New York, Hong Kong 
and Singapore in 2011 and 2014. 
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ranking as Sarma’s (2016). The highest-ranked countries in their study are Korea, Spain and 
Portugal. Sweden and Finland, on the other hand, are found down at the 16th and 19th positions.  
A more precise comparison can be conducted through the Spearman’s rank correlation (rho) and 
Kendall’s rank correlation (tau). Using these correlations, Sarma’s index and the one provided in 
this article had 101 countries in common for their 2011 rankings. The rankings displayed a 
Spearman’s rho of 0.84 and Kendall’s tau of 0.64, both significant at the 1% level. For 2014, the 
indexes had 86 countries in common, with a rho of 0.74 and tau of 0.54, both also significant at 
the 1% level.  
These results suggest that, while there is a positive and sometimes strong correlation between the 
two indexes, there are still significant differences between them. That is, in both indexes, HICs are 
ranked higher than LMICs. However, the ranking of these sub-groups is ordered differently 
because of variable selection. Thus, this comparison indicates that, while indicative of the level of 
financial development of a country, macroeconomic variables do not give the same results as when 
one uses financial inclusion microdata. Thus, in order to assess an accurate relationship between 
FI, poverty and income inequality, it is necessary to use this microdata index. 
 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has developed a novel index of financial inclusion using micro-level information. 
Employing multiple correspondence analysis, we generated index scores for 446,776 individuals 
in about 150 countries for the years 2011, 2014 and 2017 using the World Bank’s Findex dataset. 
Furthermore, the index was transformed into a  country-level score to be used to construct a Global 
Ranking of Financial Inclusion (GRFI), allowing for an over-time and a cross-country comparison. 
The chapter has two important insights. First, it confirms the proximity of mainstream financial 
inclusion to the financial development literature. Not only are those extremely connected through 
their theoretical foundations, we showed that they are also measured using very similar (sometime 
the same) aggregate variables. Therefore, if FI is a novel policy that is able to reduce poverty and 
income inequality, but it is theorised and measured as FD, there seems to be a lack of novelty in 
such policy. Such finding confirms the need for a new theory of FI and a new measurement, which 
has been provided in Chapters 3 and 5. 
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Second, the multiple correspondence analysis both visually and through the generation of country-
level measurements, has unveiled the strong differences between LMICs and HICs. In Chapter 3, 
we hypothesised that such differences could be due to three main factors: the currency hierarchy, 
the oligopolistic nature of the financial system in LMICs and the large informal labour market in 
LMICs in comparison to HICs. Whereas, so far, we were unable to confirm if such hypotheses 
determine FI in those regions, we have showed that, in average, individuals from LMICs have less 
access to basic financial services but are, at the same time, more indebted. 
Overall, our analysis has demonstrated the advantages of micro-level data to measure FI. Our new 
microdata-based country-level measure of FI constitutes the first step towards a dynamic 
comparison of FI across countries and their relation to poverty and income inequality, which is 

















An econometric analysis of the effects of financial inclusion on 
poverty and income inequality 
 
In previous chapters, we noticed the importance of macro-economic conditions and market 
structure variables for financial inclusion (FI). In Chapter 3, we discussed three key macro-
economic and structural differences between HICs and LMICs. First, LMICs are characterised by 
a high rate of labour market informality, which reaches over 90% of total employment in some 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. Second, oligopolies formed by for-profit 
banks in the financial industry are an important feature in LMICs, more so than in HICs. Countries 
such as Turkmenistan, Sierra Leone and Iran display a bank concentration of 95% or higher. This 
factor may lead to higher lending rates and expensive financial services. Finally, according to the 
currency hierarchy hypothesis, LMICs’ currencies display lower quality than core currencies, such 
as the US dollar and the Euro. This subordinated position pushes central banks to increase nominal 
base interest rates in order to keep demand for the local currency. Such policy increases banks’ 
lending rates, thus inflating the costs of FI in LMICs. 
The findings in Chapter 4 complemented our theoretical discussion, as participants reported that 
employment status and high interest rates were significant determinants of demand for financial 
services. First, we noticed that unemployed and informal workers report a lack of need and use of 
financial services, either due to lack of income or the high prices of financial services. This find is 
also similar to the one presented in the Findex dataset. In 2017, 64.63% and 29.99% of participants 
reported not having a bank account due to lack of money or its high prices, respectively (Table 
1.1). Second, many participants claimed loan interest rates were “abusive” and could generate a 
“snowball” effect, thus leading to over-indebtedness and wealth destitution. When asked on 
whether they considered if access to banking could lead to poverty reduction, most of them gave 
a negative answer or claimed it could only be possible under stringent conditions, such as a having 





The theoretical and qualitative study directed us to answer our last two research questions: 
 
RQ2: What is the causal relationship between poverty, income inequality and financial 
inclusion? 
 
RQ3: What are the effects of financial inclusion on poverty and income inequality? 
 
Based on the previous exercises, we develop an econometric model that focuses on the 
particularities of LMICs. The estimation of the model is expected to test two hypotheses. First, 
unlike the mainstream argument that FI reduces poverty and income inequality, we suggest that 
the reverse mechanism is more relevant, that is, poverty and income inequality have a more 
substantial impact on FI. In this case, a reduction of poverty and income inequality may boost FI. 
Second, we expect FI to have a positive or statistical insignificant effect on poverty and income 
inequality in LMICs. This outcome would be explained by the inherently high interest rates, the 
bank concentration and the shift of wealth from the poor to the rich. 
This chapter aims to contribute to the existing literature in two ways: first, by employing a 
microdata-based index of FI to assess its causal relationship to poverty and income inequality; 
second, by selecting variables stemmed from the Post-Keynesian theory and the case study results 
in order to evaluate the effects of FI on poverty and income inequality, as well as the effects of 
other policies on these development goals. 
 
6.1 Existing research 
While FI has been promoted as a development tool to reduce poverty and income inequality, few 
cross-country empirical studies have been conducted in order to provide evidence for such a claim.  
In the mainstream literature, three key issues undermine the effectiveness of the results: (i) the 




First, existing studies are grounded in mainstream theories, in particular the financial development 
(FD) literature, as presented in Chapters 2 and 3. This connection is also evident regarding variable 
selection as presentend in Chapter 5. Selected control variables are frequently related to country-
level measures of human capital (such as literacy levels), trade openness, rule-of-law, inflation and 
infrastructure. Kim (2016) is an exception, as the study includes variables that could determine the 
level of income inequality, such as taxation and social expenditure. In this thesis, we partially 
follow Kim (2016), but we add further control variables in line with the Post-Keynesian (PK) 
literature on the macroeconomic market structure. 
Second, five out of seven studies that analyse the relationship between FI, poverty and income 
inequality use Sarma's (2008) index of FI (Kim, 2016; Park and Mercado, 2018; Turegano and 
Garcia-Herrero, 2018; Sethi and Acharya, 2018; Dahir, 2019).96 As discussed in Chapter 5, macro-
level variables such as ATM per 1,000 individuals and credit to GDP ratio, might be good proxies 
for FD measurement, but not for FI. A more accurate measure of FI must utilise individual-level 
information in order to assess its effects on the reduction of poverty and income inequality.  
Two studies employ microdata indexes to assess the effects of FI on poverty and income inequality. 
Aslan, Deléchat, Newiak, & Yang (2017) present a partial solution to this issue by generating an 
index of FI inequality for 2011 using the Findex dataset. They estimate the effects of FI inequality 
on income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient. However, the study does not assess the 
effects of FI itself, but rather inequality in access to and usage of FI. Moreover, the study only uses 
data for 2011, overlooking the information from 2014 and 2017. Koomson et al. (2020) follow 
their work and generate a microdata index for FI in Ghana using multiple correspondence analysis 
(MCA). Results show that, in the country, FI reduces poverty. Nevertheless, the authors’ do not 
negate the axis as it was done in this thesis, which means that positive answers are considered 
negative values.97 This issue suggests that the results may be the opposite, i.e., that FI increases 
poverty in Ghana. 
 
96 Full details of cross-country studies on the relationship between FI, poverty and income inequality can be found 
in Appendix E.1. 
97 In the article’s Appendix 1, we notice that the individuals who answered “yes” to FI variables, such as bank 
account ownership, are given a negative value. This generates opposite results when estimating the effects of such 
index on poverty, as an increase in the FI index would represent a smaller level of FI. 
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Third, the simultaneity issue is not addressed in any cross-country study to date.98 While it may be 
the case that FI reduces poverty and income inequality, it is also possible that a reduction in poverty 
and income inequality levels would also enhance the level of FI, as individuals would have more 
disposable income to use financial services. Thus, current results may be biased. 
In sum, existing results conclude that FI reduces income inequality99 and poverty. This is expected 
from studies that employ aggregate measurement of FI, as the FD literature has already established 
that aggregate finance reduces income inequality and poverty, besides boosting economic growth 
(King and Levine, 1993; Levine et al., 2000; Honohan, 2004; Beck et al., 2004).100 However, 
studies that employ microdata indexes also reach similar conclusions, but these suffer from a lack 
of robustness due to the selection of only a single year, as well as measurement issues. This chapter 
aims to overcome these issues by estimating the relationship between FI, income inequality and 
poverty using a microdata-based measurement. Moreover, by using instrumental variables (IV) to 
correct for the simultaneity bias, we address the shortcomings of previous studies. 
 
6.2 The simultaneous equations model 
To address these critical shortcoming in existing studies that estimate the effects of FI on poverty 
and income inequality, we implement three modifications in the prevailing empirical models. First, 
instead of following the FD literature, we base our control variables selection in the PK theory and 
the findings from our case study. Second, we employ the Global Ranking of Financial Inclusion 
(GRFI), which is based on individual-level data, as a proxy on the country-level of FI in order to 
estimate its effects on poverty and income inequality. Finally, we correct for simultaneity bias in 
our model using instrumental variables. 
 
 
98 Simultaneity bias is further discussed in section 6.3. 
99 With exception of the full model (Model 6) in Dahir (2019), which shows an increase in income inequality. The 
author, however, reports only the results of Model 1, where FI decreases income inequality but results are not 
statistically significant. 
100 It is important to highlight that such studies focus on the role of finance to firms, not households. 
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6.2.1 The three equations 
In order to answer RQ2 and RQ3, we consider three equations. In Equation 6.1, FI is determined 
by poverty (𝑝𝑜𝑣) and income inequality (𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞), besides control variables (𝑎) grounded in the PK 
theory and findings of our case study.101 We include four control variables. First, the central bank 
interest rate (𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡) acts as a proxy for currency hierarchy. According to this hypothesis, LMICs 
must set higher 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡 in order to attract capital, as the high volatility and low quality of currencies 
reduce the demand for national currency (Herr, 2008; Carneiro and Rossi, 2013; Conti et al., 2014; 
Bortz and Kaltenbrunner, 2018). As the 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡 serves as a base rate for commercial banks loans to 
household and firms, we expect 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡 to reduce FI. Second, bank concentration (𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛) is used to 
assess if our hypothesis that oligopoly in the financial market increases the costs of financial 
services, thus reducing FI.102 Third, self-employment to total employment ratio (𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓) serves as a 
measurement of whether self-employed workers have less access to financial services, as reported 
by our participants in our case study. We expect that an increase in self-employment will reduce 
the level of FI. Fourth, we add a variable to account for the employment rate (𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘), as workers 
may display a higher demand for financial services. Finally, we add dummy variables for years to 
control for time-specific effects. 
 
𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                 (6.1) 
 
Acknowledging the possibility that FI might impact poverty and income inequality, as per the 
mainstream literature, we face a simultaneity issue. As we might have simultaneity in the 
relationship between FI, poverty and income inequality, we must consider two further equations: 
 
𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                          (6.2) 
 
 
101 A detailed outlook of the dataset is presented in the following sub-section. 
102 The bank concentration measurement displays a drawback, as there is no distinction between state-owned and 
private banks. This point will be further discussed in the results section (6.4). 
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Based on the existing literature,  poverty is determined by FI, the self-employment ratio, GDP 
growth, literacy rate, public social protection expenditure and urban population ratio. We expect 
that self-employment and poverty will have a positive relationship, as self-employed workers have 
reduced income and no formal employment benefits (Chen et al., 2006; Tassot et al., 2019). In 
turn, GDP growth, should have a negative effect on poverty, as it is expected increase the income 
of the poorest according to empirical research (Ravallion, 1995; Ghura et al., 2002; Dollar and 
Kraay, 2004). Education should also display a negative effect on poverty (Mukherjee and Benson, 
2003; European Commission, 2010; Rahman, 2013). Thus, we add literacy rates as a proxy for the 
level of education in a country. Social protection and poverty are expected to have a negative 
relationship, as basic income and other social benefits may reduce poverty levels (Jefferson and 
Kim, 2012). The variable 𝑢𝑟𝑏 accounts for the differences between urban and rural population, as 
research shows that rural areas are, in average, poorer than urban regions (Mukherjee and Benson, 
2003; Rahman, 2013; UNCTAD, 2015; Lekobane and Seleka, 2017; Tassot et al., 2019). Finally, 
we add time variables to this equation as well. 
Lastly, we provide an equation for income inequality (Eq. 6.3). Here, income inequality is 
determined by FI, GDP per capita, social expenditure, self-employment, gross capital formation 
as percentage of GDP and the tax revenue as percentage of GDP of each country. First, we use 
GDP per capita and its squared value as the literature shows a inverted-U relationship between 
income level and income inequality (Kuznets, 1955; Deyshappriya, 2017). Social expenditure is 
expected to act a redistributive policy, thus reducing income inequality (Odedokun and Round, 
2001; Tridico, 2018). Self-employment, in turn, would increase income inequality as workers 
would earn less and would not have the possibility of organising to increase their income share, 
such as through trade unions (Tridico, 2018). Gross capital formation has also shown a negative 
effect on income inequality (Sarel, 1997; Maldonado, 2017; Bucevska, 2019). Finally, we use the 
tax revenue as a proxy for redistributive policies and expect them to have a negative effect on 
income inequality (Roine et al., 2009; Martorano, 2018) 
.  




As we assume a potential simultaneous relationship between FI, poverty and income inequality, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) is biased and inconsistent. Thus, we solve this issue by implementing 
panel-data instrumental variables.103 
 
6.2.2 Addressing simultaneity and causality 
Simultaneity is a form of endogeneity of the explanatory variables, which arises when one or more 
of the explanatory variables is jointly determined with the dependent variable. The nature of a 
structural equation in a system of simultaneous equations, also known as simultaneous equations 
models (SEMs), indicates a correlation of the explanatory variable with the error term. Thus, 
applying OLS to solve SEMs leads to bias and inconsistent results (Wooldridge, 2012, chap. 16). 
Within the empirical literature on the effects of FI on poverty and income inequality, no study 
explicitly acknowledges the potential simultaneity bias. Nevertheless, four studies mention 
possible endogeneity problems, without discussing them in depth (Kim, 2016; Park and Mercado, 
2018; Le et al., 2019; Koomson et al., 2020). Kim (2016) addresses the endogeneity of income 
inequality by generalised method of moments (GMM) but does not consider the endogenous 
characteristic of FI. It also does not justify the nature of the endogeneity, so we are unable to 
compare such study to ours. Next, both Park and Mercado (2018) and Le et al. (2019) recognise 
the potential endogeneity of FI in their models, but only the latter addresses the issue by utilising 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. Results show a substantial and statistically significant 
negative effect of FI on income inequality. However, FI is measured by aggregate variables (using 
principal component analysis and Sarma's (2016) distance-based approach). Therefore, we 
consider that FI in this study is based on FD variables and does not correspond to individual-level 
FI. The study also does not consider the reverse causality, i.e., that income inequality may affect 
FI. Finally, Koomson et al. (2020) consider the endogeneity of FI and use three-stage feasible 
generalised least squares (3SFGLS) to address the endogeneity bias. However, the nature of 




103 To be further discussed in sub-section 6.3. 
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Tests Method Instruments 
Endogenous 
variables 
Le et al. (2019) Yes 
Sargan; Cragg-
Donald Wald F 
2SLS 
Lagged FI and 
lagged GDPPC 
FI and GDPPC 
Kim (2016) No N/A GMM 
Social transfer 
to GDP ratio 
Gini 
coefficient 
Koomson et al. 
(2020) 
Yes Wald 3SFGLS 





Yes N/A N/A N/A FI 
 
As in Le et al. (2019), we select the 2SLS method.104 The method consists of selecting an 
exogenous variable, i.e., an instrumental variable, that is correlated to the endogenous explanatory 
variable, but it is not correlated with the error term. In other words, the instrument must be relevant 
and exogenous (Greene, 2012, chap. 8). We also use GMM as a robustness test. While GMM is 
necessary with dynamic unobserved effects panel data models, GMM improvements are small in 
comparison to 2SLS that corrects for heteroscedasticity or serial correlation. In fact, in cross-
section regressions, point estimates and statistical significance between 2SLS and GMM are very 
similar, even under heteroscedasticity (Wooldridge, 2001). As we will show next, due to the short 
period in our dataset (2011, 2014, 2017) and the low variance over time, results using between-
effect are more appropriate. Thus, applying 2SLS instead of GMM should display alike results.  
Besides overcoming bias and inconsistency, we aim to find causal relationships between FI and 
poverty and income inequality. When applying OLS, we refer to conditional expectations, not 
causal inference: 
 
“Put differently, when we interpret the model as a conditional expectation, the ceteris 
paribus condition only refers to the included variables, while for a causal interpretation it 
 
104 More precisely, we use the Generalised 2SLS (G2SLS) from Balestra and Krishnakumar (1987), where the 




also includes the unobservables (omitted variables) in the error term” (Verbeek, 2008, 
chap. 5). 
This means that, in order to answer our RQ2 on causality, we must investigate the error term and 
address its correlation to the endogenous variables. In this case, structural equation models 
characterised by simultaneity are an adequate choice as “each equation represents a causal link, 
rather than a mere empirical association” (Goldberger, 1972, p.979). 
In our SEM, equations 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 are autonomous, i.e., each has an economic meaning in 
isolation from the other equations in the system. Moreover, each SEM equation represents a causal 
relationship as the change in an explanatory variable (including endogenous ones) has a direct 
interpretation when holding other variables fixed (Wooldridge, 2002, chap. 9). Thus, by applying 
2SLS, we can consider a causal effect of FI on poverty and income inequality, as well as income 
inequality and poverty on FI. 
 
6.3 Data 
6.3.1 The dataset 
To start, we present an outlook of the ten selected variables that are used to estimate our three 
models (Table 6.2). Whereas the FI variable has been generated in the previous chapter utilising 
the Findex dataset, other variables have been retrieved from international institutions’ database, 
such as the World Bank and the ILO. 
We notice that six variables display a drop in the number of observations when aligned to our FI 
variable: Gini, central bank interest rate, literacy, social expenditure and taxation. Therefore, in 
order to enlarge the sample size of our estimations, we utilise different approaches to missing data. 
We discuss how we handled missing values for each of the variables separately.
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Table 6.2: Summary of selected variables 
Name Variable Measurement Total observations Observations (FI≠0) Source 
𝐹𝐼 Financial inclusion Normalised index of FI 427 427 Chapter 5 
𝑝𝑜𝑣 Poverty Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day, 2011 PPP (% 
of population) 
1,099 167 World Bank 
𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞 Income inequality Gini coefficient 1,489 233 UNU-Wider 
𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡 Central bank interest rate Central bank interest rate (%) 1,486 193 IMF 
𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛 Bank concentration Assets of largest three banks to total banks ratio 2,529 405 World Bank 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 Self-employment ratio Self-employed, total (% of total employment) 3,140 424 World Bank 
𝑢𝑟𝑏 Urban population Urban to total population 2,983 424 World Bank 
𝑙𝑖𝑡 Literacy Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and 
above) 
654 119 World Bank 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ GDP growth GDP growth (annual %) 3,089 422 World Bank 
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐 GDP per capita GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 3,044 418 World Bank 
𝑔𝑘𝑓 Gross capital formation Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 2,848 414 World Bank 
𝑠𝑜𝑐 Social expenditure Public social protection expenditure (% of  GDP) 886 117 ILO/OECD 
𝑡𝑎𝑥 Taxation Tax to GDP ratio excluding social contributions (%) 1,941 279 UNU-Wider 
Note: All variables measured from 0 to 100, with exception of 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡 (-0.75 to 105.83), 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐 (630 to 115,415) and 𝑔𝑘𝑓 (-3.74368 to 85.1013).
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6.3.2 Handling missing values 
Gini coefficient, poverty ratio, literacy and social expenditure 
After an extensive selection of information from the UNU-Wider dataset,105 the first step was to 
add further information from the World Bank dataset, which results in only seven additional 
observations. Assuming that income inequality changes slowly over time, we decide to first add 
missing information by cubic interpolation. If the value of 2011, 2014 or 2017 is missing, a smooth 
measurement is added based on two previous and following observations. Such procedure yielded 
only further 24 observations. The small addition is due to the fact that, through cubic interpolation, 
there must be two values before and after the missing value, so that missing variables for 2017 are 
often not addressed. Because of that, we also handle missing values through nearest neighbour 
interpolation. Using this method, we added another 153 observations. Finally, countries without 
information of Gini coefficient were excluded from the analysis. This was the case of Belize, 
Kuwait, Oman, Turkmenistan, and Trinidad and Tobago. To illustrate the full procedure, Table 
6.3 presents cubic and nearest neighbour interpolations for Chile and Cameroon. 
The same method is used for the poverty ratio and literacy. Data were retrieved from the World 
Bank datasets but was incomplete. As before, we use cubic interpolation to handle missing values, 
which only added 16 and 37 observations, respectively. Thus, we utilise the nearest neighbour 
interpolation, which added another 191 and 234 values each. 
Finally, we address the missing values of social expenditure. After adding the information from 
the ILO database, we merged it to the OECD dataset, which provided another 38 observations. 
Cubic interpolation included 36 observations to the years 2011, 2014 and 2017, and was helpful 
to provide more specific values when using the nearest neighbour interpolation. The latter added 






105 The details on the selection of Gini coefficients for each country and year are displayed in Appendix E.2. 
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Table 6.3: Interpolation of Gini coefficient for Chile and Cameroon 











2000 54.6 54.599998 54.599998 . . 42.139999 
2001 . . 54.599998 42.14 42.139999 42.139999 
2002 . . 52.799999 . . 42.139999 
2003 52.8 52.799999 52.799999 . . 42.139999 
2004 . 51.735802 51.735802 . . 42.48 
2005 . 50.686419 50.686419 . . 42.82 
2006 49.8 49.799999 49.799999 . . 42.82 
2007 . 49.654443 49.654443 42.82 42.82 42.82 
2008 . 49.645832 49.645832 . . 42.82 
2009 49.6 49.599998 49.599998 . . 42.82 
2010 . 49.147143 49.147143 . . 42.82 
2011 48.7 48.700001 48.700001 . . 46.639999 
2012 . 48.43125 48.43125 . . 46.639999 
2013 48.3 48.299999 48.299999 . . 46.639999 
2014 . 48.568749 48.568749 46.64 46.639999 46.639999 
2015 48.5 48.5 48.5 . . 46.639999 
2016 . . 46.950001 . . 46.639999 
2017 45.4 45.400002 45.400002 . . 46.639999 
2018 . . 45.400002 . . 46.639999 






Central bank interest rate 
Policy rate had 234 missing observations. To handle this issue, we took three steps. First, we add 
the policy rate of the European Central Bank, which was absent from the dataset. This increased 
observations from 193 to 247. Second, we substituted the interest rates of four dollarized countries 
in 2011, 2014 and 2017, namely El Salvador, Puerto Rico, Ecuador and Zimbabwe, adding another 
12 observations. Third, we added information of remaining missing values by checking the official 
central bank source and, when this step was not possible, data was added through information from 
secondary sources.106 In the end, we reached 415 observations.107 
 
6.4 Model selection 
In this sub-section, we start by displaying the correlations between FI, poverty and income 
inequality and the above-mentioned control variables. Next, we show the tests we have conducted 
in order to select the best model for our estimations. We proceed to discuss the necessary 
instruments to provide unbiased estimations and causal effects.  
 
6.4.1 Correlations 
We start by presenting a Pearson correlation of all variables (Table 6.4). First, we notice that FI 
has a negative correlation both with respect to poverty and income inequality. Yet, causal effects 
cannot be concluded from it. Central bank interest rates and self-employment are also negatively 
correlated to FI, which is expected from our theory discussion. In turn, bank concentration and 
work (i.e., employment) have unexpected signs. It is also interesting to notice that FI also has 
strong correlations with GDP per capita, literacy, social protection, urbanisation and taxation.  
 
106 Full details are displayed in Appendix E.3. 
107 Data was unavailable for Somalia and Turkmenistan. 
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Table 6.4 Pearson correlations 
 𝐹𝐼 𝑝𝑜𝑣 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑜𝑐 𝑢𝑟𝑏 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐 𝑔𝑘𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑥 
𝐹𝐼 1              
𝑝𝑜𝑣 -0.4741 1             
𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖 -0.3088 0.282 1            
𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡 -0.3473 0.3046 -0.0219 1           
𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛 0.0632 0.0635 -0.0231 -0.2055 1          
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 -0.6662 0.6531 0.2696 0.2958 -0.0054 1         
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 -0.2114 0.3728 0.203 0.1112 0.019 0.4813 1        
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ -0.2847 0.2621 0.1526 0.1426 -0.014 0.3752 0.3401 1       
𝑙𝑖𝑡 0.5395 -0.6331 -0.2119 -0.157 -0.1537 -0.7118 -0.2571 -0.2635 1      
𝑠𝑜𝑐 0.6109 -0.4302 -0.37 -0.2205 0.0921 -0.6813 -0.5099 -0.4314 0.5727 1     
𝑢𝑟𝑏 0.5084 -0.5981 0.0115 -0.2776 0.0349 -0.6529 -0.3192 -0.2736 0.6136 0.5008 1    
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐 0.8132 -0.5465 -0.3372 -0.4374 0.0624 -0.7485 -0.2094 -0.2888 0.5603 0.6141 0.6296 1   
𝑔𝑘𝑓 -0.1554 0.0866 0.0143 0.1028 0.0362 0.2813 0.3178 0.4704 -0.0822 -0.2869 -0.196 -0.1801 1  
𝑡𝑎𝑥 0.4455 -0.3294 -0.1934 -0.2137 0.119 -0.5106 -0.3 -0.2941 0.4173 0.6246 0.3321 0.3765 -0.1401 1 
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However, it is possible that these correlations are linked through poverty and income 
inequality. For instance, if literacy reduces poverty and poverty reduces FI, we would expect 
that the correlation between literacy and FI is positive and strong. We will address such issues 
further in section 6.4.4. 
Second, we see a positive correlation between poverty and self-employment, and a negative 
correlation between poverty and social expenditure. Such relationships are expected as 
informality may reduce income and social expenditure reduce households spending in basic 
services, thus increasing disposable income. Finally, GDP growth and literacy display a 
negative correlation with poverty, which is also unexpected. 
Lastly, the Gini coefficient and self-employment have a positive correlation, while social 
expenditure and taxation have negative ones. Such results are expected as they address 
distribution policies. Yet, our preliminary results suggest that certain variables, such as bank 
concentration and gross capital formation (the proxy for investment), may have low 
explanatory power when conducting more advanced analyses. 
 
6.4.2 Differences between LMICs and HICs 
The first step into selecting a model is to establish if LMICs and HICs will follow different 
regression functions when analysing the effects of FI on poverty and income inequality. In 
order to test such hypothesis, we performed a Chow test. The test shows whether independent 
variables have different impacts on each sub-group of a sample. The null hypothesis is that 
there are no differences between groups (Chow, 1960).  
Using a model with between and within-effects, we estimate Eq. 6.1 with both groups. We use 
robust standard errors as the F-statistics are only valid under homoskedasticity. This equation 
includes 12 parameters (demeaned and mean values of each of the six explanatory variables) 
and 371 observations. The result for our Chow test was 28.63, which is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. This suggests that there are differences between these two regions. Thus, to 





6.4.3 Within- or between-effects model 
Before estimating Equation 6.1, we also conduct a Hausman test to evaluate whether the 
coefficients of the within-effect or between-effect model are equal.108 Our null hypothesis (H0) 
is that the difference in coefficients is not systematic. The p-value of each equation is displayed 
in Table 6.5, where 𝑏 is consistent under the H0 and HA and 𝐵 is inconsistent under HA and 
efficient under H0. 
 
Table 6.5: P-value results of Hausman test 
Equation Total sample LMICs HICs 
Eq. 6.1 0.0015 0.1054 0.1309 
Eq. 6.2 0.0472 0.0827 0.6391 
Eq. 6.3 0.0551 0.3969 0.0879 
 
We notice that half of the results indicate a rejection of the H0 (i.e., a p-value smaller than 0.1), 
which means that the within- and between-effects models are not the same. The rejection would 
direct us to select the within-estimator. However, selecting a fixed-effect model for low time-
variant variables generates poor results. At the same time, we notice that, for the other half of 
results, we fail to reject the H0. Such result means that estimates using between- or within-
estimators are equal. 
In our evaluation, we want to address two distinct effects. First, we want to estimate how much 
FI affects poverty and income inequality between countries, that is, if the effects are similar 
across countries. Second, we want to estimate the within-country effect, i.e. if a change in FI 
within a country will affect poverty and income inequality. A between-effects model is best 
identified using low-frequency data (Calderon et al., 2002), which is the case of our dataset. In 
turn, within-effects are unable to account for time-invariant variables, which may generate 
issues in our estimations. 
In our study, several variables change little over time, which generates issues for selecting the 
within estimator (Bell and Jones, 2015). In fact, Bell, Fairbrother, & Jones (2019) conclude 
 
108 Also sometimes referred as fixed- and random-effects, respectively. We prefer the terms within- and 
between-effects, in turn, as random-effects represent a weighted average of the within- and between-effects, 
which leads to confusing interpretation of coefficients (Bell et al., 2019). 
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that within-effects should only be selected in three particular cases: (i) if groups are of no 
interest; (ii) where slopes are not different across groups; and (iii) there are few level-2 entities 
(country, in our research) such that random slopes cannot be estimated.  
As (i) we are interested in addressing difference across countries, (ii) we have a hypothesis that 
slopes are different between HICs and LMICs, and (iii) we have about 150 level-2 entities, we 
conclude that the sole selection of within-estimator, as suggested by the Hausman test is 
inappropriate.109 Thus, we select the between-effects estimator for our analysis. 
 
6.4.4 The instruments 
To identify the three equations, each must have at least one exogenous variable with a non-
zero coefficient that is excluded from previous equations (Wooldridge, 2012, chap. 16). In Eq. 
6.1, social expenditure, urbanisation, literacy and GDP growth are related to poverty, but not 
directly to FI. Moreover, GDP per capita, gross capital formation, taxation and social 
expenditure are associated with income inequality but not directly to FI. Thus, we say that these 
variables are exogenous in Eq. 6.1. Likewise, in Eq. 6.2 and Eq. 6.3, central bank interest rates, 
bank concentration and employment level are related to FI, but directly not to poverty and 
income inequality. Therefore, those are the potential instruments for our estimations. Finally, 
it is possible to add lagged values of the instrumented variables as instruments, but this 
procedure generates limitations due to the short time span of our dataset. 
Instrument selection was straightforward for Eq. 6.2 and Eq. 6.3, but not for Eq. 6.1. As we 
perform estimations for a full sample (FS), LMICs and HICs, the first obstacle we encountered 
was to select valid instruments for each of the specifications. To confirm the validity, i.e., 
exogeneity of instruments, we conducted an overidentifying restriction test. The Sargan test’s 
null hypothesis holds the joint validity of selected instruments (Sargan, 1958; Verbeek, 2008, 
chap. 5). Thus, a rejection of the null hypothesis requires experimentation on the selection of 
valid instruments. 
Besides valid, instruments should also be relevant. If instruments are only marginally relevant, 
they are considered “weak” instruments, which causes biased results (Stock and Yogo, 2005). 
For 2SLS in which there is a single endogenous variable, instrument weakness can be tested if 
the first-stage F-statistics is less than 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997; Sanderson and Windmeijer, 
2016). Eq. 6.2 and 6.3 are such cases, in which FI the single endogenous regressor. However, 
 
109 Further results on between and within-effects models using GLS can be found in Appendix E.4. 
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such F-statistics threshold of 10 is a rule of thumb, not a necessary condition for instrument 
selection (Stock and Yogo, 2005). In cases with more than one endogenous regressors, such as 
in Eq. 6.1, this rule of thumb no longer holds. In turn, we use the Cragg-Donald Wald (CDW) 
F-statistics and compare to Stock & Yogo's (2005) weak identification critical values, where 
the null hypothesis is that instruments are weak. 
It is also important to highlight that increasing the number of instruments may reduce the 
accuracy of estimates (Sargan, 1958). This happens as instruments can overfit endogenous 
variables, failing to remove their endogenous components. For instance, if the numbers of 
instruments are equal to the number of observations, the first-stage estimation will display a 
𝑅2 of 1, thus producing results akin to an OLS regression (Roodman, 2009). In fact, “if the first 
few instrumental variables are well chosen, there is usually no improvement, and even a 
deterioration, in the confidence regions as the number of instrumental variables is increased 
beyond three or four” (Sargan, 1958, p.414). Thus, in this thesis, we select one instrument 
above the instrumented variable. In practice, this means that Eq. 1, which has two endogenous 
variables, has three instruments. Meanwhile, Eq. 2 and Eq. 3, which have one endogenous 
variable, have only two instruments. 
Another aspect is the choice between internal and external instruments. Internal instruments, 
i.e., lagged values of endogenous variables, suffer from limitations, as “there is a trade-off 
between the lag distance used to generate internal instruments and the depth of the sample for 
estimation” (Roodman, 2009, p.137). If there are missing values from previous observations, 
we must drop all observations for the period, resulting in a reduced sample. As we have a short 
period in our analysis, we prefer selecting external instruments when possible. 
In Eq. 6.1, we start with the maximum number of instruments for all the three specifications 
(FS, LMICs and HICs). If the Sargan test was rejected (that is, the instruments are not valid), 
we eliminate each instrument until the joint validity is achieved.110 As we want only three 
instruments in each estimation, we proceed into deleting instruments until we reach three 
jointly valid instruments. Next, we compare the F-statistics in order to select the most reliable 
instruments. 
For the FS, we select 𝑙𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1. These instruments fail to reject the null 
hypothesis with a p-value of 0.3089 which confirms the validity of our instruments. Moreover, 
the results display the F-statistics of the first-stage regression for poverty and income inequality 
 
110 Full process in Appendix E.5. 
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above the threshold of 10 (8214.49 and 826.10). The CDW test of 2588.058 rejects the null 
hypothesis, which indicates theinstruments are not weak, i.e., they are relevant. For LMICs, we 
select 𝑢𝑟𝑏, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1. These are also jointly valid (p-value 0.9237) and relevant 
instruments (F-statistics of 6067.82 and 634.78, respectively). Moreover, the CDW F-statistic 
of 1922.822 is above the 13.43 critical value in the 10% level, confirming not weak 
instruments. Finally, for HICs, 𝑙𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 were also selected.
111 These instruments are 
also jointly valid (p-value 0.4758). The first-stage F-statistics for the effects of explanatory 
variables and instruments on poverty is 238.04. The F-statistics for the income inequality 
regression is 262.80, indicating that instruments are relevant. The CDW F-statistics of 128.958 
confirms such result. 
Besides the tests that confirm validity and relevance, such instruments are also intuitively 
sound. First, we expect lagged valued of the endogenous variables (poverty and income 
inequality) to be uncorrelated to the contemporary dependent variable (FI). Also known as 
predeterminant variables, the error term in time 𝑡 is uncorrelated with current exogenous and 
all past endogenous and exogenous variables, allowing us to address endogeneity (Wooldridge, 
2012). Second, urbanisation is highly negatively correlated to poverty as we expect those who 
live in urban areas to display higher levels of income. Yet, urbanisation per se does not imply 
a higher level of FI, but works through other variables, such as poverty. Third, like 
urbanisation, literacy itself is not expected to affect FI, but to act through its effects on poverty 
reduction. Therefore, the choice for internal and external instruments are coherent with tests 
and current literature.  
In Eq. 6.2 and Eq. 6.3, instruments selection is more straightforward as there is only one 
endogenous variable, FI. Here, we have three potential instruments, 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘, 
besides the lagged value of FI. However, as FI is measured every three years, the lagged value 
must be 𝐹𝐼𝑡−3. As this gap between lagged and contemporaneous variables is significant, we 
decide to avoid the use of this variable as an instrument. We start with the only internal and the 
three external instruments and aim to reduce it to two jointly valid and not weak instruments. 
In Eq. 6.2, we select 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 (FS) and 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 (LMICs and HICs). In the FS 
model, instruments are jointly valid (p-value 0.5643) and relevant (F-statistics 18.18 in first-
 
111 According to the joint validity and weak instruments tests, we should have selected 𝑠𝑜𝑐, 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1. 
However, by choosing these instruments, we have highly biased coefficients and large standard errors. For 
example, the constant is 2216.218 with standard errors of 26439.55. Similarly, poverty displayed a coefficient 




stage). In the LMICs model, instruments are also jointly valid (p-value 0.3774) but are 
marginally weak according to Stock and Yogo’s rule of thumb (F-statistics 9.24). Finally, in 
the HICs sample, the Sargan test is not rejected (p-value 0.7620) which indicated that 
instruments are indeed valid. However, the instruments seem to be very weak (F-stat 1.70).  
In Eq. 6.3, instruments are 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 (FS), 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 (LMICs) and 
𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛 (HICs). In the full sample, the p-value is 0.9492 and F-statistics of 83.56, 
indicating valid and relevant instruments. For the LMICs, Sargan test was not rejected (p-value 
0.22) and the weak instrument rule of thumb fell a bit short (9.07). Finally, for HICs, 
instruments are valid (p-value 0.9573) and are not weak (10.87).  
Using 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 as external instruments are also intuitively sounds. We expect 
that a change in central bank interest rate, bank concentration and employment levels will not 
directly influence poverty or income inequality but could indirectly affect them through FI. 
Finally, to confirm if our potential endogenous variables are in fact endogenous, we conduct a 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. The test compares 2SLS to OLS in order to state if instrument 
variables are necessary or if OLS would yield similar results. The null hypothesis is that 
regressors are exogenous. In our tests, we find that poverty and income inequality are not 
jointly endogenous in Eq. 6.1 (p-value = 0.12) nor is FI in Eq. 6.3 (p-value = 0.63). In turn, FI 
is in fact endogenous in Eq. 6.2 (p-value = 0.00). Such results suggest that FI may not be 
simultaneously related to income inequality as we had expected and might not yield results 
different from OLS regression. 
Thus, we consider our results to be unbiased for all our three LMICs specifications, but not for 
the HICs in Eq. 6.2. However, as we are mostly interested in addressing FI in LMICs, such 
drawback does not invalidate our findings.  
 
6.5 Results 
Finally, we estimate Eq. 6.1, Eq. 6.2 and Eq. 6.3 using a generalised two-stage least squares 
(G2SLS) in order to address endogeneity deriving from simultaneity. As presented in section 
6.3, the simultaneity problem causes coefficients to be biased. In fact, results in the existing 
literature that do not address endogeneity can only be regarded as correlations, but do not offer 
causal relations. We address this bias through IV in order to evaluate the causal effects between 
FI, poverty and income inequality. 
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However, before showing the results, we highlight that, as we have normalised the FI index, it 
displays low variation, as we see in Table 6.6. Thus, small changes in explanatory variables 
may affect FI substantially. In LMICs, where the maximum FI score ranges from 15.18 to 
57.59, a 1-percentage point fluctuation can be economically meaningful. 
 
Table 6.6: Summary statistics of FI for LMICs and HICs 
 LMICs HICs 
1% 0 14.57 
50% 15.18 67.99 
99% 54.17 100 
Smallest 0 14.44 
Largest 57.59 100 
Mean 18.57 64.78 
Std. deviation 13.26 19.96 
Variance 175.83 398.51 
Observations 289 138 
 
We have previously stated that within-effects do not contribute much to our analysis, as our 
variables change slowly over time. Thus, we conduct a 2SLS using GLS estimators of the 
between-effects model. Here, we use the exogenous variables after transforming them through 
the feasible GLS (Balestra and Krishnakumar, 1987). We address heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation by using clustered standard errors. Finally, we also add a GMM estimation for a 
robustness check.  
 
6.5.1 The effects of poverty and income inequality on financial inclusion 
To start, we analyse the first causal relationship that runs from poverty and income inequality 
to FI. Such results is our main contribution to the simultaneous relationship analysis among 
those variables, as the mainstream literature focuses on the reverse causality, i.e., the effect of 
FI on poverty and income inequality. In turn, we argue that poverty and income inequality are 
the main determinants of FI, and that FI can actually have a detrimental effect on poverty and 
income inequality due to indebtedness, high fees and an income transfer from the poor to the 
wealthy. Table 6.7 shows the results of Eq. 6.1, where, 𝑝𝑜𝑣 and 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖 were instrumented using 
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the following variables: 𝑙𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 (1.1); 𝑢𝑟𝑏, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 (1.2); and 
𝑙𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1  (1.3). 
 
Table 6.7: The effects of poverty and income inequality on FI (G2SLS and GMM) 
Variables (1.1) FS GMM (1.2) LMICs  GMM (1.3) HICs GMM 
𝑝𝑜𝑣 -0.04 -0.03 -0.15** -0.16*** -4.17*** -4.02*** 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (1.46) (1.05) 
𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞 -0.19 -0.18** 0.23** 0.22*** -0.86 -0.92*** 
 (0.14) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.68) (0.25) 
𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡 -0.37* -0.33*** 0.20 0.19** -1.74 -1.18* 
 (0.22) (0.12) (0.16) (0.09) (1.25) (0.61) 
𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛 -0.02 -0.01 -0.12** -0.10*** 0.06 0.10 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.18) (0.08) 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 -0.52*** -0.54*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.20 -0.16 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.71) (0.27) 
work 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.22** 0.21*** -0.09 -0.03 
 (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.51) (0.20) 
y14 1.57 7.43*** 6.19 8.50*** omitted 9.06*** 
 (5.34) (1.74) (5.07) (1.33) N/A (3.37) 
y17 -7.45 6.04*** -4.54 6.58*** omitted 4.02 
 (9.23) (1.79) (5.26) (1.35) N/A (3.37) 
Constant 40.19*** 34.00*** 18.42** 13.32*** 93.62*** 83.37*** 
 (10.44) (5.77) (7.31) (4.21) (29.13) (13.57) 
Observations 315 315 253 253 63 63 
Countries 115 N/A 95 N/A 21 N/A 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We notice that results are very robust as coefficients remain very similar using both 2SLS and 
GMM estimators. The first significant result is that poverty reduction has different effects on 
FI in HICs and LMICs. While in the former an increase in poverty strongly reduces FI (-4.02), 
the latter displays a much smaller effect (-0.16), where both results are statistically significant 
at the 1% level. This means that a percentage point (p.p.) increase in the poverty ratio will 
decrease FI by -0.16 p.p. in LMICs. However, these results confirm our hypothesis that 
reducing poverty could boost the level of FI. 
Second, both in the full sample (FS) and in HICs, income inequality reduces FI. These results 
contribute to our hypothesis that causality runs from income to FI. Nevertheless, a puzzling 
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result emerges in the LMICs specification, where income inequality increases FI. Such result 
can be analysed through the finding that there is not a Kuznets’ “inverted-U” curve with respect 
to income inequality in LMICs. In countries in Latin America and Southern Africa, for 
example, high inequality is a historical process which can be hardly overcome by merely 
economic aspects. In turn, the power of the elites should also be considered in order to address 
income inequality in these regions (Palma and Stiglitz, 2016). Thus, the non-monotonic 
relationship between FI and income inequality in LMICs is not grasped by our estimations, 
yielding such puzzling findings.112 
Other results are interesting to our analysis, as they partially confirm our hypothesis on the role 
of interest rates and employment status. Central bank interest rate, for instance, has a negative 
effect in FI of -0.33 p.p. in the FS, which means that, in average, higher interest rates are 
negatively related to FI. However, in LMICs, an increase in 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡 pushes FI up, which is not 
consistent with our hypothesis that currency hierarchy can lead to lower levels of FI. At the 
same time, bank concentration in LMICs does have a negative effect on FI. This result could 
be related to the fact that oligopoly financial institutions may charge higher prices for loans 
and services to clients, thus reducing the level of FI, despite the high base interest rate.  
Self-employment also reduces FI both in the FS (-0.52 p.p.) and in LMICs (-0.25 p.p.). These 
results confirm the statements of participants in the Brazilian case study that the lack of formal 
employment reduces the demand for formal financial services, besides being a barrier to formal 
loans. Finally, the employment ratio of a country has a positive effect on FI in LMICs, also 
contributing to our hypothesis of the importance of work, and in particular formal employment, 
to the access and use of formal financial services. 
 
6.5.2 The effects of financial inclusion on poverty 
We turn now our attention to the first reverse causality mechanism, i.e., if FI influences 
aggregate poverty. Theoretical and empirical evidence in the mainstream literature argue that 
FI is able to reduce poverty (or at least prevent it) through three mechanisms: first, individuals 
will be able to borrow in order to invest in human capital or small businesses; second, it will 
allow them to save in order to have a cushion for times of financial distress; third, they will be 
 
112 A microdata analysis in South Africa, for instance, discovered that FI has a negative relationship with income 
inequality. However, FI also reduces the wealth of the poor, while increasing the wealth of middle-classes (von 
Fintel and Orthofer, 2020). Thus, there might be more elements of distribution that have not been analysed 
through our macroeconomic analysis using the Gini coefficient. 
144 
 
able to purchase insurance policies, which will also prevent them into falling into poverty in 
the case of unemployment, crop loss or medical emergency. 
However, as we have introduced through our game-theory model in Chapter 3 and our 
qualitative analysis in Chapter 4, most low-income individuals do not have collateral nor 
formal jobs in order to borrow at fair rates, besides not having disposable income for savings 
nor insurance. Thus, making use of such financial instruments may lead to over-indebtedness 
and wealth destitution, as it was the case of some participants in our qualitative study. 
By estimating Eq. 6.2 (Table 6.8), in which instruments were 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 (2.1), 
𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 (2.2) and (2.3), we do not find very robust results for most of our coefficients.  
 
Table 6.8: The effects of FI on poverty (G2SLS and GMM) 
Variables (2.1) FS GMM (2.2) LMICs GMM (2.3) HICs GMM 
FI 1.41* -0.06 3.34 -0.18* 0.06 -0.02*** 
 (0.86) (0.06) (2.89) (0.10) (0.07) (0.01) 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 0.81*** 0.35*** 1.04* 0.47*** 0.14 0.06*** 
 (0.29) (0.07) (0.58) (0.09) (0.10) (0.02) 
growth -1.39 0.13 -3.56 -0.26 0.29 0.04 
 (1.55) (0.27) (2.80) (0.32) (0.20) (0.03) 
lit -0.30 -0.28*** -0.75 -0.18** 0.08 0.08* 
 (0.20) (0.07) (0.57) (0.08) (0.20) (0.04) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐 -0.91 0.38*** -0.02 0.58*** -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.91) (0.14) (1.06) (0.20) (0.14) (0.02) 
urb -0.36* -0.15*** -0.63 -0.13* -0.03 -0.02* 
 (0.19) (0.06) (0.39) (0.07) (0.03) (0.01) 
y14 -21.26 -0.65 -49.19 0.00 omitted 0.34 
 (18.72) (2.19) (31.70) (2.78) N/A (0.31) 
y17 3.68 0.02 -32.19 0.06 omitted -0.02 
 (19.15) (2.11) (34.84) (2.67) N/A (0.24) 
Constant 5.68 27.52*** 32.96 13.82 -11.26 -4.95 
 (27.47) (9.70) (34.84) (11.39) (21.48) (3.96) 
Observations 293 293 240 240 63 63 
Countries 107 N/A 89 N/A 21 N/A 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
With respect to the relationship between poverty and FI, in our full sample using 2SLS, FI 
increases poverty by 1.41 p.p. While this result may not be dramatic for countries with high 
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levels of poverty ratio, this is particularly dangerous to those with very low levels of individuals 
receiving less than US$1.90 a day. As we see in Table 6.9, while dispersion is larger in LMICs, 
both groups could face a relatively significant increase in poverty. China, who displayed a 
poverty ratio of 0.5% in 2017, would see poverty more than double with a 1.41 p.p. increase in 
FI. For HICs, likewise, this would be an economically significant increase, bearing in mind the 
group mean of 0.67% of poverty incidence. The result that FI increases poverty also confirms 
the perception of most participants of the case study. For them, the poor are unable to overcome 
poverty through banking, and are likely to become poorer due to the high interest rates and 
inflexible payment schedules. At the same time, our GMM estimations display a different 
picture: FI could, indeed, slightly reduce poverty in both LMICs and HICs. This result would 
confirm the mainstream theories, but the lack of robustness shows that the effects of FI on 
poverty are not very clear. 
 
Table 6.9: Summary statistics of poverty for LMICs and HICs 
 LMICs HICs 
1% 0 0 
50% 11.4 0.3 
99% 77.87 9.9 
Smallest 0 0 
Largest 94.1 15.5 
Mean 21.68 0.67 
Std. deviation 23.42 1.45 
Variance 548.59 2.11 
Observations 2,073 780 
 
More robust results arise from the effects of self-employment and urbanisation on poverty. In 
all our specifications, self-employment increases poverty and most results are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This reiterates our qualitative findings in which self-employed 
workers were earning, in average, less than those who are formally employed due to a lack of 
minimum wage floor for the former. Thus, for those countries with high levels of self-
employment, it is understandable that many individuals will earn less than U$1.90 a day. 
Finally, urbanisation also has a negative effect on poverty. In our FS (2SLS), for instance, an 
increase in the urban population by 1 p.p. leads to a reduction of 0.36 p.p. in the poverty ratio. 
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Such result is statistically significant at the 5% level. This finding also contributes to the 
existing literature on poverty that states that urbanisation is able to reduce absolute poverty. 
 
6.5.3 The effects of financial inclusion on income inequality 
Lastly, we estimate the causal effects of FI on income inequality (Table 6.10). Our hypothesis 
is that FI could lead to an increase of income inequality as the income stream of rentists is the 
interest rates paid by workers. Thus, an increase in borrowing from poor individuals would 
also increase the income of rentiers and reduce the income of workers due to the high interest 
rates in LMICs. In turn, mainstream theories argue that the financial system could reduce such 
inequalities as the income of rentiers (savers) would be allocated to borrowers that could invest 
in human capital and business, therefore increasing their income. 
Table 6.10: The effects of FI on income inequality (G2SLS) 
Variables (3.1) FS GMM (3.2) LMICs GMM (3.3) HICs GMM 
FI -0.07 -0.04 -0.55 0.13* 0.51 -0.08** 
 (0.54) (0.04) (0.55) (0.08) (1.26) (0.03) 
GDPpc -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDPpc2 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
𝑠𝑜𝑐 -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.52 -0.54*** -0.46 -0.42*** 
 (0.17) (0.09) (0.41) (0.16) (0.35) (0.08) 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.00 0.58 0.22*** 
 (0.08) (0.04) (0.13) (0.05) (0.85) (0.07) 
gkf -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.20** -0.10 -0.01 
 (0.14) (0.08) (0.24) (0.09) (0.57) (0.10) 
𝑡𝑎𝑥 0.12 0.12 0.42 0.26** -0.61 -0.03 
 (0.40) (0.09) (0.35) (0.13) (1.24) (0.08) 
y14 -9.02 -0.59 -4.33 -2.85* -29.18 0.66 
 (8.99) (1.03) (9.54) (1.67) (32.84) (0.95) 
y17 0.34 -1.23 -3.81 -1.92 omitted -1.17 
 (9.80) (1.01) (13.01) (1.63) N/A (0.92) 
Constant 50.91*** 49.16*** 41.60*** 43.93*** 49.78** 40.76*** 
 (8.82) (3.13) (13.51) (5.06) (17.35) (3.54) 
Observations 297 297 171 171 127 127 
Countries 105 N/A 62 N/A 43 N/A 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 




As in Eq. 6.2, the effect of FI is not robust in our estimations, which suggests an irrelevant 
influence of the policy on better distributional outcomes. In the GMM specifications, FI 
increases income inequality in LMICs, whereas it reduces in HICs. While such result would be 
in line with our theoretical framework for LMICs, the results are not consistent enough to allow 
us to make strong affirmations. 
Likewise, other variables such as GDP per capita, self-employment and gross capital formation 
do not seem to play an important role in determining income inequality neither in LMICs nor 
HICs. 
However, we do find a robust negative effect of public social expenditure and income 
inequality. In LMICs, increasing the spending on social goods and services, such as education 
and health care, by 1 p.p. of GDP reduces income inequality by 0.55 p.p. Whereas such effect 
does not seem large, it is important to notice that the Gini coefficient has low variation across 
countries as we can see in Table 6.11. For instance, in 2017, Slovakia had the smallest Gini 
coefficient (23.2), while South Africa had the highest value (65.5). Therefore, we notice that 
values are quite concentrated, which means that a 0.55 p.p. change can be quite significant. 
 
Table 6.11: Key number for the Gini index, 2017 
 Gini index 
Smallest value 23.2 
Median 36.39 
Mean 38.07 
Largest value 65.5 
Standard deviation 8.78 
Variance 77.16 
 
Therefore, whereas it seems FI increases income inequality in LMICs, we are unable to draw 
strong conclusions from our results as those were not robust. In turn, we conclude that the 
effect of FI on income inequality is potentially null or very small. However, social expenditure 
does reduce income inequality is both HICs and LMICs, which indicates that such policy could 
yield better results in reducing income inequality than fostering the access to and usage of 




This last empirical chapter aimed at answering the final two research questions regarding 
causality and effects of FI on poverty and income inequality. We contributed to the literature 
by addressing the potential simultaneous relationship among these variables, estimating these 
effects through a multi-dimensional microdata-based index, and including Post-Keynesian 
hypotheses and our qualitative research as a basis to control for further determinants of these 
three key variables. 
We first analysed the effect of poverty and income inequality on the levels of FI. Such 
estimation brings an unique perspective on the determinants of FI which, to date, have only 
been discussed through an individual-level characteristics. In turn, while we acknowledge that 
gender, race and education might be important determinants of the individual’s access to and 
usage of financial services, we add that structural conditions must also be accounted for.  
In Chapter 3, we start by theorising that interest rates and the labour market structure are 
essential to understand FI and how it relates to poverty and income inequality. Through our 
qualitative research in Chapter 4, we confirmed that such factors are key in determining the 
demand of financial services by the poor. Moreover, high interest rates and informal labour 
might have negative effects on how FI is instrumentalised to reduce poverty and income 
inequality. 
In fact, we find that an increase in poverty reduces FI, which has not been addressed in the 
literature so far. Therefore, if FI is to be promoted, a key policy would be to reduce poverty 
levels in the first place. Moreover, we find partial confirmation of our hypothesis based on the 
PK literature. Whereas the effects of central bank interest rates (a proxy for the currency 
hierarchy) are not robust, we find that an increase in bank concentration reduce the levels of FI 
in LMICs. Our suggestion is that this occurs through the oligopoly power of financial 
institutions that allow them to set high fees and interest rates on individuals. Finally, we find 
that self-employment is, in fact, a significant determinant of FI. In our estimations, an increase 
of the self-employment ratio reduces FI, confirming our theoretical and qualitative results. As 
self-employed workers usually earn in cash and have irregular income streams, they are less 
likely to use the formal financial system. Furthermore, we notice that those in the labour force 
(work) also present higher levels of FI – confirming the report of unemployed workers in our 
interviews that they had no demand for banking when out of work. Thus, besides addressing 
poverty rates, a boost in formal employment could improve the levels of FI in LMICs. 
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The results on the effect of income inequality on FI are, however, inconclusive. In LMICs, an 
increase in the Gini coefficient increases the level of FI. A possible explanation for such 
puzzling result is that our estimations do not grasp the potential non-linear relationship and 
particularities of LMICs such as those in Latin America. At the same time, an increase in 
income inequality seem to reduce FI in our full sample and in HICs. However, our results are 
also not robust as our 2SLS estimates are not statistically significant. Thus, we conclude that 
the effect of income inequality on FI might be insignificant or zero. 
Our results also challenge existing claims that FI reduces poverty and income inequality in 
LMICs. In estimating Eq. 6.2, FI increases poverty in our full sample estimation using 2SLS, 
but slightly reduces in LMICs and HICs when using GMM estimators. However, as results are 
not robust, we cannot confirm a clear effect that FI has over poverty. We do, nonetheless, find 
that self-employment displays a strong and robust effect on poverty reduction in LMICs. As 
the literature on labour markets show, and our qualitative results confirm, self-employed 
workers usually earn less (sometimes below the minimum wage) and have more precarious 
socio-economic situations. Thus, in order to address poverty in LMICs, a solution that is more 
likely to be effective than fostering FI would be to address the large informality of the labour 
market. This would allow workers to earn higher wages, in average, besides being able to 
benefit from work-related conditions such as unemployment benefits, health insurance and 
pensions. 
In estimating the effect of FI on income inequality (Eq. 6.3), we also do not find robust results. 
In fact, using the GMM estimator, FI seems to increase income inequality in LMICs, while it 
reduces in HICs. Thus, we are unable to provide a confident conclusion of such effects. As in 
the previous estimation, however, another variable does display a statistically significant 
reduction on income inequality in LMICs: social expenditure. In fact, an increase in social 
expenditure reduces income inequality by about 0.50 in all our full sample, LMICs and HICs. 
Therefore, we conclude that a social policies that do display a robust negative effect on income 
inequality should be fostered instead of FI, as the latter does not have a consistent nor robust 
effect on distributional outcomes. 
Finally, we confirm that there is a simultaneous relationship between poverty and FI, but were 
unable to provide the same conclusion for the relationship between FI and income inequality. 
Our results also suggest that labour and social policies are more effective in reducing poverty 
than FI but that, by addressing poverty, FI levels can be boosted. Thus, instead of the existing 
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mainstream literature conclusion that FI can be a direct factor that reduces poverty, we confirm 




























7.1 Summary and key findings 
This thesis has presented a critical appraisal of financial inclusion (FI). As a complex policy, 
FI had to be assessed from different approaches and perspectives in order to fully grasp its 
relationship with poverty and income inequality. We provided a critical conceptual evaluation 
of FI, developed a model that connected the different instruments of FI and considered the role 
of intra-country power in such dynamic, discussed the macroeconomic factors that shape 
micro-level policies, investigated how individuals relate to financial services, offered a new 
measurement of FI and, finally, estimated the simultaneous effects between FI, poverty and 
income inequality. We conclude that FI is unable to reduce poverty in a market-based 
programme and may be detrimental to poor individuals if structural and labour market 
conditions lead them to over-indebtedness. 
We started by offering theoretical and empirical evidence exposing some shortcomings in the 
claim made in the mainstream literature that FI reduces poverty and income inequality in low- 
and middle-income countries (LMICs). Theoretically, the literature is based on the human 
capital and life-cycle hypothesis, in which individuals can overcome poverty by investing in 
themselves and making use of financial instruments during income shocks. Empirically, the 
lack of proper measurement of FI, as well as the lack of acknowledgement of the simultaneous 
relationship between FI, poverty and income inequality, has led to inappropriate conclusions 
on the effects of FI on development goals. 
To address these issues, we have answered three research questions grounded in Post-
Keynesian hypotheses and in the critical realist methodology. These questions led us to our 
conceptual, theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature. 
 
RQ1:  How do intra-country power relations affect financial inclusion in low and middle-
income countries? 
RQ2: What is the causal relationship between poverty, income inequality and financial 
inclusion? 




In Chapter 2, we investigate the conceptual foundations of FI. We evaluated 67 studies through 
systematic analysis to reach common grounds in the mainstream literature with respect to (i) 
the subject; (ii) the intermediaries; and (iii) the elements of FI. First, we discussed the subject 
of FI, i.e. who is supposed to be included in the formal financial system. We distinguished 
firms from households due to their creditworthiness and loan purposes. We also distinguish 
households from individuals, as individuals within a household may still be excluded from the 
formal financial system. Thus, we concluded that, currently, FI focuses on the individual. 
Second, we highlighted the often-implicit consideration that for-profit financial institutions 
should conduct FI. In the mainstream literature, FI should be a market-led policy, as 
government interventions through subsidies and state-owned banks lead to unsuccessful and 
politicised outcomes. However, the profit maximisation objective in such FI is incompatible 
with development goals due to the high costs of financial services and inflexible payment 
schedules.  
Third, we discussed the key elements of FI. This step is essential to understand all instruments 
that should be tackled by FI in order to avoid different interpretations and policy design. We 
concluded that, in the existing literature, banking, credit, insurance and savings are the most 
relevant instruments. Based on such analysis, we provided a summary of the concept of FI in 
the mainstream literature: “the access and usage of credit, deposits, savings, payments and 
insurance by individuals provided through for-profit financial institutions”. 
Whereas such definition clarifies the concept of FI, two issues arise from it. First, it does not 
consider the the macroeconomic constraints of LMICs, nor it addresses the power imbalance 
present in the relationship between individuals and financial institutions. This lack of analysis 
leads to a misunderstanding of the effects that FI can have on poverty and income inequality 
in this region, which is addressed in further chapters. 
In Chapter 3, we developed our theoretical contribution. Based on Post-Keynesian hypotheses, 
we discussed the importance of macroeconomic conditions and market structures that 
distinguish LMICs from high-income countries (HICs). We put forth three key aspects: (i) the 
subordinated position of LMICs’ currencies in the international monetary and financial system; 
(ii) the oligopoly characteristic of local financial markets in LMICs; and (iii) the high incidence 
of self-employed workers in the labour market in LMICs. The first two features were expected 
to positively influence the rate of interest and service costs. Yet, high levels of self-employment 
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were anticipated to exhibit a negative effect on the demand for FI. Moreover, based on World 
Bank data, we argue that income is the main constraint to access to and usage of financial 
services, which points to a potential simultaneous relationship between poverty and FI. Finally, 
we proposed that self-employment conditions would raise the likelihood of over-indebtedness 
in the face of workers’ irregular and low income. 
Considering these macroeconomic constraints, Chapter 3 also presented our micro-level model 
of FI. We developed a deposit-savings, credit and insurance game model with two agents: the 
poor individual and a for-profit financial institution in a LMIC. The first model was a 
cooperative game in which, if the individual had enough income, they applied to open a bank 
account. If the bank account is free, there are no power relations that can prevent the individual 
to access this financial services. However, if there is a fee to it, the first power imbalance 
emerges as financial institutions can decline to offer them a bank account. In this case, the 
individual only applies to a bank account if they have disposable income to afford this service. 
If the individual is able to open the account, they might be able to save if they have sufficient 
income. However, savings may not always be built if individuals are income constrained. Such 
hypotheses will be tested in the following chapter. 
Unlike the deposit-savings model, the credit and insurance models were non-cooperative 
games. There, we also added the concept of power to address the asymmetric relationship 
between the two agents. In our credit model, individuals demand loans when they do not have 
savings but the financial institution may decline to offer the loan if it believes the individual 
will be unable to repay it. Our insurance model adapted this conceptual approach to explore 
behaviour in the insurance market. However, such relationship is expected to be less present in 
the lives of poor individuals in LMICs, as it also requires disposable and regular income to 
afford the insurance premiums. In both models, the individual selected a sub-optimal solution 
to avoid enforcement from the financial institution. Such pressure can be social or a threat of 
exclusion from the formal financial system. Therefore, from a theoretical analysis, we 
hypothesised that FI in LMICs might be detrimental to the poor in an environment of high 
interest rates and low and irregular income, besides the asymmetric relationship between 
financial institutions and individuals that pushes the latter to act in a unfavourable manner. 
Subsequently, in Chapter 4, we verified our theoretical assumptions on the relationship 
between financial institutions and individuals with respect to deposit, savings, credit and 
insurance. Moreover, we uncovered mechanisms on the causal relationship between FI, poverty  
and income inequality (RQ2) and the perceived effects of FI on poverty (RQ3). We interviewed 
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30 low-income individuals in the region of Minas Gerais, Brazil, using a semi-structured 
questionnaire. Using a thematic analysis, we examined five topics: (i) bank accounts and 
savings; (ii) credit and indebtedness; (iii) insurance; (iv) power relations and enforcement 
mechanisms; and (v) causal relationship between poverty and financial inclusion. 
We reached five crucial conclusions. First, income and employment status are essential 
determinants of FI. This is an important contribution as such factors have not been addressed 
by the mainstream literature. In it, it is clear that the poor have low access to financial services, 
but this is related to supply constraints, such as a lack of bank branches or lack of 
documentation. However, we find that unemployed and self-employed participants claimed not 
needing nor frequently using formal financial services due to a lack of money or for earning in 
cash. This finding also contributes to our hypothesis that there might be a simultaneous 
relationship between FI and poverty.  
Second, high interest rates and the uncertainties in the labour market contributed to over-
indebtedness and influenced the aversion toward financial institutions. Such finding also 
supports our hypothesis that macroeconomic constraints must be taken into account when 
designing FI policies. Moreover, these foundational issues in LMICs and their effects on the 
relationship between FI and poverty have not been addressed in the FI literature. Despite the 
empirical evidence of such issues in the microfinance literature, this factor is often disregarded 
by mainstream studies on FI. Therefore, highlighting the potential of over-indebtedness of FI 
should be done and carefully addressed when proposing new FI initiatives. 
Third, we also found that power mechanisms are extremely present on the relationship between 
low-income individuals and banks (even state-owned ones). Participants reported different 
enforcement mechanisms from financial institutions, such as recurrent calls and exclusion from 
the credit market, which are considered very detrimental to income-constrained individuals. 
Thus, some interviewees said they would prefer to not eat to owe the bank as such debt might 
become a “snowball”, i.e., they would prefer a sub-optimal solution as in our credit game. This 
is a key issue that is not properly addressed in the mainstream literature either, despite 
confirming the potential negative effects of credit to the poor in LMICs. 
Fourth, participants considered that employment and wages, not FI, were key factors to address 
poverty. Such a bottom-up research is an unique approach to establishing the perceived effects 
of FI on poverty reduction. Moreover, our finding contributes to the hypothesis that FI might 
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have little to no effect on poverty reduction, but that employment related variables might be 
more relevant in addressing development goals.  
Finally, we noticed the importance of state-owned banks (SOBs) in promoting FI in the 
country, mainly through Caixa and Banco do Nordeste. This result is also at odds with the 
recommendations of the World Bank, for instance, in which SOBs are considered an improper 
intermediary of FI as it can lead to market distortions and tends to be a less successful initiative. 
Using the theoretical framework and the qualitative research as benchmarks for our final 
empirical analysis, we started by developing a new measurement of FI that is more in line with 
this specific policy. In Chapter 5, we measured FI using microdata from the World Bank Findex 
dataset, which provided us with the tools to perform the econometric analysis in the following 
chapter. Through multiple correspondence analysis, we created an index that reduced the 
dimensionalities of 11 FI variables for 446,776 observations in 2011, 2014 and 2017.  
To allow a cross-country comparison of FI, we aggregated our microdata index and produced 
the Global Ranking of Financial Inclusion. As in previous rankings (e.g. Camara and Tuesta, 
2014; Sarma, 2016; Aslan et al., 2017), HICs are on the top of the ranking, whereas LMICs are 
found in middle and bottom positions. Nevertheless, our ranking overcame certain 
shortcomings of previous aggregate indexes, such as the low scores of highly automatised 
national financial systems, and contributed to the literature by providing the first cross-country 
microdata-based ranking of FI. By transforming the index into a country-level score, we were 
able to employ it on further quantitative analyses. 
In Chapter 6, we provided our final empirical contribution and resumed answering RQ2 and 
RQ3. Acknowledging the potential simultaneous relationship between FI, poverty and income 
inequality, we suggested that both causal directions should be investigated. Because of such 
endogeneity bias, we used an instrumental variable approach through two-stage least squares 
estimations and a generalised method of moments as a robustness check. We presented three 
equations, in which control variables stemmed from Post-Keynesian hypotheses and our 
previous results from the case study.  
In Eq. 6.1, we estimated the effects of poverty and income inequality on FI, considering central 
bank interest rates, bank concentration, self-employment and employment ratios. Our results 
validated our previous hypothesis that poverty and income inequality were important 
determinants of FI. The effect of poverty on FI levels were negative, which means that an 
increase in poverty rates decreases the access to and usage of financial services. This result was 
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not only in line with our qualitative study, but also led to the confirmation of the causal relation 
running from poverty to FI. In turn, the effects of income inequality on FI were puzzling, as 
our estimations show that an increase in the former leads to an increase in FI as well. Besides 
these two key findings, our results also confirm our theoretical approaches in which bank 
concentration and self-employment reduce the level of FI in LMICs. Yet, we were unable to 
confirm the currency hierarchy hypothesis as central bank interest rate, as a proxy for such 
subordination, did not provide robust results for LMICs. 
In Eq. 6.2, we analysed the reverse causality and estimated the effects of FI on poverty, taking 
into account self-employment, social expenditure, urbanisation and gross capital formation. 
This relationship stems from the mainstream literature which suggests that FI is able to reduce 
poverty. However, our alternative suggestion was that FI could worsen poverty due to potential 
over-indebtedness and the high costs of financial services in LMICs. However, our results did 
not indicate a relevant effect of FI on poverty, which suggests that such policy might not have 
much influence in either HICs or LMICs. In turn, we found that self-employment contributes 
to poverty, which was confirms the findings in our qualitative result where informal workers 
earn, in average, less than formal ones. Thus, such results suggest that a more effective poverty 
reduction policy would be to promote formal employment, not FI policies. 
Lastly, in Eq. 6.3, we estimated the effects of FI on income inequality. Nonetheless, results 
displayed mixed evidence and were not robust. In our GMM estimations, FI slightly increases 
income inequality in LMICs but reduces in HICs. However, as results are not robust, we are 
unable to provide a clear conclusion on the effects of FI and income inequality. At the same 
time, we also find that another variable has a stronger potential to address this development 
goal. An increase in social expenditures, either in LMICs or HICs, reduce income inequality 
by around 0.50 percentage points. Therefore, such policy could also be prioritised instead of 
FI. 
In sum, the thesis addressed three research questions and concluded the following. First, there 
are power imbalances between poor individuals and for-profit financial institutions in LMICs. 
This generates a situation in which individuals will select sub-optimal solutions, for instance, 
prefer not to eat in order to pay a loan, in order to prevent being excluded from the credit market 
or suffering social shame. Second, we addressed the simultaneous relationship between FI, 
poverty and income inequality, but conclude that there is little evidence to support that FI is 
able to reduce poverty and income inequality by itself. In turn, FI could be a consequence of 
other development policies, such as formal employment generation that creates a demand for 
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financial services or social expenditures, in which poor individuals must withdraw their social 
benefits through a bank account. On the other hand, we established that poverty is a key 
determinant of FI as individuals with little to no income do not demand formal financial 
services. Therefore, if FI is to be promoted, the first step would be to solve the demand 
constraint, i.e., the lack of income. Third, whereas we did not find a robust result on the effects 
of FI on poverty and income inequality in our econometrics estimation, our qualitative 
investigation showed that individuals might fall further into poverty when making use of formal 
financial services in mainly two ways: first, by having an income shock that prevents them 
from repaying their debts in time and, second, by being unable to afford the very high interest 
rates that are charged by for-profit financial institutions. Thus, if the supply side of FI is to be 
addressed by governments or financial institutions, interest rates and a social safety net could 
enable the poor to use financial services in a safer and more sustainable manner.  
 
7.2 Policy recommendations 
Bearing in mind our findings and our key conclusions, we provide five policy 
recommendations. We present five channels to reduce poverty and income inequality and, 
finally, suggest how FI policies could be redesigned in LMICs. 
First, to reduce poverty, we endorse the opinion of our participants that there should be a focus 
on employment creation and wage policies. Formal employment leads to better wages and 
working conditions, allowing individuals to overcome poverty on their own terms and 
preventing shocks that an irregular income stream may generate.   
In order to create such formal employment opportunities with higher wages, our second 
suggestion is that governments should promote long-term investment projects. Large-scale 
projects, instead of microfinance to “entrepreneurs”, are more likely to generate formal jobs. 
Such projects could be financed through state-owned financial institutions (either commercial 
or development banks) that would provide long-term credit with low interest rates and, 
possibly, subsidised rates. 
In third place, governments should promote public services, such as education and health care, 
in order to reduce the income allocation of the poor towards these essential services. 
Furthermore, this public investment would suppress income shocks generated by medical 
emergencies, thus preventing individuals from falling into over-indebtedness and poverty. 
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In the same note, our fourth policy recommendation is that governments and international 
organisations should foster social safety nets in LMICs. Policies like unemployment benefits 
and sickness allowance could both reduce poverty and prevent over-indebtedness of the 
poorest. Alternatives to informal workers should also be considered, such as cash transfer 
programmes that could provide steady income during prolonged periods. 
Finally, if FI policies are still to be promoted, such strategies should be led by state-owned 
financial institutions. To include the poor into the formal financial system, these banks should 
provide free basic accounts and other low-cost financial services, including lower interest rates. 
In turn, market-driven FI should be focused on higher-income individuals who are able to 
afford such costs. At the same time, we do not believe that FI are able to reduce poverty and 
income inequality by itself, so it should not be the main focus on international organisations 
nor governments. 
 
7.3 Limitations and future research 
The thesis aimed to answer questions on power relations, causality and effects of FI on poverty 
and income inequality using mixed methods. Whereas we were successful in addressing some 
of its aspects, some results were unable to confirm our hypotheses. 
First, whereas we hypothesise about intra-country power relationships between financial 
institutions and inviduals in LMICs, our empirical evidence of such phenomena has fallen 
short. In our interviews, we noticed that individuals did not perceived a direct power 
relationship, but did report on mechanisms that would lead them to take unfavourable actions 
(such as reducing food consumption) in order to afford loans, for instance. Yet, the small 
sample of our qualitative interview and the lack of a further analysis from a financial institution 
perspective do not provide robust evidence of such power imbalances when examining FI in 
LMICs. 
The simultaneous causal relationship between poverty and FI was evident in our analysis. 
Reduction of poverty is able to increase the demand for FI, but an increase in FI by itself cannot 
lead to mass exit from poverty and might be detrimental in some cases. Such issue stemmed 
from the inherently high interest rates and the high levels of self-employment in LMICs. 
However, we were unable to conclude the relationship between FI and income inequality. First, 
from our qualitative research, such connections could not be established. Second, in our 
econometric estimations, we did not find evidence for endogeneity on the effects of FI on 
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income inequality. Third, our estimations provided mixed evidence on such effects, and the 
results were not robust. Therefore, further research should be conducted in order to investigate 
the shortcomings of these results. 
Finally, data constraints were also found in our research, in particular with regards to the binary 
nature of the Findex dataset and missing data in other control variables, such as the Gini 
coefficient, poverty rate and social expenditure. Whereas we tried to address such limitations 
by selecting more appropriate methods of analysing the relationship between FI, poverty and 
income inequality, it is clear that some of the econometric results must be taken with a grain 
of salt as the data is not as accurate as one would have expected. 
At the same time, other topics for future work have derived from this thesis. We highlight three 
potential themes. First, making use of the transferability aspect of our qualitative study, a 
proposal would be to adapt the questionnaire to another country. A second round of interviews 
in a different context could provide further insights on similarities among the access to and 
usage of formal financial services by the poor in LMICs. 
Second, an interesting study would be to provide a more detailed and systematic comparison 
of FI levels among urban and rural workers. While we interviewed individuals from both 
regions in Brazil, such analysis was out of the scope of this thesis. However, as we noticed in 
our econometric estimations, urbanisation also tends to reduce poverty. Thus, addressing 
potential disparities could enhance the design of policies to fight poverty and potentially 
promote FI. 
Finally, based on the visual results of the multiple correspondence analysis, a more in-depth 
investigation of the geographical distribution of FI could be provided. For instance, the low 
indebtedness and access in Middle Eastern and North African countries could be addressed by 
considering religious reasons. In turn, the higher levels of debt in Sub-Saharan countries could 
be related to the lack of formal employment and social safety nets. 
To conclude, the thesis has contributed conceptually, theoretically and empirically to the 
literature of FI. In so doing, it has generated new evidence and created innovative instruments 
that can be used in future studies of this topic, stimulating further debate within the field of 
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Table A..1: Systematic review of definition of financial inclusion 







"Financial inclusion or banking sector outreach can be defined broadly as the process of availing an 
array of required financial services, at a fair price, at the right place, form and time and without any 





EconLit Journal article 
"Earlier the definition of financial inclusion considered only banking products and services. But now, 
this definition has been expanded to consider other financial services (insurance, pension and 
remittances) and institutions (NBFCs)" 
3 




Journal article "use of formal accounts" 
4 






"De acuerdo al Centro para la Inclusión Financiera (Center for Financial Inclusion, CFI), la inclusión 
financiera es “un estado en el que las personas que puedan utilizar servicios financieros de calidad, 
tengan acceso a ellos, a precios asequibles, proveídos de manera conveniente y con dignidad para los 
clientes”. Por otra parte, Morales y Yánez (2006) definen a la bancarización como el establecimiento 
de relaciones estables y amplias ente los bancos y sus usuarios respecto de un conjunto de servicios 
financieros disponibles. La medición de la bancarización no es única y debe considerarse desde 
diferentes puntos de vista al ser un fenómeno multidimensional. Las dimensiones utilizadas con mayor 
frecuencia para su medición son: i) profundidad, como proporción que guarda el crédito al PIB 
(penetración del crédito en la economía de un país) o bien depósitos en relación al PIB; ii) inclusión, 
que puede registrarse en términos de segmentos de la población que son atendidos por la banca y por su 
alcance geográfico, que también puede ser interpretado como cobertura de servicios y, iii) intensidad de 












Earlier the definition of financial inclusion considered only banking products and services. But now, 
this definition has been expanded to consider other financial services (insurance, pension and 









"Financial inclusion can be broadly defined as an economic state where individuals and firms are not 















"state in which everyone who can use them has access to a full suite of quality financial services, 








"Financial inclusion refers to the process of promoting affordable, timely and adequate access to a 
wide range of regulated financial products and services and broadening their use by all segments 
of society through the implementation of tailored existing and innovative approaches including 
financial awareness and education with a view to promote financial well-being as well as 






Journal article "possibilidade de levar serviços financeiros a pessoas até então excluídas do sistema bancário" 




"Financial inclusion means that the majority of the population has broad access to a portfolio of quality 







"Financial inclusion can be defined as a process that serves to remove the barriers and overcome the 
inabilities of some societal groups and individuals, including the poor and disadvantaged, to access and 

















"Broadly speaking, financial inclusion means access to finance and financial services for all in a fair, 
transparent and equitable manner at an affordable cost (Sarma, 2008; Solo, 2008). Fuller and Mellor 
(2008) noted that financial inclusion is the desire to develop ‘alternative’, welfare-oriented (rather than 
profit-driven), reliable, affordable and accessible financial services for all sections of the population. 
Others, however, view inclusion as a market-driven solution for poverty alleviation (Alpana, 2007)." 
15 





"“Financial inclusion” can be defined in general as ensuring access to formal financial services at an 









"Inclusive financial systems—allowing broad access to financial services, without price or nonprice 









"Inclusive financial systems—allowing broad access to financial services, without price or nonprice 
















"Financial inclusion, or broad access to financial services, implies an absence of price and nonprice 










"Financial inclusion means that adults have access to and can effectively use a range of appropriate 
financial services. Such services must be provided responsibly and safely to the consumer and 
sustainably to the provider in a well regulated environment." 




"Financial inclusion can be defined as delivery of banking services at an affordable cost to the vast 
sections of disadvantaged and low-income groups. In the case of credit, the proper definition of the 











"‘financial inclusion’, that is, to extend the reach of credit, savings and insurance services to those 
households, communities and regions" 
23 





"financial inclusiveness, which is typically defined as the extent to which individuals can directly 













"Financial exclusion describes as a situation in which people do not have access to mainstream 
financial product and services such as banks accounts, credit cards and insurance policies, particularly 




EconLit Journal article 
"Financial inclusion can be said to encompass the process of broadening the accessibility of financial 
services for households and firms. In other words, it relates to the issue of providing and enabling the 







"l’inclusion financière, c’està-dire un meilleur accès et une utilisation plus intensive des services 
financiers" 
28 Güngen (2018) EconLit Journal article 
"Financial inclusion assumes that removing barriers to accessing formal finance benefits the poor and 
triggers their entrepreneurial spirit, thereby contributing to development by enabling households and 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to access the financial system. Under its most basic 
definition, financial inclusion simply means having a bank account. To achieve the developmental 
objectives associated with financial inclusion, however, entails converting people into financial 
consumers or investors, which means they should use their accounts actively to benefit from financial 
campaigns and services. The promotion of financial savings and investment, and the provision of 









"Financial inclusion initiatives highlight the concerted efforts undertaken by the financial system or any 
constituent thereof to bring into its fold sections of the economy that have been excluded from access 










"Greater diversification of deposits could be achieved by enabling a broader access to and use of bank 
deposits, i.e. involving a greater share of adult population in the use of bank deposits (financial 
inclusion)." 
31 






"para el presente estudio se adopta la definición de la Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores 
(CNBV), según la cual la inclusión financiera “…comprende el acceso y uso de servicios financieros 
bajo una regulación apropiada que garantice esquemas de protección al consumidor y promueva la 
educación financiera para mejorar las capacidades financieras de todos los segmentos de la población”. 
Bajo este concepto, la inclusión financiera tiene cuatro componentes: 1) acceso, 2) uso, 3) protección al 
consumidor y 4) educación financiera." 




"Financial inclusion has many different definitions. However, according to the previous studies and 
theories, financial inclusion generally refers to a state in which all working-age adults have effective 
access to credit, savings, payments, and insurance from formal service providers.  Effective access 
involves convenient and responsible service delivery, at a cost affordable to the customer and 
sustainable for the provider, with the result that financially excluded customers—such as those low-
income groups and others who are financially disadvantaged—use formal financial services rather than 
existing informal options." 
33 
Kim, Yu and 
Hassan (2018) 
EconLit Journal article 
"Financial inclusion, as dealt with in this study, means the ease of accessibility and availability of the 
formal financial services, such as bank deposit, credits, insurance, etc., for all participants in an 
economy." 




"Broadly speaking, Financial Inclusion is delivery of banking services at affordable cost to vast 
sections of disadvantaged and low-income groups" 
35 Li (2018) 
Cross-
reference 





















"The concept initially referred to the delivery of financial services to low-income segments of society 
at affordable cost. During the past decade, the concept of financial inclusion has evolved into four 
dimensions: easy access to finance for all households and enterprises, sound institutions guided by 
prudential regulation and supervision, financial and institutional sustainability of financial institutions, 











"l’inclusion financière des populations, c’est-à-dire l’accès et l’usage par ces populations exclues de 
services financiers fournis par des intermédiaires financiers formels : banques, coopératives 









"Defined as the share of the population who use financial services" 




"Following Sarma (2012, p. 3) financial inclusion in this paper refers to “a process that ensures the ease 
of access, availability and usage of the formal financial system for all members of an economy”" 





"O Relatório de Inclusão Financeira do Banco Central do Brasil, define inclusão financeira como “o 
processo de efetivo acesso e uso pela população de serviços financeiros adequados às suas 





Ntayi, et al. 
(2018) 
EconLit Journal article 
"While IMF (2008) defined financial inclusion as “access to formal financial services including 





et al. (2018) 
EconLit Journal article 
"The World Bank (2013) refers to financial inclusion as the universal access to a wide range of 
financial services by individuals and SMEs at a reasonable cost provided by responsible and 
sustainable financial institutions. Similarly, ACCION (2011) defines it as a state in which all people 
who can use financial services, including the poor, have access to a full suite of quality financial 
services, provided at affordable prices, in a convenient manner, and with dignity for the clients. 
Besides, Chakrabarty (2011) describes it as “the process of ensuring access to appropriate financial 
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products and services needed by all sections of the society in general and vulnerable groups such as 
weaker sections and low income groups in particular at an affordable cost in a fair and transparent 




Ntayi, et al. 
(2018) 
EconLit Journal article 
While ACCION (2011) defines financial inclusion as “a state in which all people who can use them 
have access to a full suite of quality financial services provided at affordable prices, in a convenient 
manner, and with dignity for the clients”. The Ministry of Finance, Planning & Economic Development 
in Uganda (2002–2009) refers to a poor person as “an individual who faces the situation of poor health, 
low level of income and consumption, unemployment, illiteracy, low level of production, physical 
insecurity, disempowerment, and isolation socially and geographically.” Coleman (1988) defined social 
capital as “a variety of different entities (which) all consist of some aspect of social structure, which 




EconLit Journal article 
"Financial inclusion is a broad concept. As defined by Sarma (2008), financial inclusion is the process 
that ensures the ease of access, availability, and usage of formal financial system for all members of an 
economy." 
48 






"La Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV) define a la Inclusión Financiera como “… el 
acceso y uso de servicios financieros bajo una regulación apropiada que garantice esquemas de 
protección al consumidor y promueva la educación financiera para mejorar las capacidades financieras 
de todos los segmentos de la población”" 




"Financial inclusion is defined as the access and usage of financial services under appropriate 
regulations to ensure consumer protection schemes and promote financial education such that it 
improves the financial capabilities of all segments of the population." (Secretaria de Hacienda) 





"Financial inclusion herein refers to the timely delivery of financial services to disadvantaged sections 
of society." 
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Rastogi and E. 
(2018) 
EconLit Journal article 
"In generalized manner, FI can be explained as the access and availability of the formal financial 
system to all the sections of the society. This definition includes people of lower income groups and 
less privileged sections of the society (Haldar et al, 2016). Financial inclusion has been divided into 
two parts. The first part is for individuals and the second is for firms. Using this twin-pronged concept, 
FI has also been defined as proportions of the individuals and firms who are banked (or unbanked for 
financial exclusion measurement)." 
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"Aunque al principio no existía consenso general sobre la definición de inclusión financiera, hoy en día 
algunos de los organismos internacionales involucrados en el tema han dado definiciones e indicadores 
mundialmente aceptados. Por ejemplo, la Asociación Global para la Inclusión Financiera (gpfi, por sus 
siglas en inglés) y el Grupo Consultivo de Ayuda a los Pobres (cgap, por sus siglas en inglés) 
consideran la siguiente definición de inclusión financiera (cgap, 2011): “se refiere a una situación en la 
que todos los adultos en edad de trabajar, incluidos aquellos actualmente excluidos del sistema 
financiero, tienen acceso efectivo a los siguientes servicios financieros provistos por las instituciones 
formales: crédito, ahorro (incluyendo cuentas corrientes), pagos y seguros”. Y se puntualiza, el acceso 
efectivo: “implica prestación del servicio conveniente y responsable, a un costo que el cliente puede 
asumir y sostenible para el que lo provee, que tenga como resultado que los clientes excluidos utilicen 
los servicios financieros formales en lugar de las opciones informales existentes”. Por excluidos del 
sector financiero: “se refiere a aquellos que no tienen acceso o no están lo suficientemente cubiertos 
por los servicios financieros formales”. Por servicio responsable: “implica tanto conducta de mercado 
responsable por parte de los proveedores y protección efectiva al consumidor financiero”, y finalmente 
por instituciones formales: “se refieren a proveedores de servicios financieros que tiene un estatus legal 
reconocido e incluye entidades (en algunos casos incluso personas) con amplios y variados atributos 








"Based on the concept of usage of financial services to define financial inclusion" 
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"Financial inclusion refers to a process that ensures the ease of access, availability and usage of the 
formal financial system for all members of an economy" 




"we define financial inclusion as a process that ensures the ease of access, availability and usage of the 







"financial inclusion as a global assemblage that constitutes materially poor people as fiscal subjects, 
financial consumers, and monetary innovators." 




"Celle-ci doit être entendue comme offre de services financiers répondant effectivement et 
efficacement aux besoins des différentes catégories de la population, à un coût devant rester compatible 






Journal article "In a broader sense, financial inclusion is defined as a process which brings different sections of people 
under a single roof of financial system, especially people in very low-income brackets, the poor and the 
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marginalized sections including migrants and makes them access the basic financial services. These 
services include not only banking products but also other products such as insurance, pension and 




EconLit Journal article 
"Financial inclusion is defined as the process of ensuring access of financial services timely and 
adequately, and credits where needed by vulnerable groups such as weaker section and low-income 







"It refers to increasing broad-based access for some 2.7 billion poor adults to formal or semi-formal 













EconLit Journal article 
"Regarding the second concept of interest for this paper, financial inclusion, it is relatively recent and 
thus quite difficult to define, let alone to measure. Sarma (2008) defines financial inclusion as “a 
process that ensures the ease of access, availability and usage of the formal financial system for all 
members of an economy”. In the same vein, Cámara and Tuesta (2014) define an inclusive financial 













"Financial inclusion means that everyone not only has access to financial 
services but also can enjoy various types of financial 








"Financial inclusion—typically defined as the proportion of individuals and firms that use financial 
services—" 
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"In its most basic definition, financial inclusion refers to the fact that a person owns an account at a 
formal financial institution." 




"Financial inclusion is defined as a process that ‘ensures the ease of access, availability and usage of 
formal financial services’ (Sarma and Pais 2008). It describes the state in which all members of society 




Table A.2: Frequency of word usage in the definition of 67 studies on financial inclusion 
Rank Word Count % Similar Words 
1 services 76 6.30 service, services, services’ 
2 access 63 5.22 
access, accessibility, accessible, 
accessing 
3 formal 29 2.40 formal 
4 banking 21 1.74 bank, banked, banking, banks 
5 affordable 17 1.41 affordable 
6 usage 17 1.41 usage 
7 credit 16 1.33 credit, credits 
8 system 16 1.33 system, systems 
9 broadly 14 1.16 broad, broadly 
10 cost 14 1.16 cost 
11 process 14 1.16 process 
12 people 12 0.99 people 
13 sections 12 0.99 section, sections 
14 groups 11 0.91 group, groups 
15 insurance 11 0.91 insurance 
16 availability 10 0.83 availability, available, availing 
17 institutions 10 0.83 institutional, institutions 
18 products 10 0.83 product, production, products 
19 income 10 0.83 income 
20 population 10 0.83 population 
21 economy 9 0.75 economy 
22 individuals 9 0.75 individual, individuals 
23 poor 9 0.75 poor 
24 prices 9 0.75 price, prices 
25 consumer 8 0.66 consumer, consumers 
26 effective 8 0.66 effective, effectively 
27 firms 8 0.66 firms 
28 households 8 0.66 households, households’ 
29 society 8 0.66 society 
30 convenient 7 0.58 convenient 
31 different 7 0.58 different 
32 ease 7 0.58 ease 
33 education 7 0.58 education 
34 members 7 0.58 members 
35 state 7 0.58 state 
36 deposits 7 0.58 deposit, deposits 
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37 accounts 6 0.50 account, accounts 
38 appropriate 6 0.50 appropriate 
39 payments 6 0.50 payment, payments 
40 regulation 6 0.50 regulated, regulation, regulations 
41 segments 6 0.50 segments 
42 responsible 6 0.50 responsible, responsibly 
43 adults 5 0.41 adult, adults 
44 clients 5 0.41 client, clients 
45 general 5 0.41 general, generalized, generally 
46 measurement 5 0.41 measure, measurement 
47 needed 5 0.41 needed, needs 
48 protection 5 0.41 protection, protections 
49 sustainable 5 0.41 sustainability, sustainable, sustainably 
50 barriers 5 0.41 barriers 
51 delivery 5 0.41 delivery 
52 disadvantaged 5 0.41 disadvantaged 
53 fair 5 0.41 fair 
54 quality 5 0.41 quality 
55 sarma 5 0.41 sarma 
56 savings 5 0.41 savings 
57 basic 4 0.33 basic 
58 dignity 4 0.33 dignity 
59 finance 4 0.33 finance 
60 full 4 0.33 full 
61 range 4 0.33 range, ranging 
62 social 4 0.33 social, socially 
63 timely 4 0.33 time, timely 
64 adequate 3 0.25 adequate, adequately 
65 allowing 3 0.25 allow, allowing 
66 based 3 0.25 based 
67 capabilities 3 0.25 capabilities 
68 customers 3 0.25 customer, customers 
69 development 3 0.25 develop, development 
70 dimensions 3 0.25 dimensions 
71 economic 3 0.25 economic 
72 enabling 3 0.25 enabling 
73 exclusion 3 0.25 exclusion 
74 existing 3 0.25 existing 
75 following 3 0.25 following 
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76 greater 3 0.25 greater 
77 improve 3 0.25 improve, improves 
78 involved 3 0.25 involved, involves, involving 
79 level 3 0.25 level, levels 
80 nonprice 3 0.25 nonprice 
81 paper 3 0.25 paper 
82 pension 3 0.25 pension 
83 person 3 0.25 person, personal 
84 proportion 3 0.25 proportion, proportions 
85 remittances 3 0.25 remittances 
86 sector 3 0.25 sector 
87 situation 3 0.25 situation 
88 study 3 0.25 studies, study 
89 suite 3 0.25 suite 
90 transparent 3 0.25 transparent 
91 view 3 0.25 view 
92 well 3 0.25 well 
93 without 3 0.25 without 
94 working 3 0.25 working 
95 accion 2 0.17 accion 
96 achieve 2 0.17 achieve, achieved 
97 actors 2 0.17 actors 
98 alternatives 2 0.17 alternative’, alternatives 
99 aspect 2 0.17 aspect, aspects 




































Part I: Demographic questions 
1. How old are you? 
2. What is your gender/sex? 
3. Are you married? 
4. Do you have children? 
5. How many people live in your house? Are there other families (households) living 
with you? 
6. What is your religion? 
7. How do you define your race? White, black, mixed, yellow or indigenous? 
8. What is your educational level? Primary, secondary or tertiary and more 
(complete/incomplete)? 
9. What is your profession? 
10. What is your occupation? Unemployed, self-employed, formal or employer? Has this 
always been your occupation? 
11. Are you the household chief, i.e., are responsible for the majority of the expenditures 
in the household? If not, who is? 
12. Do other people in the household contribute to the total household income? 
13. Who takes the decisions about household expenditures, for example, how will pay for 
each bill? 
14. Most of your income comes from work? Do you have any pension, social benefits or 
allowance? 
15. What is your monthly income? And of all people in the household? 
16. How many bedrooms does your house has? And bathrooms? How many rooms in 
total? 
17. Are you from here? If not, when did you move and why? 
 
Part II: Data on financial access and usage 
BASIC ACCESS 
1. Is there any bank around your house? How long does it take for you to get there? 
2. What about your workplace? How long does it take for you to get there? 
3. Have you used it already? If yes, is this the bank you use the most or is there 
another one you use more? 
4. Do you have a bank account? Do you have it for a long time? Do you know what 
type of bank account you have (current account, salary, savings)? Why did you 
open this account? If not, why not? If not anymore, why? (If no account, skip to 
question 7) 
5. If you do not have, do you receive payment in cash? 
6. If you do not have it, do you think it makes your life difficult in any aspect? 
7. Do you pay to have this account? How much? If not, why not? 
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8. Who told you about this account? What did they tell you that convinced you to 
open it? 
9. Would you recommend a friend or family member to open a bank account either 
on this or another bank? Why? Would you recommend any specific bank? If yes, 
why? If not, why not? 
10. Do you have a debit card? In which situations do you use your card? How many 
times more or less (day or week)? Do you use it more often than cash? 
11. What are the benefits of the debit card in your opinion? And disadvantages? 
12. When you receive money to this account, do you withdraw it fully or partially, or 
leave it in the account? If you withdraw, what do you use the money for? 
13. Have you ever used someone else’s account or borrowed yours, like a friend or 
family member? For instance, if you/they needed to receive a transfer. 
14. Do you pay or have paid bills (boleto)?  Do you use a bank account to pay it? Or 
do you prefer other ways of paying, such as a lottery shop? 
 
SAVINGS, INSURANCE AND EMERGENCIES 
15. Do you use to save money? Where/how (home, bank…) 
16. If you save, why or what for are you saving? Any specific motive or event? 
17. If you have saved money, would you use it in a case of emergency (accident or 
disease in the family, etc.) or would you act differently? If you do not have 
savings, how would you deal with this unexpected event? 
18. Do you have a health insurance? Why/why not? 
19. Do you know any other types of insurance? Have you ever hired any? Why/why 
not? 
20. Do you think that a person goes more to the doctor if he/she had a health 
insurance? Why/why not? Or if he/she had a car insurance, would it care less 
about accidents or being more relaxed? Why/ why not? 
 
CREDIT 
21. Have you ever borrowed money from a friend or family member?  
22. And from a bank or another credit institution? 
23. For what for did you use this money? (Distinguish among investment, human 
capital and consumption) 
24. Did you manage to repay this loan? How long did it take until you paid it fully? 
25. Did your daily live or plans changed after you asked for money (ex. Did your 
relationship with the lender changed/ did you stop paying something else to repay 
it) 
26. Do you have any debts today? With whom? 
27. And have you ever lent money? To whom? Could you tell a bit more about it? 
28. Do you think it makes a difference borrowing from friends and family, banks or 
other ways? Why? 




30. If you do not have a credit card, have you used a friend’s or family member’s 
card? If you have, have you ever lent it? 
31. Have you been unable to repay the credit card fully or partially (“rotativo”)? 
Why? 
32. Do you know if you had to pay more because of it? 
33. Have you ever paid anything in instalments, either with your own card or someone 
else’s? To buy what? 
34. If you did, in how many instalments and how much did you pay per month? Do 
you think this value is low, reasonable or high? 
35. Do you know what an overdraft is? Have you ever used it? To pay something 
specific? 
36. Do you remember how much you paid to use it? Do you think it is better or worse 
than other types of loan? Do you think it is more expensive, cheaper or same 
prices as other loans? 
37. Have you ever heard of or used payday loans (“consignado”)? If yes, could you 
tell a bit about this experience? 
38. And formal store credit? Could you tell us about it?  
39. And have you had a store credit card (C&A, Casas Bahia, Renner, supermarket)? 
If yes, what are the advantages and disadvantages in your opinion? 
40. Have you ever used informal credit (“fiado”) ? Where and why? 
41. Have you ever heard of Crediamigo of the Banco do Nordeste? If yes, do you or 
someone you know have used this service? With which purpose? If not, why? 
 
PERCEPTIONS 
42. Have you ever had any problems with you bank or cards? 
43. Have you ever felt anxious or angry in any point when using these services? 
44. Have you ever been pushed to pay or hire a service beyond the one you wanted? 
For instance, an insurance when you applied for a store card. 
45. Do you think it is a problem to have a bad credit score (“dirty name”)? Have you 
ever been in this situation? How was it? 
46. Have you ever felt you were treated differently in a bank or when applying for a 
card by any reason? Which? 
 
Part III: Theoretical approach 
POWER RELATIONS 
47. What is your opinion about banks in general? Do you think that if you ask them 
for money, will they have any type of power over you? What do you mean? 
48. If ever borrowed, did you have to offer any type of guarantee? 
49. Do you feel that you are able to negotiate with a bank, if you need to, for instance 





50. Have you ever suffered any type of threat or pressure to repay a debt? Could you 
tell a bit more? 
 
RATIONALITY AND EXPECTATIONS 
51. Do you think that in the future you will have more, less or the same income as 
today? Why is that? 
52. Does this influence how much or to whom you would borrow? 
53. And if you should pay in instalments? 
54. And on whether to buy expensive things? 
55. Are you planning any important event over the next years, like a wedding, having 
children, a trip, buying a car or a house? Are you saving money, or do you plan to 
borrow/pay in instalments for it? 
 
IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION TO POVERTY 
56. Do you think poverty is a problem? Do you think it could have a solution? 
57. Do you think the government could help anyhow? If you were the president, what 
would you do? 
58. Do you think that a person who earns more money, spends more as well? And do 
you think he/she use more cards, make more loans? 
59. Do you think that if a poor person would have access to a bank, he/she could get 
out of poverty?  
60. If you would earn 3 times more, what would you do with that money? And would 




61. What do you plan to do with the money of this interview? 





C.2 Interview process 
Pilot interviews took place between 02/06/2019 and 11/06/2019 and interviews used for this 
study took place between June and July 2019 in the region of Minas Gerais, Brazil. These were 
conducted in Portuguese and were documented using a voice recorder. From August to October 
2019, interviews were transcribed both by the researcher and a research assistant, Ms Laís 
Landes, and translated into English by the researcher. Participants were also remunerated for 
their time, in the value of R$50. 
 
Pilot interviews 
The first step was to carry a pilot study, in which two participants answered the first draft of 
the semi-structured questionnaire in order to account for potential pitfalls in the elaboration of 
the questions. The test of questionnaire started with two pilot interviews in the urban area: a 
self-employed female who was temporarily unemployed and a wage-earner male who worked 
as a cleaner. The former, interviewed on the 2nd of June 2019, was unable to understand certain 
questions, as they seemed to have been unclearly formulated, in particular the ones about power 
and the relationship between income and spending. Moreover, while she was not aware of the 
specific name of some services, she knew what they meant, so a decision has been made in first 
asking if the person knows the service and if she says no, to explain what it is. The original 
question about poverty solution made the interviewee uncomfortable, as she felt she did not 
have the necessary knowledge to answer the question. Thus, this part was reformulated to 
introduce the topic by asking if the participant thinks poverty is a problem and if the 
government could help. At last, as a suggestion from Pilot 1, further questions were introduced, 
such as who take the financial decisions in the household and on whether the person has come 
from a different location. These could show some gender issues, as well as migration 
movements. 
After reformulating the questionnaire in order to make it clearer and more straightforward, the 
second pilot interview was conducted on the 11th of June 2019. The interviewee, a 19-year-
old male, was a wage earner and worked as a cleaner. We noticed that questions using the 
terminology “is this your main/secondary income?” was a bit confusing, reason why we 
changed to “is most of your earnings from work” if the person answered they worked, and 
directly asked if they receive any other income by asking “do you receive benefits, pension or 
allowance?”, which then gave us more direct answers as well. The question about poverty still 
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made the interviewee a bit uncomfortable, but it worked better than in Pilot 1. An implemented 
change was to directly ask “if you were president, what would you do to solve poverty?” and 
if the person looked overwhelmed, I would suggest “just one important measure in your 
opinion”. A last necessary addition to the questionnaire was to ask further questions when the 
person did not own a bank account, such as “do you think this makes your life harder?”, so we 
could understand better the possible constraints of an unbanked person. 
 
Process of contacting participants 
The first round of interviews happened as Pilot 2 told Participant 2 he had joined this study. 
She then acted as a gate-keeper and made the contact with the following participants: 1, 3, 4, 
5, and 6. P1 then contacted P9. These were residents of the Pampulha and North regions. P13 
was not directly contacted by P2, but her husband was, who then indicated his wife to 
participate, as his income was above the sample selection. They live in the West region of Belo 
Horizonte (Oeste). The second round of interviews took place at Jatobá, where Neli, the 
coordinator of the institution, introduced me to P4 and P5. The last round in Izidora was 
facilitated by P13, the local leader of Helena Greco area put me in touch with P10, P11, P12 
and P14. P15 was interviewed at the Rosa Leão area, introduced by the other local leader, 
Charlene. 
In the rural area, the process was different. Interviews were done in fewer days and counted 
with the support of a research assistant, Ms Landes, who helped conducting some of the 
interviews. The first round happened in a district area of Nova Esperança. There, we first 
contacted P16, who then put us in touch with participants 17, 18, 19 and 20. The second round 
was in Glaucilândia. There, we started with a door-to-door search of participants and managed 
to conduct separate interviews of participant 26 and 21. Later, participant 21 introduced us to 
P22. After seen us conducting the interview, interviewees 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 asked if they 
could also participate. We associate this interest with the fact that we were paying R$50 for 
each participant, which was considered a large amount in that community. The third round, in 
Extração, we did a door-to-door research and interviewed P29 at his residence, whereas P30 




C.3 Information on interview locations 
Interviews were conducted in Minas Gerais, a federal state with the second largest population 
(around 10% of total)113 and third largest GDP with a participation of 8.7% (Fundação João 
Pinheiro, 2018). Figure C.1 shows its location. 
 
Figure C.1: Location of Minas Gerais 
 
Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica (2012), colour changed by the researcher. 
 
Two primary regions were selected to conduct the interviews: Norte de Minas (North) and 
Jequitinhonha, representing the rural areas, and Belo Horizonte, representing the urban region. 
Choosing these two contrasting regions was preferred as the access and usage of financial 




113 Estimated population of 21.168.791 (IBGE). 
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Figure C.2: Interview locations 
 
Source: Alves Diniz and Batella (2005, fig. 5), region names added by the author. 
 
Urban area interviews 
The urban area interviews were organised as follows: the first two rounds took place in the 
Pampulha neighbourhood. The second round took place at Barreiro, in the southwest area. The 
last round was conducted in the North (Norte). Figure C.3 displays the city divisions based on 













Figure C.3: Belo Horizonte by income (R$ 2010) 
 
Source: Prefeitura de Belo Horizonte (2020), colour changed by the researcher. 
 
The first round of interviews was in the Pampulha and North regions, working class/low 
middle-class neighbourhoods, mostly constituted of individuals who work on services at lower 
Pampulha or Centre (upper-middle class/rich neighbourhoods). The second round of interviews 
took place at Jatobá (Barreiro region), on a waste picker cooperative (Figure C.4). 
The third round of interviews happened in the North region of Zilah Sposito, particularly in the 
occupation Izidora. This is a very precarious neighbourhood, where there is not pavement and 





Figure C.4: Women working at Coopersoli, Jatobá 
 
Source: Prefeitura de Belo Horizonte (2017) 
 
Figure C.5: Izidora occupation, Zilah Sposito 
 
Source: picture taken by the researcher. 
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Rural area interviews 
The rural area interviews were conducted in three different locations. The first round happened 
in a district area of Montes Claros (400,000 habitants), called Nova Esperança (Figure C.6). 
The district had 1,676 habitants in 2010 and has no banks or lottery houses, as well as no public 
transport to the Montes Claros, which is at a 23km distance. 
 
Figure C.6: Nova Esperança, Montes Claros 
 
Source: Google maps. 
 
The second round of interviews took place at Glaucilândia (Figure C.7), a town 34km away 
from Montes Claros. Despite being an independent town, the location had only 548 habitants 







Figure C.7: Glaucilândia 
 
Source: Google maps. 
 
Finally, two further interviews were conducted in Extração, also known as Curralinho (Figure 
C.8). The district has 628 dwellers and belong to Diamantina (a town with 44,746 habitants). 
However, these are not connected by public transport (IBGE, 2010). 
 
Figure C.8: Village centre of Extração (Curralinho), Diamantina 
 
Source: photo by the researcher.
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C.4 Socio-economic information of participants 
 
Table C.1: Socio-economic information of participants 






Religion Race Education Profession Occupation 
Previous 
occupation 



















Urban 19 Male Single 0 3 No Mixed 
Complete 
secondary 






































































































Urban 57 Female Married 2 4 Evangelic Black 
Incomplete 
secondary 












































Urban 54 Female Married 2 2 Catholic Mixed 
Incomplete 
secondary 




Urban 47 Female Single 9 3 Catholic Mixed 
Incomplete 
primary 








2 4 Catholic Mixed 
Incomplete 
primary 




Rural 26 Female Single 4 6 Evangelic Mixed 
Incomplete 
secondary 

















































































Religion Race Education Profession Occupation 
Previous 
occupation 






















































































Pilot 1 No Yes, partner x Work No 
No fixed 
income 
Don’t know 4 NA NA NA 









As child Better city 




























4 No, shared 
Husband and 
children 










Her Work No 
Around 
MW 
Not sure about son, 
daughter is on 
unemployment 



























As child Work 












































































































18 No Husband 
Her and 
husband 
















































Mother Work Allowance 
Around 
R$1000 



























24 Yes No Her Work 
Bolsa 
Familia 







25 Yes No Him Work  R$946 R$946 4 Glaucilândia   













Pension  1 MW 2 MW 9 Glaucilândia   
28 Yes No Her Pension Work 1 MW 1 MW 5 Glaucilândia   

















C.5 Banking information of participants 
 















Payment of bills 
1 15 Caixa Public Salary Loan Yes Yes Yes Lottery 




3 5 Itau Private Savings NA Yes No No Online 
4 3 Caixa Public Salary/Savings BF Yes 
Not 
anymore 
Yes Lottery and shop 
5 3 Caixa and BB Public 
Savings/Salary/Checking 
Account 
Work Yes Yes Yes 
Lottery and credit 
card 
6 30 Caixa Public Savings Savings Yes No No 
Lottery and direct 
debit 
7 30 Caixa Public Savings Savings Yes No Yes Lottery 
8 10 Caixa and Itau 
Public and 
private 
Savings/Salary NA Yes Yes Yes Lottery 
9 30 No NA NA Unemployment No No No No 
10 3 Bradesco Private Salary Work Yes No No Lottery 
11 50 Caixa Public Savings Pension Yes Yes No NA 
12 90 No NA NA Unemployment 
Not 
anymore 






Savings/Salary Work Yes Yes Yes No 
14 60 Caixa Public Savings BF Yes Yes Yes Lottery and shop 
15 60 Caixa Public Savings Savings Yes No No No 
16 100 BB Public Savings Loan Yes No No Lottery or bank 




Public Crediamigo Loan Yes No No Lottery 

















Payment of bills 
20 20 Caixa Public Savings Work Yes No No Lottery 







22 10 Sicoob Private Savings Savings Yes No Yes Lottery or bank 




24 15 No NA NA Debt No 
Not 
anymore 
Yes Lottery or bank 
25 3 Santander/Caixa 
Private and 
public 




26 5 Sicoob/BB 
Private and 
public 
Savings Savings/Benefit Yes No No Lottery or bank 
27 10 Sicoob Private Savings Savings No Yes Yes Lottery or bank 









Salary/Savings Work Yes Yes Yes Lottery 











Participant Savings Money for emergency Health insurance Reason Other insurance Store credit Instalments 
1 No Family No Expensive No Shoes TV 
2 Yes Family No No money No Department Food, clothes, TV 
3 Yes Savings/Extra work No Expensive No No Mobile 
4 Yes Savings/Family No NA No Car, Department, Shoes Food, mobile, fridge 
5 Yes Savings/Family Yes Husband's work No Shoes, Department Mobile, laptop, TV 
6 Yes Savings Yes Grandma pays No Not anymore DVD and radio 
7 Yes Savings No Not interested Mobile Shoes, Clothes Mobile 
8 Yes Savings/bank loan Yes NA Car Department No 
9 No God No No money Funeral No Furniture 
10 No Savings/bank loan Yes Work No Sister's name 
TV, furniture, school 
supply, shoes 
11 No Friends No No money No Department, clothes Food, clothes 
12 No Neighbours Not anymore Unemployment No Mobile Mobile 
13 Yes None Not anymore Expensive No Shoes Shoes 
14 No None No No money No Shoes, radio Radio, medicine 
15 Yes Savings/Family Yes Mom pays Funeral No No 
16 No Family No NA Funeral No 
School supply, shoes, 
clothes, furniture 
17 No Family Yes Brother pays No No Mobile 
18 Yes Savings/Family/Bank Yes Husband's work No Supermarket, drugstore Furniture, fridge 
19 Yes Savings No Expensive No Department Laptop 
20 Yes Family/workplace Not sure NA No Clothes, furniture Clothes, furniture 
21 No Bank loan No No interest No Department store 
Food, clothes, shoes, 
TV, cable 
22 Yes Family/Friends/Bank Yes Sister's insurance No Clothes Clothes to sell 
23 Yes Friends/Family No No money No Department, school 
School supply, shoes, 
clothes, food, education 
24 No NA No No advantage No NA Food 
25 No Family No Free health care Life (not anymore) Department TV, food 




Participant Savings Money for emergency Health insurance Reason Other insurance Store credit Instalments 
27 Yes Savings/Friends Yes Son pays No Supermarket, department Clothes, mobile, food 
28 No Bank loan No NA No Drugstore Medicine, food 
29 No NA Yes Wife bought Goods, credit card Yes Furniture 

























Bad credit Reason 
1 Housing R$ 5,000 3 R$ 10,000 52.40% R$ 5,000 50% Yes Credit card 
2 Housing NA 10 NA NA NA NA No NA 
3 No NA NA NA NA NA NA No NA 
4 Traveling R$ 1,000 2 R$ 5,000 248.04% R$ 4,016 80.10% Yes NA 
5 Credit card repay NA 1 NA NA NA NA Yes Credit card 
6 
Child birth (layette, 
furniture), delay car 
payment 
R$ 2,000 3 R$ 4,000 52.23% R$ 1,996 49.90% Yes Bank loan 
7 No NA NA NA NA NA NA Yes Store credit 
8 Household R$ 3,200 2 R$ 6,720 84.49% R$ 3,532 52.50% No NA 
9 No NA NA NA NA NA NA No NA 
10 No NA NA NA NA NA NA Yes Store credit 
11 Housing, food R$ 9,100 NA 14000+ NA NA NA Yes Bank loan 
12 No NA NA NA NA NA NA Yes TV cable unpaid 
13 Housing NA 8 NA NA NA NA No NA 
14 Goods R$ 1,000 Unpaid R$ 5,000 NA NA NA Yes Credit card 
15 No NA NA NA NA NA NA Yes NA 
16 Bills R$ 1,100 1 R$ 1,416 49.40% R$ 316 22.30% Yes Store credit 
17 Food NA NA NA NA NA NA Yes Store credit 
18 
Housing and health 
care 
R$ 1,500 0.5 NA NA NA NA Yes Store credit 
19 No NA NA NA NA NA NA No NA 
20 Household, bills R$ 1,000 0.66 NA NA NA NA No NA 




NA NA NA NA NA NA No NA 
23 No NA NA NA NA NA NA Yes Credit card 











Bad credit Reason 
25 Dental care R$ 2,000 3 R$ 3,000 28.25% R$ 1,000 33.10% Yes Loan 
26 Yes NA NA NA 80% NA NA Yes Loan 
27 Housing R$ 5,000 5 R$ 9,800 30.70% R$ 4,800 49.20% No NA 
28 Housing R$ 4,000 6 R$ 13,392 53.37% R$ 9,392 70.10% Yes Credit card 
29 Business R$ 5,000 NA R$ 4,400 NA NA NA No NA 






















Poverty cause Poverty solution Banking reduces poverty 
Interview 
money 
1 No No Cancelled card Inequality Housing, health care Depends on the wage Bill 
2 No No No Inequality 
Employment, higher wages, reduce 
wage inequality 
No Childcare 
3 No No 
Withdraw 
problem 
Inequality Education Depends on the purpose of the loan Transport 
4 No No 
Delayed release 
of card after 
payment 
NA Employment, education, higher wages 
Depends on the person's 
administration skills 
Savings 




interest rates on 
the rest 
NA Housing Depends on the wage Savings 
6 Yes No Broken card NA NA Depends on the purpose of the loan NA 
7 No No 
Bill didn't 
arrive and he 
got a bad credit 
rating 
Bad politicians Health care, education, employment No Savings 
8 No No No Unemployment Employment, higher wages Depends on the wage Food 
9 No No No Inequality Health care No Food 
10 No No No Inequality Housing, education No 
Informal loan 
repayment 
11 No Yes Everything 
Inequality, 
corruption 
Social assistance No Food 




Bad politicians Employment and higher wages Depends on the type of bank 
Food, toilet 
paper 
13 No No No Bad politicians 
Wage reduction, health care, clothing, 
food 
Depends on wage Beauty care 
14 No No 
Tricked to open 
current account 
NA Employment, school, health care Depends on the wage Food 
15 No No No NA Employment, higher wages, education NA Food 
16 No No No 
Lack of 
information 








Poverty cause Poverty solution Banking reduces poverty 
Interview 
money 
17 No No No 
History, 
inequality 
Reduce wage inequality, education, 
water supply 
No Food 
18 No No No Corruption 





19 No No No Inequality 
Employment, reduce wage inequality, 
education 
No Medicine 
20 NA No High fees NA Employment No Not sure 





NA Lower taxes, employment No Transport 
22 No No No Bad politicians 
Higher benefits, higher wages, easy 
retirement, housing 
No 
Debt and fabric 
for craft 
23 No No No NA 





24 Yes No 
High interest 
rates 
NA Lower interest rates, investment 




25 Yes Yes 
High interest 





Housing, employment, education, 
kindergarden, health care 
No Food 
26 NA Yes 
Debt sold to 
another bank 
Inequality 
Income distribution, lack of 
opportunity 
No Food 
27 No Yes No NA 
Housing, food, easier retirement, 
employment 
Depends on if the person has 
income 
Shoes 
28 Yes No Blocked card NA Allowing easier retirement pensions No Transport 
29 No No No Bad politicians Reduce wage inequality No Bill 
30 No Yes 
Bank charged 













C.6 Simulations of loans from BNB 
 















D.1 Variables description 
Table D.1: Full description of selected variables and methods of multi-dimensional indexes of FI 






Factor analysis and 
weighted geometric 
mean 
23 to 31 
countries 
(depends on the 
year) 
Access (weight 
0.52 for 2009 
and 0.51 
remainder) 
Number of ATMs per 1,000 sq. km; Number of branches of other depository corporations 
(ODCs) 
Usage (0.48 for 
2009 and 0.49 
remainder) 
Number of resident households’ depositors with ODCs per 1,000 adults; Number of 
resident households borrowers with ODCs per 1,000 adults 
2 
 










Individual has an account (composite indicator)/ debit card/ credit card 
Moreover, for 2014: if has a debit card, card in own name 
Usage 
Individual has saved/borrowed from a financial institution in the past 12 months; uses 
electronic payments; has used mobile phone to pay bills/ send/ receive money; has a loan 
from financial institution for home/land purchase or construction 
Moreover, for 2014: used debit card/credit card in the past 12 months; made 




Possibility of coming up with emergency funds 
 












ATM per 100,000 adults; commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults; ATMs per 1,000 
km2; commercial bank branches per 1,000km2 
Usage 
Individual has a bank account/ mobile service/ debit card/ credit card/ savings/ loans; 
someone else in household has an account 








Bank branches per 1,000km2; Bank branches per lakh115 adults; deposit account per 1,000 




Fitted values (OLS) 162 countries Access 
Number of bank accounts per 100 adults, percentage of access (household survey); 









Ownership of mobile money, current or cheques, investment, savings, susu, fixed deposit, 
E-zwich accounts; insurance policy; access to credit 
 Usage Cheque book, ATM, E-zwich card, E-banking transactions; remittance receipt 
7 Sarma (2016) 
Axiomatic distance-
based approach 
57 to 128 
(depends on the 
year) 
Access Number of deposit bank account per 1,000 adults 
Availability 
Number of bank branches + Number of registered mobile money service providers agents 
(2/3 weight); Number of ATMs (1/3 weight) 
 
















Number of branches and banking agents; bank, co-op and microfinance, banking agents’ 
presence; Number of ATMs; Number of point of services 
Usage 
Number of deposits, loans and credit accounts; proportion of bank, co-op and microfinance 
deposit and credit accounts  
Financial 
Education 
Average adult education in years; percentage of population with lack of education; 
percentage of illiterate adults; adults with incomplete elementary school 
Consumer 
protection 
Number of technical and legal advices and disputes 
Social 
development 
Average income per municipality; percentage of non-poor and non-vulnerable population; 








Table D.2 Description of variables of Findex 2011, 2014 and 2017 
Variable 2011 2014 2017 
Account at a financial 
institution 
Denotes the percentage of respondents with 
an account (self or together with someone 
else) at a bank, credit union, another financial 
institution (e.g., cooperative, microfinance 
institution), or the post office (if applicable) 
including respondents who reported having a 
debit card. 
Respondents who report having an account 
(by themselves or together with someone 
else) at a bank or another type of financial 
institution 
Refers to respondents who reported having 
an account (by themselves or together with 
someone else) at a bank or another type of 
financial institution 
Debit card ownership 
Denotes the percentage of respondents with a 
debit card. 
Respondents who report having a debit card. 
Refers to respondents who reported having a 
debit card 
Credit card ownership 
Denotes the percentage of respondents with a 
credit card. 
Respondents who report having a credit card. 
Refers to respondents who reported having a 
credit card 
Mobile money account 
[Composite variable 
created by author] 
 
1. Mobile phone used to pay bills: denotes 
the percentage of respondents who report 
using a mobile phone to pay bills in the past 
12 months (q15a1a) 
2. Mobile phone used to send money: denotes 
the percentage of respondents who report 
using a mobile phone to send money in the 
past 12 months (q15a1b) 
3. Mobile phone used to receive money: 
denotes the percentage of respondents who 
report using a mobile phone to receive 
money in the past 12 months (q15a1c) 
 
Respondents who report personally using a 
mobile money service in the past 12 months 
Refers to respondents who reported 
personally using a mobile money service in 
the past 12 months. 
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Loan from financial 
institution in past 12 
months 
Denotes the percentage of respondents who 
report borrowing any money from a bank, 
credit union, microfinance institution, or 
another financial institution such as a 
cooperative in the past 12 months. 
Respondents who report borrowing any 
money from a bank or another type of 
financial institution in the past 12 months. 
Refers to respondents who reported 
borrowing any money from a bank or another 
type of financial institution, or using a credit 
card, in the past 12 months 
Loan from a store 
(store credit) in past 12 
months 
Denotes the percentage of respondents who 
borrowed any money in the past 12 months 
from a store by using installment credit or 
buying on credit. 
Respondents who report borrowing any 
money from a store by using installment 
credit or buying on credit in the past 12 
months. 
Denotes respondents who report borrowing 
any money from a store by using installment 
credit or buying on credit in the past 12 
months 
Loan to start, operate, 
or expand a farm or 
business in past 12 
months 
N/A 
Respondents who report borrowing any 
money to start, operate, or expand a farm or 
business in the past 12 months. 
N/A 
Loan for school fees 
Denotes the percentage of respondents who 
report having an outstanding loan to pay for 
school fees. 
Respondents who report borrowing any 
money for education or school fees in the 
past 12 months. 
Denotes respondents who report borrowing 
any money for education or school fees in the 
past 12 months 
Loan for medical 
purposes 
Denotes the percentage of respondents who 
report having an outstanding loan for 
emergency or health purposes. 
 
Respondents who report borrowing any 
money for health or medical purposes in the 
past 12 months. 
Denotes respondents who report borrowing 
any money for health or medical purposes in 
the past 12 months. 
 
 




Denotes the percentage of respondents who 
report having an outstanding loan to purchase 
their home or apartment. 
Respondents who report having an outstand-
ing loan from a bank or another type of 
financial institution to purchase a home, an 
apartment, or land. 
Refers to respondents who reported having 
an outstanding loan (by themselves or 
together with someone else) from a bank or 
another type of financial institution to 
purchase a home, an apartment, or land. 
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Savings at a financial 
institution in the past 
12 months 
Denotes the percentage of respondents who 
report saving or setting aside any money by 
using an account at a formal financial 
institution such as a bank, credit union, 
microfinance institution, or cooperative in the 
past 12 months. 
Respondents who report saving or setting 
aside any money by using an account at a 
bank or another type of financial institution 
in the past 12 months. 
Refers to respondents who reported saving or 
setting aside any money at a bank or another 




D.2 Data selection and transformation 
In the Findex 2011 dataset, q1 or “account” is defined as a composite indicator based on the 
values of q1a (“has an account at a financial institution”) and q1b (“has an account at the post 
office”). However, it is not clear how this composite indicator q1 has been built. When 
analyzing the variable in detail, it is possible to see that it overestimates account ownership of 
several individuals. Table D.2 provides a sample of where q1 has been designated a positive 
value, although q1a and q1b were either missing or negative. 
 
Table D.2. Sample of account ownership measurements from the Findex 2011 database 
ID Economy 
Account at financial 
institution 




82522 LUX no no yes 
82523 LUX refused refused yes 
82524 LUX refused refused yes 
 
Due to this measurement failure, we decide to use only “Account at financial institution” 
instead of the provided composite indicator q1 in the analysis. 
Another issue that has risen while analysing the data is that very few countries use mobile 
phones for financial purposes. These, however, have a higher usage of this device. When using 
three different variables to assess similar activities, countries such as Kenya, where 71% of the 
population have used a mobile to receive money, was overestimated with respect to financial 
inclusion. We decide to create a new variable “Mobile Account” (q15a1d), in which if any of 
the three variables were positive, the new variable would also be positive (Table D.3). This is 








Table D.3. Summary statistics for mobile usage variables from the Findex 2011 database 
Variable Observation Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mobile phone to pay bills 148,328 0.021 0.145 
Mobile phone to send money 148,261 0.036 0.187 
Mobile phone to receive 
money 






















D.3 Index generation with multiple correspondence analysis 
Multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) is part of the methodology known as multivariate 
analysis, a statistical technique that is used to analyse more than two variables simultaneously. 
Multivariate statistical techniques can be classified into either dependent or independent. In a 
dependence technique, one or more variables are identified as the dependent variable as to be 
predict or estimate by other explanatory variables. This means that there is a causal relation 
among them. This would be the case of multiple regressions or structural equation modelling. 
In contrast, an interdependence technique has no defined dependent variable. Its purpose is to 
analyse the relation among all the variables in order to find their underlying structure. 
Therefore, in interdependence techniques, there is no causality (Hair et al., 2014). 
Within the interdependence technique, there are five main types of approaches: factor analysis, 
confirmatory factor analysis, cluster analysis, perceptual mapping116 and correspondence 
analysis. In factor analysis, which includes principal component analysis, we analyse a large 
number of variables and explain them by their underlying dimensions (factors). We reduce 
these variables into factors with the aim of creating a composite measure. Confirmatory factor 
analysis, however, is used to identify the contribution and quality of a particular scale. Cluster 
analysis differs from these previous analyses as it creates subgroups of individuals or objects. 
This allow us to identify particular groups as we do not predefine them. Another technique, the 
multidimensional scaling, focus on graphical representation, in which the similarity of 
continuous data is transformed into distances in a multidimensional space. Finally, 
correspondence analysis (CA) also displays observations in a multidimensional space but 
employing categorical data. It then transforms these observations into a metric level and creates 
both a dimensional reduction and perceptual mapping (Hair et al., 2014). 
MCA is inserted within the broader CA framework. Nonetheless, unlike CA, which is based 
on a cross-tabulation of two categorical variables, MCA is able to compute several variables 
simultaneously by using an indicator or Burt matrix. MCA is considered to be an extension of 
the simple correspondence analysis for when using more than two variables. It can also be seen 
as an equivalent of PCA, but for categorical variables (Abdi and Valentin, 2007; Husson and 
Josse, 2014). 
When using MCA as an extension of CA, the method is to apply the observations into an 
indicator matrix (𝑍). An indicator matrix is a table that links individuals and categories. Its 
 
116 Sometimes known as multidimensional scaling. 
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elements will be 1 where the category was chosen and 0 otherwise. It is also described as a 
matrix of dummy variables (Greenacre and Blasius, 2006). The dataset is composed of 𝑁 
individuals defined by 𝑄 categorical variables. Each 𝑄 has 𝐽 options of answer (Husson and 
Josse, 2014). In our example, as the choice of answers is only “yes” or “no”, 𝐽 = 2. However, 
in one of the supplementary variables that are part of the Findex, there are different possibilities 
of answering. For instance, when asked about their level of education, individuals can answer 
“primary or less”, “secondary” or “tertiary or more”. In this case, 𝐽 = 3. Mathematically, 
 
𝐽 = ∑ 𝐽𝑞
𝑄
𝑞=1                                                        (D.1) 
 
In trying to demonstrate how the MCA works, I chose a create a small sample of 7 individuals 
and present a stepwise example (Table D.4). Using the Findex data, the indicator matrix will 
look like this: 
 
Table D.4: Supposed sample of Findex dataset 
ID Bank account Credit card 
1 Yes Yes 
2 No Yes 
3 Yes No 
4 No No 
5 Yes Yes 
6 Yes No 
7 Yes No 
 
 








Figure D.1: Indicator matrix of Findex dataset sample 
 
 Bank account Credit card  
ID Yes No Yes No  
1 1 0 1 0 𝑄 = 2 
2 0 1 1 0 𝑄 = 2 
3 1 0 0 1 𝑄 = 2 
4 0 1 0 1 𝑄 = 2 
5 1 0 1 0 𝑄 = 2 
6 1 0 0 1 𝑄 = 2 
7 1 0 0 1 𝑄 = 2 
 𝑁1 = 5 𝑁2 = 2 𝑁3 = 3 𝑁4 = 4  
 
This indicator table will then be used to project the answers in a two-dimensional plan, 
according to their frequencies and masses117. As we can see, the “no” category displays a 
positive coordinate, reason for which I decide to invert the coordinates of the y axis (Table 
D.5). This will allow for a more straightforward analysis of Figure D.2. 
 
Table D.5: Coordinates for Findex sample using MCA 
Categories dim1 dim2  
Bank account No 1.581 1.581 
Yes -.632 - .632 
Credit card No -.866 .866 








117 Mass in the correspondence analysis literature is the row and column relative totals. Those are used as 
weights to give more or less importance to the profiles (Greenacre and Blasius, 2006; Husson and Josse, 2014). 
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Figure D.2: MCA plot for Findex sample 
 
As we notice in Figure D.2, positive answers to account and credit card ownerships are on the 
upper side of the graph, while negative ones are on its bottom side. At the same time, we see 
that, as the majority of individuals has a bank account, these answers are displayed close to the 
origin, while those that have answered they do not own one are placed far from it, as it is a rare 
response. Moreover, as 3 out of 7 individuals have bank accounts but do not have credit cards, 
their answers are slightly closer together than those who also have a bank account but own a 
credit card (2 out of 7). 
This sample analysis was done using the indicator matrix (𝑍), due to limited observations. 
However, 𝑍 is burdensome and can exceed memory limitations for large samples (Stata, 2013). 
Moreover, there is a considerable underestimation of the measure of fit with respect to 
explained inertias118 when using the indicator matrix (Greenacre and Blasius, 2006). Therefore, 
for large datasets, as it is the case of the Findex, it is preferable to use the Burt matrix method. 
The Burt table is defined as the product of the indicator matrix and its transpose. 
 




𝐵 = 𝑍𝑇𝑍                                                        (D.2) 
 
In the Findex data example, a Burt table is represented in Figure D.3: 
 
Figure D.3: Burt table of Findex dataset sample 
  Bank account Credit card 
 ID Yes No Yes No 
 1 1 0 1 0 
 2 0 1 1 0 
 3 1 0 0 1 
 4 0 1 0 1 
 5 1 0 1 0 
 6 1 0 0 1 
 7 1 0 0 1 
Bank 
account 
Yes 5 0 2 3 
No 0 2 1 1 
Credit 
card 
Yes 2 1 3 0 
No 3 1 0 4 
 
In our full sample, 𝑁 = 446,776 and 𝑄 = 11. As all the answers are binary, 𝐽 = 2 for each 𝑄. 
The 𝑍 matrix is thus of size 446,776 𝑥 22 and the 𝐵 matrix of size 22 𝑥 22. In that way, the 




























D.4 Full list of the Global Ranking of Financial Inclusion 
 
Table D.6. The Global Ranking of Financial Inclusion (GRFI) 
Rank GRFI 2011 Score GRFI 2014 Score GRFI 2017 Score 
1 Sweden 1 Norway 1 Norway 1 
2 New Zealand 0.96096832 New Zealand 0.94831634 Canada 0.93925679 
3 Finland 0.94250089 Canada 0.93279457 New Zealand 0.88149965 
4 Australia 0.9352718 Sweden 0.92034501 Sweden 0.88137692 
5 Canada 0.91992617 Finland 0.88955343 Luxembourg 0.8646971 
6 Denmark 0.90344626 Australia 0.86555076 Finland 0.84391421 
7 Netherlands 0.87696278 United Kingdom 0.85406357 Australia 0.84148878 
8 Luxembourg 0.87541926 Luxembourg 0.84831798 Denmark 0.82942843 
9 United States 0.82916677 Denmark 0.83552569 United States 0.82450575 
10 Belgium 0.81719321 Israel 0.81867319 United Kingdom 0.81950557 
11 United Kingdom 0.81629759 United States 0.81045282 Netherlands 0.80449718 
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12 Ireland 0.81413764 Spain 0.80914938 Switzerland 0.80398142 
13 Germany 0.7965371 Japan 0.80450153 Belgium 0.78008246 
14 Kuwait 0.78893507 Netherlands 0.79477501 Japan 0.77604544 
15 Austria 0.78590292 Germany 0.7886911 Singapore 0.77421969 
16 Malta 0.74763733 Belgium 0.78656203 Germany 0.7639876 
17 France 0.7442714 Switzerland 0.78238755 Spain 0.76288992 
18 Korea, Rep. 0.73844951 Singapore 0.75634569 Korea, Rep. 0.75242078 
19 
Hong Kong SAR, 
China 0.73831952 Ireland 0.7510131 Austria 0.73134565 
20 Spain 0.70270562 France 0.73900843 Ireland 0.72926533 
21 Slovenia 0.69991827 Korea, Rep. 0.72935116 Israel 0.7271834 
22 Estonia 0.69368589 Austria 0.72837126 
Hong Kong SAR, 
China 0.70971853 
23 Cyprus 0.64723516 
Hong Kong SAR, 
China 0.70550483 France 0.70648521 
24 Singapore 0.64637637 Estonia 0.70103687 Taiwan, China 0.69398451 
25 Japan 0.63565397 Taiwan, China 0.68726677 Malta 0.69273674 
26 Israel 0.61907375 Slovenia 0.68567157 Estonia 0.68559504 
27 Taiwan, China 0.61199307 Croatia 0.67272925 Slovenia 0.66750938 
28 Portugal 0.60734564 Malta 0.66722333 Italy 0.66681468 
29 Croatia 0.58701515 Bahrain 0.63264894 
United Arab 
Emirates 0.62745428 
30 Slovak Republic 0.56502759 
United Arab 
Emirates 0.62449825 Slovak Republic 0.61776465 
31 Czech Republic 0.54856116 Latvia 0.59872383 Portugal 0.60751122 
32 Latvia 0.5315972 Slovak Republic 0.59299129 Bahrain 0.58664274 
33 Qatar 0.51654863 Italy 0.58415282 Czech Republic 0.57543921 
34 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0.50384617 Czech Republic 0.57993633 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.57345146 
35 Oman 0.49550769 Mongolia 0.57589823 Poland 0.56337851 
36 Mauritius 0.49397266 Portugal 0.5618881 Croatia 0.54796529 
37 
United Arab 
Emirates 0.49397257 Mauritius 0.54165119 Latvia 0.52800918 
38 Turkey 0.48098776 Kuwait 0.5372805 Malaysia 0.5267356 
39 Hungary 0.47468939 Cyprus 0.5229646 Kuwait 0.5199967 
40 Bahrain 0.47434029 Malaysia 0.50507802 Mauritius 0.512734 
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41 Mongolia 0.47251955 China 0.47311586 Mongolia 0.50862461 
42 Lithuania 0.46399641 Lithuania 0.47108299 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0.49614418 
43 Thailand 0.44469702 Puerto Rico 0.46933654 Cyprus 0.49046832 
44 Greece 0.41529971 Thailand 0.46548614 China 0.48918739 
45 Jamaica 0.40991077 Poland 0.45972592 Turkey 0.48424283 
46 Malaysia 0.39760131 South Africa 0.45740616 Belarus 0.48403424 
47 Poland 0.39690471 Brazil 0.45023739 Lithuania 0.4820742 
48 Italy 0.39568463 Chile 0.44777459 Thailand 0.47021911 
49 Macedonia, FYR 0.38820237 Hungary 0.44555631 Namibia 0.45244986 
50 China 0.38146341 Macedonia, FYR 0.44174486 Chile 0.44856235 
51 Brazil 0.36063302 Saudi Arabia 0.4406527 Bulgaria 0.43778038 
52 Saudi Arabia 0.36016682 Greece 0.44059163 Hungary 0.4362646 
53 Serbia 0.35669553 Jamaica 0.43168354 Venezuela, RB 0.42537856 
54 South Africa 0.35139075 Serbia 0.43029857 Uruguay 0.42266437 
55 Belarus 0.34145316 Costa Rica 0.42107627 Saudi Arabia 0.41851676 
56 Costa Rica 0.32201701 Belarus 0.41381541 
Russian 
Federation 0.41788104 
57 Sri Lanka 0.31803155 
Russian 
Federation 0.41371772 Greece 0.41109794 
58 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 0.309847 Uruguay 0.40895012 Macedonia, FYR 0.39762917 
59 Montenegro 0.29164797 Turkey 0.40437108 Brazil 0.39142197 
60 Bulgaria 0.29155305 Bulgaria 0.40033787 Serbia 0.3865419 
61 Kenya 0.27620241 Montenegro 0.39027551 Costa Rica 0.37650499 
62 Chile 0.27502376 Sri Lanka 0.37997124 Kazakhstan 0.36557913 
63 
Russian 
Federation 0.27201539 Kenya 0.37630805 Ukraine 0.35789499 
64 Ukraine 0.26252007 Venezuela, RB 0.35933563 Sri Lanka 0.34642801 
65 Kazakhstan 0.26182249 Romania 0.35420743 Romania 0.33945182 
66 Venezuela, RB 0.25928202 Namibia 0.35260212 Montenegro 0.33325347 
67 Lebanon 0.25637752 Botswana 0.34440362 Georgia 0.33168852 
68 Romania 0.25582463 Ukraine 0.34081453 
Dominican 
Republic 0.32081565 
69 Angola 0.24272709 
Dominican 
Republic 0.33671626 Kenya 0.31835681 
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70 Swaziland 0.23971531 Lebanon 0.33468232 India 0.29989016 
71 Zimbabwe 0.23771937 Argentina 0.3286452 South Africa 0.29988062 
72 
Dominican 
Republic 0.23501337 Kazakhstan 0.31658539 Lebanon 0.29417101 





74 Argentina 0.2263739 Bolivia 0.30465129 Armenia 0.27813569 
75 Ecuador 0.21999465 Belize 0.29743445 Bolivia 0.26354578 
76 Colombia 0.21202242 Mexico 0.27925128 Argentina 0.2633214 
77 Morocco 0.21171096 Nigeria 0.27834114 Libya 0.25325578 
78 Uruguay 0.20564911 Colombia 0.27808127 Indonesia 0.2520397 
79 Botswana 0.19306757 Kosovo 0.27603966 Kosovo 0.2513822 
80 Bolivia 0.19269742 Panama 0.2727749 Ecuador 0.23321585 
81 Bangladesh 0.19189334 Ecuador 0.26465815 Colombia 0.22597498 
82 Nigeria 0.1910523 Georgia 0.26460409 Tajikistan 0.22306877 
83 Panama 0.18793948 El Salvador 0.24691129 Moldova 0.22225054 
84 Georgia 0.17970614 Indonesia 0.24364223 Panama 0.22201839 
85 Albania 0.1796457 India 0.22749662 Jordan 0.22000778 
86 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 0.17537706 Guatemala 0.21988212 Peru 0.21496899 
87 Philippines 0.17503527 Vietnam 0.21548529 Vietnam 0.20506708 
88 Lao PDR 0.1674588 Algeria 0.21460278 Botswana 0.20015088 
89 Mexico 0.16719061 Uganda 0.21426903 Ghana 0.19636932 
90 Ghana 0.16220956 Peru 0.21065201 Nigeria 0.19308834 
91 Guatemala 0.15418194 Albania 0.19948435 Tunisia 0.19181061 
92 Peru 0.1540442 Nepal 0.19429953 Nepal 0.18970467 
93 India 0.15340784 Philippines 0.19208443 Albania 0.18253383 
94 Zambia 0.15153426 Azerbaijan 0.19185382 Turkmenistan 0.18129578 
95 Vietnam 0.15090699 Ghana 0.19152927 Honduras 0.18071052 
96 Nepal 0.14991188 Rwanda 0.19070219 Guatemala 0.17481612 
97 Rwanda 0.14783908 Bhutan 0.18403405 Uganda 0.17442027 
98 Algeria 0.14536755 Zambia 0.17932135 Zambia 0.16780618 
99 Paraguay 0.14299443 Gabon 0.17591932 Mexico 0.16161413 
100 
West Bank and 
Gaza 0.14231104 Honduras 0.17292187 Ethiopia 0.15942949 
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101 Uganda 0.14114372 Jordan 0.17142873 Mozambique 0.15591694 
102 Jordan 0.14052431 Tunisia 0.1707871 Algeria 0.15180664 
103 Honduras 0.12916216 Armenia 0.16267568 Haiti 0.14704004 
104 Uzbekistan 0.12291671 Angola 0.15456079 Kyrgyz Republic 0.14280415 
105 Armenia 0.12288269 Uzbekistan 0.15273209 Azerbaijan 0.14254785 
106 Azerbaijan 0.12235593 Cambodia 0.14317246 Philippines 0.14220303 
107 Tanzania 0.12073816 Bangladesh 0.13955806 Gabon 0.14218831 
108 Indonesia 0.11980094 Mauritania 0.13751817 Paraguay 0.1375798 
109 Iraq 0.11466344 Nicaragua 0.13510107 El Salvador 0.13543274 
110 El Salvador 0.11461792 Moldova 0.12488277 Benin 0.12894543 
111 Liberia 0.10875637 
West Bank and 
Gaza 0.12324434 Lao PDR 0.12881601 
112 Malawi 0.10660087 Myanmar 0.11680176 Bangladesh 0.12879111 
113 Lesotho 0.10520069 Tanzania 0.11485886 Togo 0.12865184 
114 Haiti 0.10153848 Kyrgyz Republic 0.1061644 Rwanda 0.1284568 
115 Moldova 0.09481389 Ethiopia 0.10427323 Cambodia 0.12700839 
116 Sierra Leone 0.09257607 Malawi 0.10121818 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.12692249 
117 Mauritania 0.08945227 Haiti 0.09795293 Nicaragua 0.12383792 
118 Nicaragua 0.08667465 Zimbabwe 0.09122999 Lesotho 0.12205341 
119 Chad 0.08515136 Congo, Rep. 0.08921291 Burkina Faso 0.11439942 
120 Comoros 0.08236081 Sierra Leone 0.08767383 Uzbekistan 0.10673666 
121 Djibouti 0.07931998 Benin 0.08699986 Cameroon 0.10297137 
122 Afghanistan 0.07432321 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.0867934 Zimbabwe 0.10108162 
123 Gabon 0.07340191 Iraq 0.08415885 Myanmar 0.09554914 
124 Sudan 0.06982932 Senegal 0.07588271 Malawi 0.09127819 
125 Cameroon 0.06176766 Ivory Coast 0.07162809 Morocco 0.08925539 
126 Congo, Rep. 0.05576349 Burkina Faso 0.06993922 
West Bank and 
Gaza 0.08518209 
127 Pakistan 0.05261227 Sudan 0.06991885 Mauritania 0.07954754 
128 Burkina Faso 0.04952682 Somalia 0.0577886 Liberia 0.07940972 
129 Cambodia 0.04926754 Togo 0.05757565 Tanzania 0.07210979 
130 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.04388884 Cameroon 0.05622087 Congo, Rep. 0.07113567 
131 Kyrgyz Republic 0.03992744 Pakistan 0.05397604 Mali 0.07110111 
132 Yemen, Rep. 0.03981394 Afghanistan 0.05324388 Senegal 0.07027806 
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133 Togo 0.03730064 Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.04325277 Guinea 0.04372271 
134 Benin 0.03665847 Mali 0.04298539 
Central African 
Rep. 0.03535364 
135 Mali 0.03013374 Tajikistan 0.04245162 Iraq 0.03373666 
136 Turkmenistan 0.02776752 Chad 0.04008637 Pakistan 0.03308754 
137 Senegal 0.02726529 Guinea 0.03515873 Cote d'Ivoire 0.02857214 
138 Tajikistan 0.02328606 Yemen, Rep. 0.03467888 Sierra Leone 0.02465378 
139 
Central African 
Repub. 0.01278288 Turkmenistan 0.03171131 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 0.02385792 
140 Madagascar 0.01253937 Burundi 0.02189513 Afghanistan 0.02131184 
141 Burundi 0.0112908 Madagascar 0.01899051 South Sudan 0.01085947 
142 Guinea 0.00959252 Niger 0 Chad 0.00848196 
143 Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.00620072   Madagascar 0.0062731 










E.1 Existing econometrical studies on the relationship among FI, poverty and income inequality 
 
Table E.1 The effects of income and income inequality on FI 









GNI per capita; Rule of 








GNI per capita is not statistically 
significant (s.s.) 












Table E.2 The effects of FI on income and income inequality 
Study Method FI variable 
Dependent 
variable 













FI; Share of highest to 
lowest income; Inflation; 
Education completion; 
Bank claims growth; GDP 
growth; Rule of Law; 





FI is negatively correlated to 
poverty by -0.595 at the 1% s.s. 
level 










growth; income tax to 
total tax revenue ration; 
government social 





FI reduces income inequality 
by -0.056 at the 5% level 
GMM 160 
FI reduces income inequality 









FI inequality; GDP per 
capita; agricultural 
production to GDP ratio; 
Openness to trade; 
Inflation; Average years 
of schooling; Gender 
inequality index; Access 
to electricity in rural areas  
2011 140 76 
Inequality in financial access 
increases income inequality by 
0.271 at the 1% level 
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Le et al. 
(2019) 
2SLS PCA/Distance-








FI index; rule of law; 
GDP per capita; 
unemployment; domestic 





FI reduces income inequality 
by -18.316 (PCA) and -9.655 
















GDPPC; digital inclusion 
NA 190 689 
FI increases income inequality 










GDP per capita 





FI and GDPPC are cointegrated 
















FI; GDP per capita; 
Government consumption 
to GDP ratio; trade 
openness to GDP ratio; 





FI reduces income inequality 





2011 37 37 
FI reduces income inequality 
by -2.4 at the 10% level 
Note: NA represents non-applicable, as the information was not available on the study. 
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E.2 Selection criteria for income inequality variable 
A problem we faced was to consistently select a measure for income inequality based on the Gini 
coefficient. Several countries had observations for the same year, as these were measured 
differently or by different agencies. In order to clarify the selection, we present our decision 
method in Table E.3: 
Table E.3: Gini coefficient decision criteria 
Order Coverage area Resource Scale 
1 All Net income Per capita 
2 Urban Gross income Equivalized 
3 Rural Net/gross income No adjustment 
4 Part Earnings  
5  Consumption  
 
After this first round, still remained 453 duplicated variables. We then select by quality of data 
(keep highest quality score), which leaves us with 135 duplicates. We then keep the latest revised 
version “New 2019” or the years before that. We then reach countries that have very specific 
measures. Azerbaijan (select second observation); GBR (select with North Ireland); HKG (pre-
tax); MOZ (World Bank study); PSE (more precise population count); VEN (World Bank study). 
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E.3 Handling missing values 
Table E.4 Added values of central bank interest rate (CBINT) 
Country Variable Year CBINT Source 
ARE Repo 2011 1.00 Trading Economics 
ARE Repo 2014 1.00 Trading Economics 
ARE Repo 2017 1.00 Trading Economics 
ARG Lebac 2011 12.78 Central Bank 
ARG Lebac 2014 27.69 Central Bank 
CHE Interest on sight deposits 2017 -0.75 Central Bank 
CZE 2 week repo 2011 0.75 Central Bank 
CZE 3 week repo 2014 0.05 Central Bank 
CZE 4 week repo 2017 0.18 Central Bank 
GBR Bank of England base rate 2017 0.29 Central Bank 
HKG Discount window base rate 2011 0.50 Central Bank 
HKG Discount window base rate 2014 0.50 Central Bank 
HKG Discount window base rate 2017 1.35 Central Bank 
HRV On Lombard credit 2011 8.54 Central Bank 
HRV On Lombard credit 2014 5.00 Central Bank 
HRV Overnight Credit Rate 2017 2.50 Central Bank 
HUN Base rate 2011 6.13 Central Bank 
HUN Base rate 2014 2.33 Central Bank 
HUN Base rate 2017 0.90 Central Bank 
JPN Base rate 2011 0.10 Central Bank 
JPN Base rate 2014 0.00 Central Bank 
JPN Base rate 2017 -0.10 Central Bank 
KWT Discount rate 2011 2.50 Central Bank 
KWT Discount rate 2014 2.00 Central Bank 
KWT Discount rate 2017 2.69 Central Bank 
LTU Overnight repurchase 2011 2.00 Central Bank 
LTU Overnight repurchase 2014 0.53 Central Bank 
LVA Refinancing rate 2011 3.50 Central Bank 
NOR Key policy rate 2014 1.49 Central Bank 
NOR Key policy rate 2017 0.50 Central Bank 
OMN Repo 2011 2.00 Central Bank 
PAN Deposit Interest Rate 2011 2.32 World Bank 
PAN Deposit Interest Rate 2014 2.16 World Bank 
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PAN Deposit Interest Rate 2017 2.16 World Bank 
POL Reference rate 2011 4.25 Central Bank 
POL Reference rate 2014 2.38 Central Bank 
POL Reference rate 2017 1.50 Central Bank 
SWE Reference rate 2017 -0.50 Central Bank 
TTO Repo rate 2011 3.21 Central Bank 
URY Base rate 2014 9.25 Central Bank 
URY Base rate 2017 9.25 Central Bank 
BDI Interest rate of marginal lending facility 2011 11.01 Central Bank 
BDI Interest rate of marginal lending facility 2014 9.63 Central Bank 
BIH Deposits in KM and indexed to EUR (2years) 2012 4.41 Central Bank 
BIH Deposits in KM and indexed to EUR (2years) 2014 2.97 Central Bank 
BIH Deposits in KM and indexed to EUR (2years) 2017 1.46 Central Bank 
BOL Reference rate (MN) 2011 1.38 Central Bank 
BOL Reference rate (MN) 2014 2.94 Central Bank 
BOL Reference rate (MN) 2017 2.62 Central Bank 
BTN Deposit Interest Rate 2011 4.50 Trading Economics 
BTN Deposit Interest Rate 2014 4.00 Trading Economics 
BTN Deposit Interest Rate 2017 2.80 Trading Economics 
BWA Bank rate 2011 9.50 Central Bank 
BWA Bank rate 2014 7.50 Central Bank 
BWA Bank rate 2017 5.42 Central Bank 
CHN Rediscount rate 2011 2.25 CEIC 
CHN Rediscount rate 2014 2.25 CEIC 
COM Avance a l'Etat 2011 2.37 Central Bank 
DJI Average lending rate 2011 11.50 Trading Economics 
DZA Discount rate 2011 4.00 Trading Economics 
DZA Discount rate 2014 4.00 Trading Economics 
DZA Discount rate 2017 3.50 Trading Economics 
ECU Tasa activa referencial 2011 8.35 Central Bank 
ECU Tasa activa referencial 2014 8.12 Central Bank 
ECU Tasa activa referencial 2017 7.92 Central Bank 
ETH Bank's savings rate 2014 5.00 Trading Economics 
ETH Bank's savings rate 2017 5.50 Trading Economics 
GIN Key rate 2011 22.00 Trading Economics 
GIN Key rate 2014 16.00 Trading Economics 
GIN Key rate 2017 12.50 Trading Economics 
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HTI Taux nominal sur Bons BRH 2011 7.00 Central Bank 
HTI Taux nominal sur Bons BRH 2014 10.75 Central Bank 
HTI Taux nominal sur Bons BRH 2017 20.00 Central Bank 
IRN Bank Profit rates for lending and borrowing 2017 18.00 Trading Economics 
KHM Saving deposit rate 2011 1.35 Trading Economics 
KHM Saving deposit rate 2014 1.40 Trading Economics 
KHM Saving deposit rate 2017 1.55 Trading Economics 
LAO Short-term lending interest rate 2011 5.00 Trading Economics 
LAO Short-term lending interest rate 2014 5.00 Trading Economics 
LAO Short-term lending interest rate 2017 4.25 Trading Economics 
LBN Deposit Interest Rate 2011 5.88 Trading Economics 
LBN Deposit Interest Rate 2014 5.91 Trading Economics 
LBN Deposit Interest Rate 2017 6.26 Trading Economics 
LBR Deposit Interest Rate 2011 3.03 CEIC 
LBR Deposit Interest Rate 2014 4.16 CEIC 
LBR Deposit Interest Rate 2016 3.85 CEIC 
LBY Repo 28 days 2019 2.35 Central Bank 
LKA Standing Deposit Facility Rate 2011 7.00 Central Bank 
LKA Standing Deposit Facility Rate 2014 6.50 Central Bank 
LKA Standing Deposit Facility Rate 2017 7.25 Central Bank 
LSO Policy rate 2017 6.88 Central Bank 
MAR Deposit Interest Rate 2011 3.76 Trading Economics 
MAR Deposit Interest Rate 2014 3.89 Trading Economics 
MAR Deposit Interest Rate 2017 3.10 Trading Economics 
MDG Taux directeur 2011 9.50 Trading Economics 
MDG Taux directeur 2014 9.50 Central Bank 
MDG Taux directeur 2017 8.78 Central Bank 
MKD Interest rate on the Central Bank bill 2011 4.00 Central Bank 
MKD Interest rate on the Central Bank bill 2014 3.25 Central Bank 
MKD Interest rate on the Central Bank bill 2017 3.27 Central Bank 
MMR Central bank rate 2011 12.00 Trading Economics 
MMR Central bank rate 2014 10.00 Trading Economics 
MMR Central bank rate 2017 10.00 Central Bank 
MNE Lending rate 2011 9.75 World Bank 
MNE Lending rate 2014 9.22 World Bank 
MNE Lending rate 2017 6.81 World Bank 
MOZ Facilidade Permanente de Cedência 2011 16.17 Central Bank 
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MOZ Facilidade Permanente de Cedência 2014 8.19 Central Bank 
MOZ Facilidade Permanente de Cedência 2017 22.75 Central Bank 
MRT Discount rate 2011 9.00 Trading Economics 
MRT Discount rate 2014 9.00 Trading Economics 
MRT Discount rate 2017 9.00 Trading Economics 
MWI Reference rate 2011 15.00 Trading Economics 
MWI Reference rate 2014 24.38 Trading Economics 
MWI Reference rate 2017 20.33 Trading Economics 
NAM Repo rate 2011 6.00 Central Bank 
NAM Repo rate 2014 5.75 Central Bank 
NAM Repo rate 2017 6.90 Central Bank 
NIC Deposit Interest Rate  2011 1.85 Trading Economics 
NIC Deposit Interest Rate  2014 1.05 Trading Economics 
NIC Deposit Interest Rate  2017 1.25 Trading Economics 
PAK Key rate 2011 13.13 Trading Economics 
PAK Key rate 2014 9.92 Trading Economics 
PAK SBP Policy rate 2017 5.75 Central Bank 
PSE Deposit Interest Rate  2011 0.53 World Bank 
PSE Deposit Interest Rate  2014 0.83 World Bank 
PSE Deposit Interest Rate  2017 1.39 World Bank 
ROU Policy rate 2011 6.21 Central Bank 
ROU Policy rate 2014 3.31 Central Bank 
ROU Policy rate 2017 1.75 Central Bank 
RWA Repo 2011 6.08 Trading Economics 
SDN Murabaha Profits Margin Rate 2011 10.00 Trading Economics 
SDN Murabaha Profits Margin Rate 2014 12.00 Trading Economics 
SWZ Bank rate 2011 5.50 Central Bank 
SYR Deposit interest rate 2010 6.22 Trading Economics 
TUN Key rate 2014 4.63 Central Bank 
TUN Key rate 2017 4.79 Central Bank 
TZA Discount rate 2011 8.48 Central Bank 
TZA Discount rate 2014 16.00 Central Bank 
TZA Discount rate 2017 11.42 Central Bank 
UGA Central bank rate 2011 18.17 Central Bank 
UGA Central bank rate 2014 11.21 Central Bank 
UGA Central bank rate 2017 10.46 Central Bank 
UKR Key policy rate 2011 7.75 Central Bank 
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UKR Key policy rate 2014 10.19 Central Bank 
UKR Key policy rate 2017 13.23 Central Bank 
UZB Refinancing Rate 2011 12.00 Trading Economics 
VEN Discount rate 2011 29.50 Central Bank 
VEN Discount rate 2014 29.50 Central Bank 
VEN Discount rate 2017 29.50 Central Bank 
XKX Lending rate 2011 13.78 World Bank 
XKX Lending rate 2014 10.62 World Bank 
XKX Lending rate 2017 6.83 World Bank 
YEM Deposit interest rate 2011 20.00 Trading Economics 
YEM Deposit interest rate 2014 15.00 Trading Economics 
ZMB Weighted lending base rate 2011 18.91 Central Bank 
ZMB Policy rate 2014 11.57 Central Bank 
ZMB Policy rate 2017 12.69 Central Bank 
XKX Lending rate 2011 13.78 World Bank 
XKX Lending rate 2014 10.62 World Bank 
XKX Lending rate 2017 6.83 World Bank 
YEM Deposit interest rate 2011 20.00 Trading Economics 
YEM Deposit interest rate 2014 15.00 Trading Economics 
ZMB Weighted lending base rate 2011 18.91 Central Bank 
ZMB Policy rate 2014 11.57 Central Bank 












E.4 Estimations with simultaneity bias 
In order to visualise this issue, we select the random-effects between-within (REBW) estimator 
(Mundlak, 1978; Schunck, 2013; Bell et al., 2019).119 In this model, we are able to estimate both 
the between and within estimator and understand the relationship between our variables within a 
country and between countries. The new equations will contain both the demeaned explanatory 
variable (within-effect) and its mean (between-effect), so that: 
 
𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑊(𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝛽2𝐵(𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝛽3𝑊(𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) + 𝛽4𝐵(𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) +
                                                            𝛽𝑘𝑊(𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑘 − 𝑎𝑖𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝛽𝑘𝐵(𝑎𝑖𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝑢1                                       (E.1) 
 
As stated before, we assume that there is a simultaneous relationship among our three key 
variables. This means that, while FI may affect poverty and income inequality, the latter two 
variables may also determine the level of FI. We confirm this hypothesis by performing an 
endogeneity test. Under the null hypothesis that specified endogenous regressors can be treated as 
exogenous, the test provides results that are robust to violations of conditional homoscedasticity 
(Baum et al., 2007). We reject the null hypothesis in our tests, which means that poverty and 
income inequality are, indeed, endogenous. Therefore, an OLS estimator will yield biased results, 
as we will see next. 
Let’s first estimate Eq. E.1 using a REBW GLS method. Based on our hypotheses in Chapter 3, 
we consider that there are differences between HICs and LMICs. Therefore, we perform a Chow 
test to ascertain this hypothesis. With two restrictions, 12 parameters and 371 observations, our 
test result was 162.88. Comparing to the critical value of 4.66 at the 1% statistical significance, we 
reject the null hypothesis that both groups follow the same regression function. Thus, we estimate 
both groups together and separately (Table E.5). Model (1) display the results of the full sample 
(FS), where Model (2) show the results for LMICs and Model (3) for HICs. Here, de*variable 
corresponds to the within-effect, while variable*mean is the between-effect of each variable on FI. 
 
 
119 Also referred as hybrid model. 
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Table E.5: The relationship between poverty, income distribution and FI 
FI (1) FS (2) LMICs (3) HICs 
depov -0.33 -0.26 7.65* 
 (0.22) (0.19) (4.00) 
povmean 0.06 -0.13** 0.45 
 (0.10) (0.06) (3.58) 
degini -0.14 -0.01 -0.76 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.57) 
ginimean -0.58*** 0.17 -0.87 
 (0.16) (0.11) (0.62) 
decbint -0.06 -0.11 0.09 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.54) 
cbintmean -0.62*** 0.24 -0.17 
 (0.23) (0.17) (0.47) 
debcon 0.06 0.01 0.11 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.17) 
bconmean 0.06 -0.13** 0.17 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.15) 
deself -0.85*** -1.01*** 0.12 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.68) 
selfmean -0.85*** -0.28*** -0.75** 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.37) 
dework 0.55* 0.92*** 0.29 
 (0.29) (0.33) (0.48) 
workmean 0.73*** 0.22** 0.61 
 (0.13) (0.09) (0.38) 
Constant 47.53*** 21.75*** 63.06** 
 (10.90) (7.66) (26.02) 
Observations 371 256 115 
Number of cty 135 96 39 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To start, we notice that demeaned variables have low explanatory power (with exception of poverty 
in HICs, self-employment and work). This was expected as the low variation of variables within 
countries does not enable a proper measurement of such relationships. In sum, this suggests that 
HICs which had an increase in poverty levels also display higher levels of FI. Moreover, LMICs 
with increasing self-employment rates present lower levels of FI. 
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In turn, the mean values of each explanatory variable display more meaningful results. For 
instance, among LMICs, those with higher levels of poverty display lower levels of FI. Likewise, 










E.5 Instrument selection 





F-stat in first 
stage (𝑝𝑜𝑣) 
F-stat in first 
stage (𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞) 
1 𝑠𝑜𝑐, 𝑡𝑎𝑥, 𝑔𝑘𝑓, 𝑢𝑟𝑏, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑙𝑖𝑡, 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ, 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐 0.0000 3109.55 266.88 
2 𝑠𝑜𝑐, 𝑔𝑘𝑓, 𝑢𝑟𝑏, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑙𝑖𝑡, 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ, 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐 0.0000 4757.32 484.54 
3 𝑙𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 0.3089 8214.49 826.10 
4 𝑠𝑜𝑐, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 0.0000 9945.33 926.73 
5 𝑢𝑟𝑏, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 0.0021 10384.68 1003.37 
6 𝑢𝑟𝑏, 𝑠𝑜𝑐, 𝑙𝑖𝑡 0.6769 18.67 2.24 
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F-stat in first 
stage (𝑝𝑜𝑣) 
F-stat in first 
stage (𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞) 
1 𝑠𝑜𝑐, 𝑡𝑎𝑥, 𝑔𝑘𝑓, 𝑢𝑟𝑏, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑙𝑖𝑡, 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ, 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐 0.0013 1993.82 180.55 
2 𝑠𝑜𝑐, 𝑔𝑘𝑓, 𝑢𝑟𝑏, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑙𝑖𝑡, 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ, 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐 0.0004 3294.62 358.16 
3 𝑙𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 0.1270 6013.64 623.39 
4 𝑠𝑜𝑐, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 0.2014 5561.72 553.48 
5 𝑢𝑟𝑏, 𝑠𝑜𝑐, 𝑙𝑖𝑡 0.8505 1.24 11.96 
6 𝑢𝑟𝑏, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 0.9237 6067.82 634.78 

















F-stat in first 
stage (𝑝𝑜𝑣) 
F-stat in first 
stage (𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞) 
1 𝑠𝑜𝑐, 𝑡𝑎𝑥, 𝑔𝑘𝑓, 𝑢𝑟𝑏, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑙𝑖𝑡, 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ, 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐 0.4755 170.40 223.22 
2 𝑠𝑜𝑐, 𝑔𝑘𝑓, 𝑢𝑟𝑏, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑙𝑖𝑡, 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ, 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐 0.3658 199.12 276.22 
3 𝑙𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 0.4758 238.04 262.80 
4 𝑠𝑜𝑐, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 0.0185 220.04 218.45 
5 𝑢𝑟𝑏, 𝑠𝑜𝑐, 𝑙𝑖𝑡 0.8585 1.70 1.69 
6 𝑢𝑟𝑏, 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑡−1, 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 0.0109 229.22 218.04 
Note: In some of the estimations there was perfect collinerity with the time variables, so they had to be dropped in order to proceed with 






Table E.11: Instrument selection for financial inclusion (Eq. 6.2), FS 
Step Instruments 
Sargan test (joint 
validity) 
F-stat in first stage 
(𝐹𝐼) 
1 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘, 𝐹𝐼𝑡−3 0.0023 192.81 
2 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.0080 17.51 
3 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.5643 18.18 
4 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛 0.2329 17.90 
5 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.0075 18.92 
Note: In the first estimation there was perfect collinerity with the 2017 dummy variables, so it was 
dropped in order to proceed with the Sargan test. 
 
Table E.12: Instrument selection for financial inclusion (Eq. 6.2), LMICs 
Step Instruments 
Sargan test (joint 
validity) 
F-stat in first stage 
(𝐹𝐼) 
1 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘, 𝐹𝐼𝑡−3 0.0132 97.45 
2 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.2240 8.11 
3 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.0763 8.86 
4 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛 0.0193 8.83 
5 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.3774 9.24 
 
 
Table E.13: Instrument selection for financial inclusion (Eq. 6.2), HICs 
Step Instruments 
Sargan test (joint 
validity) 
F-stat in first stage 
(𝐹𝐼) 
1 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘, 𝐹𝐼𝑡−3 0.2833 11.37 
2 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.7222 1.38 
3 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.8167 1.37 
4 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛 0.4332 1.65 




Table E.14: Instrument selection for financial inclusion (Eq. 6.3), FS 
Step Instruments 
Sargan test (joint 
validity) 
F-stat in first stage 
(𝐹𝐼) 
1 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘, 𝐹𝐼𝑡−3 0.4697 376.28 
2 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.4141 75.13 
3 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.9492 83.56 
4 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛 0.8724 82.50 
5 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.1817 84.27 
6 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝐹𝐼𝑡−3 0.1307 467.02 
 




F-stat in first 
stage (𝐹𝐼) 
1 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘, 𝐹𝐼𝑡−3 0.1132 109.05 
2 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.4641 8.43 
3 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.3352 8.57 
4 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛 0.6915 8.95 
5 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.2200 9.07 
6 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝐹𝐼𝑡−3 0.0152 133.17 
 




F-stat in first 
stage (𝐹𝐼) 
1 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘, 𝐹𝐼𝑡−3 0.6904 64.46 
2 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.9475 9.53 
3 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.7325 10.84 
4 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑛 0.9573 10.87 
5 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.7368 10.87 
6 𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑡, 𝐹𝐼𝑡−3 0.2789 78.42 
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